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Abstract 
Introduction 
Empirical research has demonstrated that interpretation biases have a causal effect on 
levels of anxiety (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).   The dual process model of mood 
regulation (Forgas & Ciarocchi, 2002) however proposes that there would be an interaction 
between interpretation biases and anxiety. Within this model, clinical anxiety can be 
understood as a failure to evoke effortful, mood regulatory strategies.  No previous research 
has explored the interaction between interpretation biases and mood, in both high and low 
trait anxious individuals, within a dual process model framework.      
Experiment One 
Interpretation biases using the ambiguous scenario method, were measured following a 
positive mood induction in both high (n=17) and low (n=21) trait anxious participants, and 
subsequent effects on high and low positive affect were measured.  Both groups demonstrated 
a mood congruent response bias, however this did not serve to maintain changes in positive 
affect.  The theoretical implications of these findings and the limitations of the methodology 
are discussed.   
Experiment Two 
The findings of experiment one were extended upon, with interpretation biases being 
measured following an anxious mood induction, in high (n=15) and low (n=20) trait anxious 
participants.  Both high and low anxious participants demonstrated an increasingly mood 
incongruent interpretation bias over time.  There was some evidence of a more positive 
response bias amongst low trait anxious participants.  A subsequent decrease in negative 
affect was interpreted as evidence of mood decay rather than mood regulation.  The reported 
xviii 
 
results are discussed in relation to the dual process model and evidence for an interaction 
between interpretation biases and anxiety.   
General Discussion 
The results of this study provide evidence of the benefits of exploring cognitive biases 
within a dual process model framework.  The failure to find differences between high and 
low anxious participants is discussed in relation to methodological limitations with 
suggestions for areas of further research.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Summary of the Chapter 
In this chapter, two separate areas of research will be brought together to explore 
whether their respective findings could facilitate our understanding of the cognitive processes 
involved in the regulation of anxiety.  Research within clinical and cognitive psychology has 
contributed a great deal to our understanding of the processes involved in the regulation of 
anxiety and differences in the cognitive processes of anxious and non-anxious individuals.  In 
particular, a growing area of research has shown that the ways in which ambiguous 
information is interpreted differs between high and low anxious individuals (e.g. Butler & 
Mathews, 1983) and can be manipulated to produce congruent effects on anxiety (e.g. 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).  However, the causal relationship between anxiety and 
interpretation biases has yet to be fully explored, with further research needed to determine 
whether, as is suggested within models of mood regulation, there is an interaction between 
interpretation biases and anxiety, with each exerting influence over the other.  Models of 
mood regulation may provide a useful framework within which to explore the relationship 
between anxiety and interpretation biases, in particular the hedonistic (Larsen, 2000a), 
contextual (Erber & Erber, 2000) and dual-process models of mood regulation (Forgas, 
2000).  These models suggest that there would be an interaction between anxiety and 
interpretation biases, with anxiety influencing interpretations, which in turn influences 
anxiety.  Each of these three models suggest differing motivations for mood regulation, 
namely hedonistic concerns (i.e. to feel good), social and contextual factors or an interaction 
between intra- and inter-personal demands, respectively.  Although these models are 
primarily concerned with normal processes of mood regulation, there is evidence within the 
literature on depression in particular (e.g. Beevers, 2005), to suggest that these models could 
also be useful in exploring dysfunctional mood regulation.  There has been, at present, little 
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research exploring the interaction between anxiety and interpretation biases explicitly, taking 
account of the evidence from models of mood regulation.  Nor has there has been any 
research exploring how the mood regulatory effects of interpretation biases may differ 
between high and low anxious individuals.  This has important implications for the 
application of interpretation bias training to interventions for clinical anxiety, by further 
expanding our understanding of normal processes and how exactly these differ in anxious 
individuals, in order to develop more sophisticated and targeted interventions.   
In this chapter, a brief overview of the research into interpretation biases in anxiety 
is provided and some of the difficulties in inferring a causal relationship are discussed in 
relation to models of mood regulation.  These models of mood regulation are presented in 
turn in section 1.4, with conclusions as to how these models might facilitate an understanding 
of the relationship between anxiety and interpretation biases.  A more detailed review of the 
literature on interpretation biases is then provided, with particular gaps in the literature 
highlighted, which are central to determining whether interpretation bias is a mood regulatory 
strategy.  The clinical implications for this research are proposed, followed by the aims and 
specific research questions to be addressed in sections 1.9 to 1.11.   
1.2  Mood Regulation and Interpretation Biases 
An interpretation bias is the phenomenon observed when individuals presented with 
an ambiguous scenario, will tend to make either neutral or negative inferences about the 
meanings of that scenario.  For example, when a friend walks past you in the street without 
acknowledging you, you may interpret this as the friend just not seeing you (neutral 
interpretation) or that they were ignoring you (negative interpretation).   As will be discussed 
further in section 1.6, the available evidence demonstrates that interpretation biases of 
anxious individuals tend to be more negative than non-anxious individuals (e.g. Butler & 
Mathews, 1983).  In order to demonstrate the causal effects of interpretation biases on 
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anxiety, procedures have been developed to train either a positive or negative interpretation 
bias which have been shown to have congruent effects on levels of anxiety in non-anxious 
participants (e.g. Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).  These studies are grounded within 
cognitive theories of mood, which propose that it is the cognitive processes which lead to the 
change in mood (e.g. Beck, 1995).  However, models of mood regulation, suggest that there 
is a more complex relationship between cognitions and mood, with mood influencing 
cognitions, which in turn influence mood. This has yet to be explored within the research into 
interpretation biases and anxiety.  In drawing together these two, distinct areas of research, 
this chapter will begin within an overview of the three main models of mood regulation.   
1.3  Defining and Measuring Mood 
In understanding how moods are regulated, it is helpful to firstly establish a clear 
definition of what a mood is.  Often within the literature, the term is used interchangeably 
with emotion and affect. Although they are overlapping and related constructs, there are 
important differences with regards to the aetiologies, functions, with differing effects on 
cognition and behaviour and consequently, how they can be regulated. 
1.3.1 Distinguishing Moods from Emotions 
Parkinson, Totterdell, Briner and Reynolds (1996) and Beedie, Terry and Lane 
(2005) have provided comprehensive summaries of the literature in this area, outlining the 
defining features of a mood and how these, in particular, distinguish moods from emotions.     
Most frequently, moods are defined by their duration, with moods lasting much 
longer than emotions (e.g. Ekman, 1994; Nowlis, & Nowlis, 1956; Watson & Clark, 1994).  
Parkinson et al (1996) also distinguish moods and emotions according to the ‘time pattern’, 
with changes in mood being much more insidious and more gradual to change, whereas 
emotions have a clearer onset and offset pattern (Watson & Clark, 1994).   
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Moods are said to differ from emotions in regards to their ‘intentionality’ (e.g. 
Berkowitz, 2000; Bless & Schwartz, 1999; Ellis & Moore, 1999), which is similar to 
Parkinson et al’s (1996) ‘directedness’.  Both refer to the understanding that emotions are 
generally directed at a particular object, whereas moods are not.  Moods tend to be more 
general states that can affect behaviour and cognitions about many objects.  For example, 
anxiety caused by the presence of a spider, will lead to anxiety and behaviours directed 
towards the spider.  An anxious mood however, may have no definable cause and thus is not 
directed towards anything in particular, yet will influence most of behaviours, such as 
withdrawing from other people and activities.   
A further feature is that of ‘consequences’ referred to by Beedie et al (2005) which 
is also subsumed within Parkinson et al’s (1996) feature of ‘directedness’.  Some authors 
have reported that emotions will lead to changes in behaviour or ‘action-tendencies’ (Frijda, 
1986), whereas moods will lead to changes in cognitions and cognitive biases.  Moods and 
emotions are also said to differ by what causes them, with emotions generally having quite 
specific triggers, be they external or internal to the individual.  Moods on the other hand may 
be as a result of a series of events or triggers (e.g. Averill & Nunley, 1992; Elster, 1996).  For 
example, a series of minor criticisms or failures at work may accumulate in time to create a 
more general depressed mood.  The awareness of the causation of moods and emotions has 
been referred to also, with emotions seeming to have specific and salient causes, whereas the 
triggers for moods may be so many and relatively minor, so as to not enter conscious 
awareness (e.g. Clark & Isen, 1982; Isen, 1984; Zajonc, 1980).   
The function of moods and emotions is highlighted by both Parksinson et al (1996) 
and Beedie et al (2005).  Emotions serve the function of providing information about the 
world and environment around us, for example anxiety signals to us that it is dangerous and 
need to act accordingly.  Moods however, provide information about the self and thus will 
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bias cognitions, rather than behaviour (e.g. Clore, 1994; Morris, 1992).  As in the above 
example, a depressed mood from several failures at work, may provide information about the 
individual’s capabilities and bias their cognitions to create an attentional bias towards other 
failures at work.  Finally, there is also evidence regarding the physiological differences 
between emotions and moods, which are in line with the observed difference in regards to 
‘directedness’ (e.g. Ketai, 1975; Levenson, 1994).  Emotions tend to have fairly predictable 
physiological consequences, for example anxiety will trigger the ‘fight or flight’ response, 
with raised heart rate, blood pressure and respirations, for example.  Moods however, have no 
such discernable physiological changes associated with them.   
1.3.2 Structure of Mood 
Having reviewed the differences between moods and emotions, the question then 
arises as to the structure of moods.  Unlike emotions, which have clear onsets, facial 
expressions, behaviours and physiological consequences, moods are much more subtle and 
therefore harder to categorise.  There are a number of models of the structure of moods (e.g. 
Russell, 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Schlosberg, 1952), which are reviewed by 
Parksinon et al (1996).  It is generally agreed that mood varies along two dimensions, that of 
pleasantness- unpleasantness and high-low activation or arousal (Parkinson et al, 1996).  
From these two dimensions, circumplex models of affect have been developed, with affective 
states situated around the circumplex, depending on the degree of activation and pleasantness 
(e.g. Russell, 1980).  For example, fear can be regarded as an unpleasant mood with high 
activation whereas contentment is high in pleasantness and low in activation.  Watson and 
Tellegen (1985) refer to these dimensions as positive (PA) and negative (NA) affect, 
reflecting degrees of pleasantness and engagement with the environment.  The affective states 
are largely based on self-report and word-meanings and broadly give rise to eight categories, 
with examples shown in Table 1.1.   
6 
 
Table 1.1 
Categorisation of Affective Terms, Based on Watson and Tellegen’s (1985) Circumplex 
Model of Affective States 
 Negative 
Affect 
Pleasantness Positive Affect Engagement 
High  Fearful 
Nervous 
Happy 
Pleased 
Excited 
Peppy 
 
Astonished 
Surprised 
Low Calm 
Relaxed 
Lonely 
Sad 
Drowsy 
Sleepy 
Quiet 
Still  
 
1.3.3  Positive and Negative Affect: Related Constructs? 
It would seem that it would be perfectly possible to experience both positive and 
negative affect at the same time, for example the happy, excitement of starting a new job 
mixed with the fear and anxiety of what might be to come, suggesting some independence of 
the two constructs.  Such a suggestion is supported by fMRI studies, which have 
demonstrated that there are separate neural pathways for positive and negative affect 
(Davidson, 1998).  This is also important at the individual level, where it is claimed that there 
are tendencies to attend to either positive or negative affect, which roughly correspond to the 
personality traits of extraversion (attending to PA) and neuroticism (attending to NA; 
e.g.Eysenck, 1967; Larsen, 2000a; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989).  Other studies however, suggest 
that there are degrees of dependence, with high levels of positive or negative affect excluding 
any experience of the other, whereas in the context of milder moods, there may be elements 
of both positive and negative affect, as in the previous example (e.g. Diener & Emmons, 
1984; Diener & Iran-Nejad, 1986).   
The evidence suggesting that there is some independence of PA and NA, with 
individual differences as to the preference for attending to one or the other, may have 
important implications for considering how moods are regulated or dysregulated.  This will 
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be considered in more detail in the following section in relation to models of mood 
regulation.   
1.4  Models of Mood Regulation 
There are three main models of mood regulation: hedonistic, contextual and dual-
process models, each of which emphasise the importance of different motivations for 
regulating mood, namely hedonistic concerns (i.e. to feel good), contextual demands (i.e. 
according to the demands of the situation) or a combination of these and other concerns, as in 
the dual-process model.  Each of these models will be described below with consideration as 
to the evidence of each.   
1.4.1  Hedonistic Model of Mood Regulation 
1.4.1.1  Description of the Model 
Larsen (2000a) one of the main proponents of the hedonistic model, suggests that 
mood regulation is part of a modular process of self-regulation, whereby several self-
regulatory process occur in parallel, with mood being just one of these, and all of these 
modules are regulated by a ‘self-control executive function’ (see Figure 1.1).   
Larsen suggests that all of these modules are driven by the same basic hedonistic 
desire to increase pleasure and decrease pain.  Each of these modules will have both short- 
and long-term goals, which may be conflicting and there will be individual differences as to 
the relevance of each.  For example, with regards to regulation of eating, there may be a short 
term goal of pleasure from eating, which conflicts with the long term goal of health and 
weight loss, which may be of more or less relevance to the individual depending on a variety 
of factors, such as life stage for example.  The model proposes that for individuals there are 
certain set-points or goals for mood and individuals will be constantly comparing their 
current state with the desired state.  Where there are discrepancies, cognitive or behavioural 
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strategies will be employed to bring mood in line with the desired state.  Some of the 
responses may be automatic and some will be conscious and effortful.  There will also be 
individual differences as to how much discrepancy is tolerated before strategies are employed 
to regulate mood.   
Figure 1.1 
Diagrammatic Representation The Hedonistic Model Of Mood Regulation, Adapted from 
Larsen (2000b), pp. 221 
 
Although Larsen has not expanded particularly on the nature of these self-regulatory 
processes (in common with all of these proposed models), he does review the evidence in 
support of the main hypothesis of a hedonistic drive to maximise pleasure, with a particular 
focus on increasing pleasure rather than decreasing pain.   
1.4.1.2 Critical Review of the Evidence for a Hedonistic Model 
Larsen (2000b) refers to a number of other studies which suggest that most people, 
most of the time, will try to and in fact do, achieve a relatively positive mood.  Studies have 
suggested that most people, most of the time, feel pleasant (Myers & Diener, 1996).  Larsen 
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therefore concludes that their regulatory systems must be set to helping them achieve these 
‘pleasant’ states.  Also, most people report happiness to be their most important goal in life, 
which is consistently found across several different cultures (Diener, 2000).  Meyers (2000), 
in a large review paper, also reported for most people, their general mood state is ‘slightly 
positive’.  Larsen also cites several other studies which report that most people are happy and 
most people wish to be happy (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Diener & Diener, 1996; Watson, 
2000; Zelenski & Larsen, 2000).  This, it is argued, demonstrates that there is unlikely to be a 
regulatory system that would promote a ‘neutral’ or negative mood.  
In terms of individual differences which could lead to dysfunctions of mood 
regulation, Larsen (2000a) refers to research which suggests that the experience of positive 
and negative moods is not correlated, i.e. experiencing more pleasant affect, does not lead to 
experiencing less negative affect and proposes that disorders of mood regulation are due to 
lack of positive affect rather than too much negative affect.  For example, Davidson (1998) 
demonstrated the different hemispheric localisation of activation in the prefrontal cortex for 
positive and negative affect, suggesting two separate processes and pathways.  Research into 
the personality constructs of extraversion and neuroticism, suggests that in extraversion, 
mood regulation is focussed on increasing pleasure, whereas in neuroticism, mood regulation 
is focussed on decreasing pain, or negative affect (e.g. Depue, 1996; Zelenski & Larsen, 
1999).  Underlying both these processes is the hedonistic principle of increasing pain and 
decreasing pleasure, but with very differing outcomes for subjective well-being.   
On examination of the studies cited, the evidence for a bias towards positive affect is 
not quite as clear as Larsen seems to portray.  Cacioppo and Gardner (1999) studied the 
affective system from an evolutionary perspective.  The authors refer to a ‘positivity offset’, 
which is the tendency for a neutral or mildly positive evaluation of an unknown object and an 
‘approach tendency’ for which there are evolutionary advantages resulting in humans being 
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curious about and exploring their environment.  Cacioppo and Gardner also refer to a 
‘negativity bias’, whereby there is a heightened sensitivity and responsiveness to negative 
stimuli.  Although this study would seem to suggest that there are evolutionary advantages to 
being in a positive mood most of the time, there is also evidence for advantages to negative 
affect by being vigilant to threat and quick to respond with negative affect, which is not 
necessarily in line with a hedonistic model.   
Diener and Diener (1996) reviewed evidence from several large scale studies where 
individuals were asked to rate on a single Likert scale how happy or satisfied they were, from 
which the authors observed a slightly positive bias.  One could question how reliable such 
retrospective reports of general ‘happiness’ are, and in using just a single-item of ‘happiness’ 
to estimate general mood, there could be a bias in responses towards reporting happiness.  In 
a defence of using a single item of happiness in the aforementioned study, the authors 
reported that such measures do correlate highly with other measures of subjective well-being 
(SWB), on the assumption that being happy leads to greater SWB.  However, this then calls 
into question Larsen’s (2000a) proposal that there are individual differences in whether 
people are focussed on positive or negative affective states, as this study would imply that 
individuals are generally focussed on levels of positive affect.  It should also be noted that the 
positive bias was only ‘slight’, which without information about experiences of negative 
moods, could also be interpreted as people still spending a lot of their time in negative or 
neutral moods, which would also be counter to the hedonistic model’s principles.  Larsen, 
Diener and Emmons (1985) using a cross-sectional design, found that time spent being 
happy, across a number of different samples, was 65% at the most.  However, in drawing on 
this as evidence for a hedonic system of mood regulation, there is an oversight of the still 
significant amount of time spent in a negative or neutral mood (at least 35% of the time).   
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In a more recent study, Kuppens, Realo, and Diener (2008) observed that this 
relationship between positive affect and SWB was actually mediated by how individualistic 
the society was, with participants in individualistic societies being more sensitive to 
experiences of negative affect in relation to SWB, which would actually be supportive of the 
proposed differential focus on positive or negative affect.  The evidence from this study 
would also imply that the hedonistic principle is not universal and that social and cultural 
factors have an important influence over whether positive and negative moods are tolerated, 
accentuated or regulated.   
In looking to other experimental evidence in regards to this model, the evidence is 
overall not supportive of a purely hedonistic model.  According to this model, in an attempt 
to maintain a hedonic balance, positive moods should be maintained, leading to congruent 
cognition and behaviour, whereas negative moods should be regulated, leading to 
incongruent cognition and behaviour.  There is in fact a wealth of evidence within memory 
research which demonstrate mood congruent memory in both positive and negative moods 
(e.g. Bullington, 1990; Josephson, Singer, & Salovey, 1996; Reidy & Richards, 1997).  
Hepburn, Barnhofer, and Williams (2006) also demonstrated mood congruent effects for 
predicted valence of future events after both positive and negative mood inductions.  Mood 
congruent effects of negative moods have also been demonstrated for causal inferences and 
attribution (Forgas & Locke, 2005), social judgment (Mayer & Hanson, 1995) and learning 
(Rinck, Glowalla, & Schneider, 1992).  Some studies have found no effect of negative moods 
on cognition (e.g. Gayle, 1997; Levy & Mineka, 1998).   
There is also evidence that mood-congruent cognition and behaviour is mediated by 
numerous different individual differences, such as trait anxiety (Levy & Mineka, 1998), 
depression (Joormann & Siemer, 2004), extraversion/introversion (Tamir, 2009), attachment 
style (Pereg & Mikulincer, 2004), ‘self-complexity’ (Sakaki, 2004), self-esteem (Heimpel, 
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Wood, Marshall, & Brown, 2002; Smith & Petty, 1995), affect acknowledgement (i.e. 
repressors/sensitizers; McFarland & Buehler, 1997) and other personality characteristics 
(Rusting, 1999).   
Tice and Baumeister (1993) using self-reports, found that there are times when 
individuals will choose to get into a bad mood and get out of a good mood, contrary to the 
hedonistic model.  Tice and Bratslavsky (2000), in reviewing the evidence for motivators of 
mood regulation, report on at least six different types of mood regulation, which includes 
maintaining negative moods, and only three of these are hedonistic types.  The authors 
therefore suggest that whilst there are times where hedonistic goals will drive mood 
regulation, suggesting it may even be most of the time, there is also evidence for other goals 
of mood regulation, which should be incorporated into models of mood regulations.   
1.4.1.3 Summary 
In consideration of the evidence, it would appear that whilst hedonistic principles 
may drive mood regulation for some people, some of the time, to conclude that it is an over-
arching motivator is likely to be an oversimplification of a much more complex process and 
minimises the importance of social, contextual and individual factors in determining the goals 
of mood regulation, and therefore how and when mood is regulated.  In taking a quite 
opposing position, Erber and Erber (2000) describe a contextual model of mood regulation, 
where the goal of mood regulation is not mood itself, but rather to change behavioural and 
cognitive outcomes.   
1.4.2  Contextual Model of Mood Regulation 
1.4.2.1 Evidence Contrary to the Hedonistic Model 
Erber and Erber (2000) suggest that mood regulation is principally driven by social 
and contextual demands and the need to change our behaviour to meet these demands.  This 
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perspective seeks to account for the impact of different social pressures on mood regulation 
which is somewhat overlooked in the previous model.  The authors cite several studies which 
shed doubt on the hedonistic principle of mood regulation and provide supporting evidence 
for the importance of contextual factors.   
1.4.2.2 Critical Review of the Evidence for Social and Contextual Motivators 
Erber and Tesser (1992) demonstrated that when in a ‘sad’ mood, participants 
reported feeling less sad after 10 minutes of completing complex mathematical problems.  
However, for participants who were given a simple task or no task, the ‘sad’ mood was 
maintained after the 10 minutes.  If the hedonistic principle were correct, they argue, 
participants in the no task condition would also have regulated their own moods 
spontaneously.  Erber and Therriault (1994) reported similar findings, using physical exercise 
as a mood regulating strategy, where mood was regulated during a challenging exercise task 
and maintained during an easy exercise task.  These more challenging tasks, they argue, 
facilitate mood regulation by preventing participants from engaging in mood-congruent 
cognitive processes, as was believed to be the case in the other simple-task and no-task 
conditions.  Erber and Erber (2000) therefore suggest that the main motivator of mood 
regulation is not to change the mood, as the hedonistic model proposes, as if it were, all the 
participants in the above studies would have shown evidence of regulating a sad mood, 
whereas in the absence of demanding tasks, they maintained their mood throughout.   
Erber and Erber (2000) explored the effects of the social demands of a situation on 
motivating mood-regulation and they cite several studies exploring this; they refer to what 
they term the ‘coolness effect’.  For example, Erber, Wegner, and Therriault (1996) 
demonstrated that following a mood induction, participants chose mood-congruent tasks 
when they believed they would complete the tasks alone, whereas those believing they would 
complete the task with a stranger, chose mood-incongruent tasks, irrespective of whether the 
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induced mood was positive or negative.  This effect was also true when participants were led 
to believe the stranger was either ‘happy’ or ‘depressed’.  This would seem to suggest that in 
the presence of strangers, the tendency is to regulate towards a neutral mood – the ‘coolness 
effect’, which may have advantages in such social situations.  The authors suggest that our 
own mood state and the consequent cognitive effects, may interfere with social interactions 
and our own mood may seem inappropriate if we subsequently find the other in a contrasting 
mood state.  Therefore, it would seem to be most appropriate to attenuate our mood prior to 
such interactions.   
Commons and Erber (1997) demonstrated that there are differences in mood 
regulation when the anticipated interaction is with a stranger as opposed to a romantic 
partner.  As predicted, following positive or negative mood inductions, stranger-interactions 
led to the choice of mood incongruent tasks, whereas anticipated interactions with romantic 
partners, led to the choice of mood congruent tasks.  Further extending the hypothesis that 
social situations influence mood regulation, the authors also demonstrated the propensity 
towards mood regulation in the perceived presence of a critical other, and mood-maintenance 
in the perceived presence of an accepting other.  Mood-regulation is also mediated by the 
anticipated contextual demands of the situation, not only social.  For example, similar effects 
were found in anticipation of a cognitively demanding task (Erber & Erber, 1994) or where 
accuracy was required (Therriault, Erber, & Oktela, 1996).   
1.4.2.3  Summary  
The evidence for the contextual model of mood-regulation is definitely compelling 
and provides an insight into the contextual-motivational aspects of mood regulation.  
However, in considering the contextual motivators of mood regulation, there is an oversight 
as to how mood regulation might be affected by internal processes.  It would seem unlikely 
that a sad mood would be maintained indefinitely until social demands determined otherwise,  
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As suggested by Buss (2000), the common desire to be happy is a goal in and of itself, which 
suggests that mood could also be a motivator of mood regulation.  It would seem that there is 
therefore a need for a model which assumes a position between these two extremes and 
incorporates both the internal motivators of the hedonistic model and the social motivators of 
the contextual model.  Forgas (2000) has proposed such a model, referred to as the dual-
process model of mood regulation.   
1.4.3 Dual Process Model of Mood Regulation 
1.4.3.1  Description of the Model 
Forgas’s dual-process model of mood regulation (e.g. Forgas, 2000; Forgas & 
Ciarrochi, 2002) would appear to be a more sophisticated representation of mood regulation, 
incorporating ideas from both the above models.  The process of mood regulation is viewed 
as a homeostatic process, whereby mood can be attenuated or accentuated, consciously or 
unconsciously, in response to both internal and external demands.  Whilst the two previous 
models acknowledge that there will be individual differences in mood-regulation, these 
individual differences or ‘person features’ are clearly incorporated within this model.  A 
diagrammatic illustration of the dual-process model is presented in Figure 1.2.   
This model takes into account the situational and individual factors that will 
determine whether and how mood is regulated.  It also allows for the explanation of mood 
congruent and incongruent responses and processes, automatic and effortful processes and 
changes in mood congruency over time.   
This model proposes that initially, mood will result in automatic and effortless 
processing, that is congruent with the mood, in what they term substantive processing.  This 
is in line with associative network theories of memory (Bower, 1981), where the induced 
affect will automatically trigger similarly valenced cognitions, through network activation, 
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leading to mood congruent cognitive biases and thus promoting ‘affect infusion’, i.e. 
maintenance or amplification of the mood.  For example, when confronted with a belligerent 
colleague at work who causes us to experience anger at their behaviour, substantive 
processing will lead to the activation of congruent, negatively valenced memories of similar 
experiences, such as all the times we’ve had arguments with that colleague, which will 
maintain that negative mood or exacerbate it.  These processes are automatic, preconscious 
and effortless, resulting in mood congruent cognitions and behaviours and subsequently 
maintenance of the mood.   
Figure 1.2 
Illustration of Forgas and Ciarrochi’s (2002) Dual Process Model of Mood Regulation, pp. 
338 
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The second form of processing is the motivated processing strategy, which occurs 
temporally after substantive processing.  This is described as a more deliberate, effortful and 
slower process that serves to regulate mood and results in incongruent cognitions and 
behaviour.  As in the above example where we experience anger at a belligerent colleague, 
whilst initial substantive processing will lead to congruent biases, depending on a variety of 
internal and situational factors, it may not be desirable or appropriate to maintain that mood.  
For example, this difficult colleague may in fact be your boss and so motivated strategies 
would be employed to attenuate the negative mood, using mood-incongruent cognitive or 
behavioural strategies, such as focusing on the pay rise that will result if you can keep your 
cool.   
Why and when motivated processes are employed, will depend on a number of 
individual and situational factors, as summarised in Figure 1.2.  Forgas and Ciarocchi (2002) 
state that motivated processing is more likely when the task is of personal relevance (Forgas 
& Fiedler, 1996), if people are aware of the cause or consequence of the mood (Berkowitz, 
Jaffee, Jo, & Troccoli, 2000), certain individual differences (e.g.  Rusting, 2001) or if the 
mood is experienced as highly aversive. The intensity of the mood for example, may 
determine whether it is desirable to try to regulate it, or if it is so overwhelming that the 
cognitive resources may not be available to regulate the mood.  Motivated processing is 
effortful and so the individual will need to be motivated and have cognitive resources 
available to engage in this type of processing.  Situational and social factors will influence the 
individual’s motivation to regulate their mood.  For example whilst it may be perfectly 
acceptable to feel sad and cry with one’s romantic partner, such displays of mood and 
emotion, may not be appropriate in a meeting at work and so one is more likely to engage in 
motivated processing in the latter situation.   
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These processes are thought to operate within a homeostatic feedback loop, where 
mood is constantly kept in check and regulated in line with the demands of situational and 
internal factors.  Again using the belligerent colleague example, whilst recalling the time they 
fell over drunk at the Christmas party (motivated processing), may take the sting out their 
current behaviour, it may improve mood a little too much, which may also be inappropriate, 
if for example it led you to laughing at them.  Thus, mood will be constantly monitored and 
regulated through either substantive or motivated processes.  In terms of internal motivators, 
this model also proposes an internal thermostat for mood, where irrespective of external 
demands, if mood reaches levels that are intolerable for the individual, motivated processing 
may also be used to maintain mood within set limits.  These thresholds may differ for each 
individual and moods may be relatively more unchecked in the absence of external and social 
pressures.  Although this is a relatively new model of mood regulation, there is a growing 
body of evidence in support of it (e.g. Beevers, 2005), which will be reviewed below.  
1.4.3.2  Critical Review of the Evidence in Support of a Dual Process Model 
Forgas and Ciarrochi (2002) carried out a series of experiments whereby a happy, 
sad or neutral mood was induced in participants.  There then followed a sentence completion 
task, whereby participants were presented with an incomplete sentence consisting of a name 
followed by ‘is’, i.e. ‘Dan is…’ and were required to complete 120 sentences or continue 
until they ran out of descriptors.  Mood was measured pre and post mood induction and again 
following the sentence completion task.  The authors demonstrated that in both positive and 
negative mood conditions, there were congruent changes in mood following the mood 
induction, followed by a return to baseline after the sentence completion task.  In the analyses 
of the sentences, they demonstrated that in both happy and sad conditions, descriptors were 
initially congruent with mood but in the final sentences, descriptors were mood-incongruent, 
suggesting initially substantive processes followed by motivated processes, in order to 
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regulate mood.  In a second experiment the authors demonstrated the same effect in a word 
completion task, where participants were given the first letter and asked to generate 
adjectives.  In both experiments, participants in a neutral mood generated equal numbers of 
congruent and incongruent descriptors or words in both halves of the task.  In their final 
experiment, similar methods were used, although the measure of mood regulation was to 
generate as many self-descriptors as possible to complete the sentence ‘I am…’, a procedure 
which again demonstrated mood congruent, followed by incongruent self-statements.  The 
initial generation of congruent followed by incongruent statements, would indicate as is 
proposed by this model that following initially congruent strategies, motivated processing is 
elicited, which serves to regulate mood.   
In these experiments, it is possible that during the latter tasks, mood is decaying 
naturally and that cognitive processes are simply changing congruent to mood.  Alternatively, 
as discussed by Erber and Erber (2000), the cognitive demands of the task could simply be 
preventing mood congruent processes, rather than a change in congruent to incongruent.  The 
authors however argue that the pattern of change and such a significantly incongruent bias at 
the end of the task is unlikely to be the result of mood decay or distraction.  They also 
highlight that participants’ responses did not become gradually more incongruent over time, 
as mood decay or distraction would suggest, but that there was a sudden and significant 
change towards incongruence, which became more incongruent over time.   
In a study by Sedikides (1994), there was also a reported change in mood 
congruency over time.  After a mood induction procedure, where dysphoric, happy or neutral 
moods were induced, participants were asked to write self-descriptive essays.  As the dual 
process model would predict, self-descriptions were initially mood congruent, becoming 
increasingly incongruent over time.   
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Beevers (2005) has conducted a review of the literature into depression in relation to 
the dual process model.  It is proposed by Beevers, that individuals with depression have a 
cognitive bias towards negative associative processing information about the self (equivalent 
to Forgas’ construct of substantive processing).  Whilst motivated processing would normally 
overcome this negative bias, because of either the high cognitive load or negative associative 
processing, the cognitive resources are not available to correct it or motivated processing is 
inadequate to overcome the effects of the associative or substantive processing.  This leads to 
a downward spiral into depression, whereby negative associative processing, leads to 
activation of negative cognitions and deterioration in mood.  There is evidence within the 
literature, to support this model of vulnerability to depression, albeit not directly related to the 
dual process model.  For example, it has been demonstrated that negative mood can impair 
cognitive resources (Ellis, Moore, Varner, & Ottaway, 1997; Ellis, Ottaway, Varner, Becker, 
& Moore, 1997).  Teasdale (1988) has also demonstrated the spiralling feedback loop of 
cognition and mood, whereby mood reduces cognitive resources, which impairs motivated 
processing, substantive processing continues, leading to an increase in dysphoria and further 
depletion of cognitive resources.   
Also supporting a dual process model of depression, Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, 
and Whitney (2002) using a prospective design, demonstrated that performance on a sentence 
completion task under cognitive load, was a significant predictor of depressive symptoms 4-6 
weeks later.  This demonstrates the importance of having available cognitive resources in 
order to manage mood and stave off depressive symptoms.   
Haeffel et al. (2007), employing both cross-sectional and prospective designs were 
able to demonstrate the importance of substantive and motivated processing in predicting 
depressive symptoms following stressful life events.  In the first experiment, participants’ 
responses to a lab-based stressor were measured, to which their immediate affective 
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responses were best predicted by their substantive processing.  However, over a 5 week 
period, their response to stressors was best predicted by motivated processing styles.  These 
results also lend support to the dual-process model of vulnerability to depression, through the 
demonstration that those immediate, substantive processes predict immediate affective 
responses, whereas the slower, more effortful, motivated processes predict affect in the 
longer term, suggesting their importance in vulnerability to depression.  It also highlights the 
importance of individual differences in the ways in which mood is regulated.   
1.4.3.3  Summary 
Although the dual-process model provides a more comprehensive framework for 
understanding mood regulation, the number of potential factors influencing choice of 
processing strategy would make it particularly difficult to make predictions about the 
processing choice in any given situation, which is acknowledged by the authors (e.g. Forgas 
& Ciarocchi, 2002).  However, in looking to evidence from the hedonistic and contextual 
models, some insight into the differing intra-individual motivators and contextual factors 
which may influence mood regulation can be gained.   
1.4.4 Summary of Models of Mood Regulation 
In summary, there are three main models which seek to explain why moods are 
regulated.  The first, hedonistic model has much in common with the early cognitive theories, 
proposed by for example, Beck (1976) and Clark and Isen (1982), which suggest that 
negative moods will be regulated and positive moods maintained in a constant strive to 
increase pleasure and decrease pain.  However, the available evidence would suggest that 
mood regulation is more complex than simply trying to reduce negative affective states at all 
costs, with several studies showing maintenance of negative moods through mood congruent 
processes.  As discussed, the evidence used to support these models has been reported in a 
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slightly biased way, with the minimisation of the evidence which suggests that people also 
spend a significant proportion of the time in a negative mood, the evolutionary advantages of 
negative mood and the influence of social and contextual factors.  The contextual model of 
mood regulation, refuting that mood regulation is motivated by mood and internal factors, 
demonstrates the significant effect of social and contextual factors on mood regulatory 
strategies.  In bringing together these two perspectives and trying to account for the more 
subtle regulation of mood that occurs outside of conscious awareness, the dual process model 
does provide a more comprehensive framework from which to explore both normal and 
disordered mood regulation and has been applied to models of depression (e.g. Beevers, 
2005) and grief (Stroebe & Schut, 1999) with growing evidence of its utility.   
In the following section, the specific application of a dual-process model of mood 
regulation to an understanding of the interaction between anxiety and interpretation biases, 
with consideration of hedonistic and contextual concerns, will be explored, along with a 
discussion as to whether there is any empirical evidence at present which would refute or 
lend support to a dual process model of anxiety regulation.   
1.5  Mood Regulatory Effects of Interpretation Biases According to a Dual Process Model 
According to the dual process model, if, as is hypothesised, interpretation biases are 
a cognitive strategy employed to regulate an anxious mood, the following observations 
should be made.  When in an anxious mood, interpretation biases should be initially 
congruent with the mood.  If motivated, and with the necessary cognitive resources available, 
individuals should then switch to incongruent interpretation biases, leading to mood 
regulation and a reduction in anxiety.  This latter effect has been widely researched, with 
changes in interpretation biases, leading to changes in anxiety.  This suggests that 
interpretation biases may serve to regulate mood, as discussed further below.  However, as 
23 
 
discussed in section 1.6.4, further research is still needed to determine the causality, and 
whether there is in fact an interaction, as proposed by the dual process model.   
1.6  Interpretation Biases 
1.6.1  Interpretation Biases in Clinical Populations   
Much of the research into interpretation biases within clinical populations has 
focused on anxiety and anxious interpretations.  Beck (1976) first suggested that anxious 
individuals were more likely to interpret ambiguous information in a threatening manner and 
subsequent research has supported this hypothesis (e.g. Butler & Mathews, 1983; Clark et al., 
1997; Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, & Swindell, 1993; McNally & Foa, 1987; Stopa & Clark, 
2000).  This finding has important implications with the hypothesis that it is these biased 
interpretations that lead to the experience of anxiety and should therefore, be the target of 
interventions.  However, these observations do not imply causality and so further empirical 
studies were required to explore this relationship between anxiety and interpretation biases.   
1.6.2  Experimental Research into Interpretation Biases 
1.6.2.1 Measures in Interpretation Biases   
In order to measure interpretation biases, and investigate them within experimental 
settings, a range of methods has been devised to provide quantitative evidence for biased 
interpretations.  One particular method that is often used is the homophone task.  
Homophones are two words that have two different spellings and meanings, but when 
spoken, sound the same, for example, ‘die’ and ‘dye’.  In this method, participants are 
presented with the word auditorily and are asked to write it down, revealing whether they 
have made a neutral (dye) or threat (die) interpretation (e.g. Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1987; Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989).  Another variation of the basic homophone 
method, involves asking participants to make sentences using the homophones to reveal the 
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interpretation they have of the word (Richards, Reynolds, & French, 1993).  In these cited 
studies, it has been shown that anxious individuals are more likely to select the negative 
meaning than the non-anxious controls.   
Similar findings have also been reported using the homograph method (e.g. Richards 
& French, 1992).  A homograph is a word that has two differing meanings depending on the 
context, for example the word ‘rose’ could refer to the noun meaning a flower or the 
adjective as in ‘she rose up from her chair’.  Homographs can be used to measure 
interpretation biases with the use of those that have both a neutral and threat related meaning.  
For example ‘batter’ could refer to the noun, as in ‘batter for pancakes’ or to the verb as in to 
‘batter somebody’.  Richards and French (1992) presented homographs as a single priming 
word, followed by a lexical decision task, whereby participants were asked to decide whether 
a letter-string was a real or nonsense word.  The real, target words were related to either the 
threat or neutral interpretation of the homograph.  For example ‘batter’, could be followed by 
the word ‘pancake’ (neutral) or ‘assault’ (threat).  Individual’s interpretation biases could 
then be inferred by the speed with which they made the lexical decision for threat versus 
neutral interpretations.  In this study, as would be predicted, anxious participants 
demonstrated a bias towards the anxious interpretations whereas the non-anxious participants 
had a bias towards the neutral meanings.   
The homograph and homophone methods are not always the most ideal methods for 
measuring interpretation biases as there are a limited number of homographs and 
homophones within the English language and even fewer with both a neutral and a 
threatening interpretation.  It is also the case that those with both threat/neutral meanings tend 
to pertain only to threats to the physical self rather than social/ego threats.  This is an 
important factor given that although some individuals may be anxious about physical threats, 
as in panic (Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986) and health anxiety (e.g. Warwick & 
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Salkovkis, 1990); for many it is socially threatening situations that cause the greatest anxiety, 
as in social anxiety (e.g. Halford & Foddy, 1982; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982).    
To allow for more control over the types of threat pertained to, more sophisticated 
methods were devised using ambiguous scenarios or sentences.  For example, MacLeod and 
Cohen (1993) presented participants with ambiguous sentences, followed by disambiguating 
sentences which gave either a positive or negative resolution to the sentence.  The authors 
found that anxious participants had much quicker reading times for the negative than the 
neutral interpretation.  The ambiguous sentence procedure has been replicated several times 
and has been shown to be a robust measure of interpretation biases in anxiety (Calvo & 
Castillo, 1997; Calvo, Eysenck, & Castillo, 1997; Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; Eysenck, Mogg, 
May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991).   
Despite the strong evidence of negative interpretation biases amongst anxious 
populations, these studies do not demonstrate whether these biases are causal in the 
development or maintenance of anxiety, are as a direct result of being anxious or as suggested 
by the dual process model, an interaction between both.  
1.6.2.2 Training Interpretation Biases  
Grey and Mathews (2000) demonstrated that interpretation biases could be trained 
within experimental settings and later this was extended upon by Mathews and Mackintosh 
(2000) using more realistic methods of training biases, i.e. the ambiguous scenario method.  
In a series of experiments by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000), participants were assigned to 
either the positive or negative bias training condition.  In order to train an anxious or neutral 
interpretation bias, both groups were presented with several ambiguous scenarios with the 
last word left as a fragment for the participants to complete.  The word fragment had only one 
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solution which gave either a positive or negative resolution to the scenario, depending on the 
assigned condition.  For example:  
Your partner asks you to go to an anniversary dinner that their company is 
holding.  You have not met any of their work colleagues before.  Getting ready 
to go, you think that new people you will meet will find you (boring/friendly).   
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000), pp.604. 
Participants were given equal numbers of physical and social threat scenarios to 
control for this as a potential confounding variable.  Participants were presented with 64 such 
scenarios, with either a positive or negative outcome, depending on the condition they were 
assigned to (i.e. positive or negative).  Following the training for interpretation biases, all 
participants were then tested for interpretation of novel stimuli, using the sentence 
recognition task.  This involved the presentation of ambiguous scenarios as in the training, 
although the word fragment this time did not disambiguate the scenario.  Participants were 
then asked to answer a comprehension question about the scenario, in order to ensure active 
processing and encoding of the scenario.  For example: 
The Local Club 
You are invited for a night out at a local club, although you don’t know any of the 
members very well.  As you approach the door you can hear loud music and noisy 
conversation, but as you enter the room it is quiet for a 
m_m_nt (moment) 
Do you know most of the club members? 
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000), pp. 604. 
27 
 
After reading 20 different scenarios, participants were given a recognition task, 
based on the 20 ambiguous test items.  For each scenario, participants were shown four 
different sentences and were asked to rate how similar in meaning the sentences were to the 
original scenarios on a scale of 1-4.  These four sentences included a positive and a negative 
foil that were unrelated to the original meaning and a positive and a negative target that were 
similar to the original in meaning.  Below are examples of these sentences, which relate to the 
above scenario.  Participants with a negative interpretation bias would be expected to rate the 
negative targets as more similar and those with a positive interpretation bias, to rate the 
positive targets as more similar in meaning.  Through the inclusion of both target and foil 
items, it enabled the authors to rule out the possibility that they were observing a response 
bias (high recognition of both congruent target and foil items) and that it was a genuine 
interpretation bias (higher recognition of congruent target items only).   
Negative Foil As you enter the room someone asks you why you are there. 
Negative Target As you enter the room everyone stops and stares at you. 
Positive Foil As you enter the room someone greets you warmly. 
Positive Target As you enter the room the music stops for a moment. 
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000), pp. 604. 
The authors demonstrated that the training phase led to congruent changes in 
interpretation biases of novel stimuli in the testing phase.  There was also some evidence for 
congruent changes in mood, with participants in the negative condition significantly 
increasing in anxiety but no significant reduction in anxiety in the positive condition.  The 
authors also reported on a comparison with a neutral-mood control condition, the results of 
which suggested that positive training led to reduced recognition of negative items and 
negative training led to reduced recognition of positive items.   
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A possible interpretation of these results was that the training procedure itself had 
direct effects on mood, which due to mood-congruent network activation (Bower, 1981) led 
to congruent recall on the test items.  However, Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) reported on 
a further experiment employing a longer delay between training and interpretation tests to 
ensure the decay of any potentially induced moods, thus demonstrating that in the absence of 
a change in mood, there were still congruent changes in interpretation biases, significantly so 
for the negative condition.  This would suggest that a change in mood is not necessary for a 
change in interpretation biases, which strengthens the evidence for interpretation biases 
having a causal effect on anxiety.  This also suggests that biased interpretations occur at the 
time of encoding the ambiguous scenarios, rather than at the recall stage, which causes the 
change in mood, rather than mood changing the interpretation biases.   
This experimental training procedure has been replicated and extended upon several 
times by Mathews and colleagues.  It has been demonstrated that essential to the change in 
anxiety as well as interpretation biases is the active generation of interpretations in the 
training, through completion of the word fragments (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Mathews 
& Mackintosh, 2000).  The effects of the training on tests of interpretation biases have been 
shown to endure across time and contexts (Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 
2006; Yiend, Mackintosh, & Mathews, 2005).  Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, and Rutherford 
(2006) also demonstrated the effects of interpretation bias modification on the vulnerability to 
stressors in an experimental design, where negative bias training led to increased emotional 
reactivity to a stressful video. This would seem to support the argument for a causal role of 
interpretation biases on anxiety.   
The experimental paradigm has been further developed to explore whether positive 
interpretation biases could be trained in clinically or high anxious participants, and what 
effects this has on anxiety levels.  Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, and Yiend (2007) trained high 
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anxious participants over four sessions, in a positive bias, with the results demonstrating a 
more positive interpretation bias of novel stimuli and a reduction in trait anxiety as compared 
to an untrained control group.  Murphy, Hirsch, Mathews, Smith, and Clark (2007) used the 
training procedure with socially anxious participants, with effects seen on interpretation 
biases following training, but the effect on anxiety was not replicated.  The effects on mood 
were found to be enhanced when imagery was used as opposed to verbal processing of the 
training material (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006).  A later study, which 
employed positive feedback for benign interpretations in a group of socially anxious 
individuals in an 8-week training programme, successfully demonstrated a more positive bias 
and a reduction in social anxiety, as compared to a control group (Beard & Amir, 2008).   
1.6.2.3  Summary of the Effects of Interpretation Biases on Anxiety  
The evidence for interpretation biases having a causal effect on anxiety vulnerability 
is very compelling and the above findings show a robust and consistent phenomenon.  In 
summary, the findings demonstrate that high anxious individuals have a significantly more 
negative interpretation bias than low anxious individuals.  Both negative and positive 
interpretation biases can be trained in non-anxious participants, which generalise to novel 
stimuli and have congruent effects on anxiety.  Clinically anxious participants can also be 
trained in a more neutral interpretation, with mixed findings as to the effects on anxiety, 
although the research is still in the early stages.   
1.6.3  Inferring Causality of Interpretation Biases in Anxiety 
There are still some unexplored areas which are important to investigate before 
concluding that interpretation biases have a causal effect on anxiety as there are some 
particular methodological issues with the training and testing of interpretation biases.  Due to 
the nature of the tests of interpretation bias used, it is not possible to establish whether biases 
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have changed over time, as it is not possible to repeat these tests within the same experiment, 
due to practice effects.  However, given the robust findings comparing positive, negative and 
neutral training, this is perhaps less of a concern.  Although the evidence would seem to 
suggest otherwise, it cannot be ruled out that the training procedures are actually influencing 
anxiety which in turn has a congruent effect on interpretation biases through the activation of 
congruent cognitive processes.  It would seem fairly plausible that reading 64 statements 
about personally relevant, embarrassing or threatening situations, could leave people feeling 
rather more anxious, which may in turn, influence how they interpret new information.   
Within the literature reviewed thus far, there still remains some question as to the 
nature of the causal relationship between anxiety and interpretation biases, of which there are 
three main possibilities to be considered.  As is suggested above, interpretation biases could 
be causal in creating anxiety, which would imply that the training procedures only affect the 
interpretation biases of new stimuli, which then leads to a change in anxiety.  Another 
plausible hypothesis could be that anxiety has a causal effect on interpretation biases, in 
which case the training directly affects anxiety and interpretation biases change as a result.  
However, Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) argue against this explanation, given that biases 
were still observed long after any effects on anxiety had decayed.  Alternatively and 
theoretically in line with the dual process model, there still remains the possibility of an 
interaction between anxiety and interpretation biases, whereby anxiety leads to more anxious 
interpretations, which then leads to an increase in anxiety.   
1.6.4   Evidence of the Causal Effects of Anxiety on Interpretation Biases    
In order to explore the hypothesis that there is an interaction between anxiety and 
interpretation biases, having already examined the evidence for the effect of biases on 
anxiety, a further review was conducted to explore what effects anxiety has on interpretation 
biases.  Relatively few studies were identified that had attempted to explore the effect of 
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induced mood on interpretation biases.  Those that were found to be of relevance are 
reviewed below.   
Calvo, Eysenck, and Castillo (1997) exposed high and low test-anxious participants 
to an evaluative stress procedure, where participants were told that their performance in the 
experiment would be evaluated against other students and would provide a measure of 
intelligence and academic success.  Using a variation of the ambiguous scenario method, 
participants were presented with ambiguous scenarios pertaining to physical-, ego- or no-
threat situations, followed by a disambiguating sentence, which either confirmed or 
disconfirmed the threat interpretation.  Under evaluative stress conditions, high trait anxious 
participants showed slowed reading of the disconfirming sentences and faster reading of the 
confirming sentences for the ego-threat items only, as compared to the low trait anxious 
participants.  This suggests that induced anxiety does have an effect on interpretation biases, 
with high anxious participants showing a mood-congruent bias.  Through an analysis of the 
time-course of these biases, the authors also demonstrated that the bias occurs ‘on-line’ in the 
processing stage, rather than at retrieval.  It was also observed that the interpretation biases 
were not automatic, as with attentional biases, but seemed to occur during post-lexical 
selection or during elaboration of the threat meaning.   
Expanding upon the above study, Calvo and Castillo (1997) examined the 
differences in interpretation biases among high and low trait anxious participants under 
stressful and neutral conditions.  The authors found that interpretation biases were only 
evident in the high anxious participants in the stressful condition, suggesting these biases 
were only activated temporarily when anxiety was induced.  The authors also showed the 
temporal sequence of biases, whereby initially all meanings are activated (i.e. no bias is 
present) and only after a delay of 1,250 milliseconds are biased interpretations selected.   
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In both Calvo et al. (1997) and Calvo and Castillo’s (1997) studies, it was 
demonstrated that there is an effect of induced anxiety on the interpretation biases of high 
anxious participants under stressful conditions.  Contrary to the hypothesis that interpretation 
biases are a mood regulating strategy, there was no evidence of an incongruent interpretation 
bias, as would be expected according to the dual process model.  However, it is difficult to 
interpret from the results what effects were observed on anxiety levels at any stage in the 
procedure, thereby making any conclusions regarding mood regulation more difficult.  
Firstly, because the test for biases was also the method for inducing anxiety (on the pretence 
that it was a measure of intelligence), anxiety was only measured prior to the procedure and 
at the end.  Therefore, it is not known whether the differential effects on the latter anxiety 
measures were as a result of mood induction or the regulatory effects of interpretation biases.  
Therefore, the observation of no interpretation biases in the low anxious group is potentially 
because they did not experience any increase in anxiety, therefore had no reason to employ 
regulatory strategies.  Alternatively, as changes in interpretation biases were not measured as 
a function of time, it could, as suggested by the dual process model, be that biases were 
initially congruent with an increase in anxiety, changing to incongruent and subsequently 
reducing anxiety levels, which if the case, such effects would have been lost in the analysis.   
Davey, Bickerstaffe, and MacDonald (2006) induced a range of emotions (disgust, 
anxiety, happy, neutral) in a student population and measured subsequent interpretation 
biases using the homophone-spelling method.  Mood was induced by presenting imagery 
vignettes simultaneous to mood congruent music.  The authors observed a mood congruent 
interpretation bias, with participants in the anxious and disgust conditions interpreting 
significantly more ambiguous homophones as threat related, as compared to participants in 
the neutral and happy conditions.   This suggests that an induced negative mood led to mood 
congruent interpretation biases, with no effects seen for positive moods.  As in the previous 
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studies, the effect of time on interpretation biases was not measured, therefore any changes 
occurring over time, would have been lost in the analysis, resulting in an apparent neutral 
interpretation bias.  Unfortunately, the authors also did not measure final mood following the 
test for interpretation biases, therefore it is not possible to ascertain what effect the 
interpretations biases had on subsequent mood, i.e. did the negative interpretation bias serve 
to maintain the negative mood.  This study does however, provide evidence that induced 
moods do have an effect on interpretation biases, which would warrant further research.   
Using a related experimental paradigm, Blanchette and Richards (2003) examined 
the hypothesis that contextual cues may influence interpretation biases in an induced anxious 
state.  Participants rated their pre-task emotional state, and were then allocated to either the 
anxious or control condition.  In the anxious condition, participants were told that their 
performance was being video-taped whilst they completed the homophone-spelling task.  In 
the non-anxious condition, participants were just asked to complete the homophone-spelling 
task.  Whilst completing the homophone spelling task, participants were presented with a 
contextual cue on a computer screen, for example the threat/neutral homophone ‘Die/Dye’ 
was presented with either ‘Death’ (threat cue) or ‘Hair’ (neutral cue). On completion of the 
spelling task, participants again rated their current mood before completing a recognition task 
for the contextual cues.  The authors reported that there was no effect of anxiety on mood 
congruent or incongruent interpretation biases.  What the authors did observe was that 
induced anxiety led to increased reliance on the contextual cue when presented both 
supraliminally and subliminally.  Blanchette, Richards, and Cross (2007) replicated these 
findings using ambiguous facial expressions as a test for interpretation biases.  The results 
from these experiments provide an interesting, added dimension to the interpretation bias 
literature with the addition of contextual cues.  However, in terms of the particular questions 
posed here as to the direction of the relationship between anxiety and interpretation biases, it 
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does somewhat confuse the matter.  It is possible that reliance on the contextual cues, was as 
a result of an attentional bias.  It has been established that heightened anxiety leads to an 
attentional bias (e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 2002), which may be what is observed here with 
the contextual cues.  As attentional biases are automatic, whereas interpretation biases are 
selected (Calvo & Castillo, 1997), it is quite possible that in these studies what is actually 
observed is the preferential reliance on attentional biases over interpretation biases in a 
threatening situation.  It may also be the case that the particular mood induction procedure 
employed may have led to an increased desire for participants to try and get the task ‘right’, 
as they were being videoed, which led to an increased reliance on contextual cues.  In these 
studies, therefore it is difficult to ascertain the how much of the observed differences are due 
to attentional biases and it cannot be concluded that mood does or does not have an affect on 
interpretation biases.     
Salemink, van den Hout, and Kindt (2007a) conducted an experiment with the 
specific aim of establishing the causal relationship between anxiety and interpretation biases. 
However, the authors appear to have essentially replicated the studies by Mathews and 
Mackintosh (2000), by training interpretation biases and then measuring interpretation bias of 
novel stimuli and changes in anxiety.  The authors reported a non-significant congruent 
change in anxiety levels.  The authors did include one modification to the procedure in that 
they asked participants whether they were aware of the valence of the training phase, which it 
appears they were, although this finding has not been reported in previous studies (Mathews 
& Mackintosh, 2000).  In their analysis it suggests that the relationship between the test for 
interpretation bias and training is partially mediated by explicit awareness of the valence of 
the training.  However, this might not necessarily imply that they were aware of being primed 
to respond in particular ways in the testing phase, as this was not explicitly measured.   
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Extending on the results of the above studies, Salemink, van den Hout, and Kindt 
(2007b), questioned whether due to the methods of training and testing of interpretation 
biases being very similar, participants were learning a method-dependent strategy, i.e. were 
being trained to respond to the ambiguous scenarios in a particularly valenced way.  For this 
reason, they assessed interpretation biases using less direct methods: the extrinsic affective 
Simon task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003) and the Ambiguous Social Situations Interpretations 
Questionnaire (ASSIQ: Stopa & Clark, 2000).  Whilst they showed that the training had an 
effect on state and trait anxiety, they failed to fully replicate the findings on tests for 
interpretation biases.  In a post-hoc power calculation, the authors found that their sample 
lacked sufficient power and suggested that the EAST may not have been a sensitive enough 
measure of interpretation biases.  The ASSIQ was designed to measure differences between 
clinical and non-clinical populations, which again may account for why it was not sensitive 
enough for use with a normal population.  In these two studies, although the authors had 
attempted to explore whether interpretation biases were causal in changes in anxiety, there is 
little additional evidence for either possible explanation beyond that which had already been 
established in previous studies, such as by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000).  The effect on 
mood as a result of the stress-inducing procedure was mentioned only briefly, suggesting that 
high trait anxious participants were more anxious after the mood-induction than the low-trait 
anxious participants.  Due to the ambiguity of how the mood data is reported, it is not 
possible to draw any conclusions as to the effect of mood on interpretation biases.     
1.6.4.1 Summary of the Evidence 
In summary, there is limited evidence for the causal effects of anxiety on 
interpretation biases and no evidence for the subsequent effects on anxiety.  It has been 
shown that high anxious individuals have a more negative interpretation bias than low 
anxious individuals.  There is also evidence to suggest that these biases are only activated 
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under stress and are not as a result of an automatic process, i.e. threatening interpretations are 
selected rather than automatically activated.  In one study, it has been shown that induced 
mood has a congruent effect on interpretation biases, although how mood is then affected as a 
result of these biases, was not measured.  In none of these studies, has the variable of time 
been included in the analyses of interpretation biases subsequent to mood induction, which is 
particularly relevant to the dual process model.  Through analysing the bias data without time 
as a variable, some important differences or changes in biases over time could have been 
overlooked.  As the specific interaction between anxiety, interpretation biases and subsequent 
effects on anxiety, proposed by the dual process model, has yet to be explored, there remains 
a large gap in the literature.   
1.6.5 Exploring the Interaction between Interpretation Biases and Anxiety 
In an attempt to overcome some of the difficulties with establishing the causal 
relationship between anxiety and interpretation biases, some preliminary and as yet 
unpublished undergraduate studies have begun to explore the relationship further (personal 
communication, B.Mackintosh, October 2007).  In three separate studies, non-clinical, non-
anxious, participants were exposed to either a positive or negative mood induction, followed 
by the ambiguous scenario test for interpretation biases (Hunter, Mackintosh, & Eckstein, 
2006; Vinnicombe, Mackintosh, & Eckstein, 2006) or the homograph interpretation bias test 
(Segal, Parry, Hoppitt, & Mackintosh, 2006).  In each of these studies, a mood incongruent 
response bias was observed in the negative mood condition, with no effects observed for the 
positive mood condition.  The effect on mood was also particularly interesting when 
comparisons were made of the mood ratings at three points during the procedure: pre and 
post mood induction and post-interpretation bias testing.  The authors reported a congruent 
effect on mood following the mood-induction, followed by a return to baseline mood rating 
in both conditions.   
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Although in these studies, there was no evidence for an interpretation bias after 
induced mood, there are some methodological issues which may have affected the results 
reported.  Participants were exposed to ‘mood inducing music’ throughout the test for 
interpretation biases in order to maintain the mood induced by the film, which may have 
simply been distracting, as was indeed reported by their participants.  It may also have been 
the case that although music is known to be effective in inducing moods (e.g. Bruner, 1990), 
which music for which mood is thought to be due to personal tastes and conditioning 
(Crozier, 1997).  Therefore, the music potentially could have had incongruent effects on 
mood and thus the effect on interpretation biases.  In exploring these effects with a dual 
process model framework, it would be anticipated that any effects seen, may change over 
time, therefore these effects may have been lost in the study, without the inclusion of time as 
a variable.  Finally, it is also expected that participants high in trait anxiety, would respond 
differently to those low in anxiety, therefore by not separating the groups accordingly any 
effects may have been lost.  Therefore, from the results of these preliminary studies it cannot 
be determined whether the results are supportive or not of the dual process model and the 
hypothesised interaction between anxiety and interpretation biases.   
1.7  Clinical Relevance of Research 
Current research into interpretation biases and mood regulation models has already 
proven to be of clinical importance, which it is hoped could be further enhanced through 
combining the two areas in future studies and promoting our understanding of how anxiety 
disorders are maintained.  The finding that interpretation biases can be manipulated to 
produce congruent effects on anxiety, has led to the development of interventions for use 
within clinical populations, namely cognitive bias modification (CBM; e.g. Mathews et al., 
2007; Beard & Amir, 2008), which is proving to be a promising intervention.  Through the 
repeated exposure of clinically anxious individuals to neutral interpretations of ambiguous 
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scenarios, individuals have gone on to demonstrate more neutral interpretations with a 
subsequent reduction in anxiety.   
Models of mood regulation have also provided a framework within which to 
understand normal processes of mood regulation and how exactly these processes go awry 
and lead to the development of mood disorders.  For example, in the application of the dual 
process model to depression, this has provided a framework within which to understand how 
difficulties in disengaging from substantive processing exaggerates the negative mood, which 
in turn reduces the cognitive resources available to regulate mood, leading to a downward 
spiral of depression (Beevers, 2005).  If this model could also be applied to anxiety, then this 
could provide an understanding of how the particular processes could make an individual 
more vulnerable to anxiety, with more targeted interventions to prevent or break this 
downward spiral.  Such research should be able to demonstrate the differences in mood 
regulation between clinically and non-clinically anxious individuals, in order to explore how 
the process differs between individuals and if it is indeed a failure to evoke motivated 
processing strategies.  If it can be shown that the process of interpretation biases is a mood 
regulatory strategy that changes over time from congruent to incongruent, with subsequent 
changes in anxiety then this would lend further support to the use of CBM in clinical 
populations.  In understanding how the process breaks down in anxious individuals, for 
example if it is only when under stress or it is a general difficulty with mood regulation, then 
more targeted CBM interventions could be developed to increase the generalisability of the 
intervention.   
1.8  Summary of Areas for Further Research 
In order to begin to explore whether interpretation biases may be a mood regulatory 
strategy employed to reduce an anxious mood and whether high anxious participants fail to 
engage in motivated processing in order to regulate their mood, within a dual process model 
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framework, further research is required in this area.  Such research, extending the findings of 
the undergraduate studies, should involve the induction of an anxious mood, in both high and 
low anxious participants, with measures of interpretation biases recorded as a function of 
time to gauge whether low anxious participants do show a change from substantive to 
motivated processing and how this differs from the responses of high anxious participants.  
Measures of mood should also be taken at baseline, following mood induction and finally 
following tests for interpretation biases, to explore what, if any, effect the biases have on 
mood.   
As discussed in relation to the conflicting findings of the hedonistic and contextual 
models, it may be that the motives of mood regulation could differ as a result of internal 
factors or social factors.  The dual process model acknowledges that it can be difficult to 
predict which factor will drive mood regulation and in which direction (Forgas & Ciarrochi, 
2002).  Therefore, consideration needs to be given to controlling for the contextual demands 
of the situation, in order to be able to drawn conclusions as to what might motivate 
participants to regulate mood.  This may be achieved though the inclusion of a positive mood 
condition, in addition to an anxious mood condition.  If, as the hedonistic model suggests, 
internal, hedonistic concerns will motivate mood regulation, then it should be observed that 
mood maintaining strategies are employed in a positive mood, whereas mood regulatory 
strategies should be employed in the negative mood condition.  However, if as the contextual 
model suggests, contextual demands will determine whether mood is regulated or maintained 
then it should be that no differences in regulation are observed between the positive and 
negative conditions.  For example, if the task is perceived as easy, mood should be 
maintained, where as if it is challenging, mood should be regulated, irrespective of whether 
an anxious or positive mood was induced.  In also considering Larsen’s (2000a) proposal that 
there are separate pathways for positive and negative affect, and disorders of mood regulation 
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are as a result of a focus on the negative pathways, it would also be interesting to observe 
whether there are differences in the responses of the high and low anxious participants to the 
positive mood induction, to observe whether high anxious individuals regulate a positive 
mood more than low anxious participants, due to a tendency to focus on the negative 
interpretation.  Alternatively, as suggested by Beevers (2005) in relation to the dual process 
model of depression, is the dysregulation of mood due to an inability to disengage from 
substantive processing when in a negative mood, rather than any difficulties maintaining a 
positive mood?   
1.9  Aims of the Current Study 
This study aims to compare the effects of induced positive and anxious moods on 
high and low trait anxious participants’ interpretation biases and the subsequent effect of 
these biases on mood.  As the dual process model suggests that cognitive processes will 
change from congruent to incongruent for mood regulation to take place, the proposed study 
will examine interpretation biases as a function of time, with the test for interpretation biases 
split into two equal halves.  It would be predicted that in the anxious mood induction 
condition, high trait anxious participants will be unable to engage in effortful motivated 
process and therefore demonstrate mood congruent biases throughout the test, whereas low 
anxious participants will show a change from congruent to incongruent biases.  It would also 
be predicted that as a result of failing to engage in motivated processing, high trait anxious 
participants’ mood will not return to baseline following the test for interpretation biases, 
whereas low anxious participants’ mood will.  In the positive mood induction condition, in 
line with the findings in relation to the dual process model of depression, it would be 
expected that both high and low trait anxious participants will demonstrate mood congruent 
interpretation biases throughout, with a positive mood being maintained at the end.   
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1.10  The Proposed Study 
In order to address the above aims for this study and in extending on the 
undergraduate studies, the following procedure is proposed.   
Two experiments will be conducted, firstly exploring the effects of exposure to a 
positive mood induction and a second experiment to explore the effects of an anxious mood 
induction.  In both experiments, mood will be measured prior to the mood induction, 
immediately following and after the test for interpretation biases.  In both experiments, both 
high and low trait anxious participants will be included.  In analysing the effects of mood on 
interpretation biases, the effects during the first half of the test will be compared with those in 
the second half, to explore whether biases change over time.  There are also some 
methodological issues which it is hoped could be addressed in order to control for particular 
extraneous variables.   
Firstly, the selection of a mood induction procedure in the undergraduate studies was 
based on the authors’ own experiences and piloted on a small sample.  The authors also used 
a combination of video clips and music to induce and maintain a mood, which was found to 
be unsuccessful for some participants.  Whilst there is considerable evidence that video clips 
are effective in inducing moods, the use of music is less well established and may have acted 
as a confounding variable, altering the induction of the desired mood.  With regards to the use 
of videos, there is published evidence, based on larger samples, demonstrating which film 
clips are most effective at inducing specific moods (Hewig et al., 2005).  The use of 
evidence-based procedures could also increase the likelihood that specific moods are induced, 
i.e. anxious moods, which may have been a possible extraneous factor in the earlier studies.   
In measuring mood, the undergraduate studies used an eight item visual analogue 
scale, referring to different affective states, all of which were averaged to provide a single 
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measure of mood valence on one continuum, i.e. positive or negative.  This may have biased 
the results reported as any differential effects on particular moods, i.e. effects on anxious but 
not on happy moods, may have been lost.  It is therefore proposed that in this study, items 
related to the particular moods induced are selected for each experiment and examined 
separately to further exclude the possibility of a change on one scale being obscured by a lack 
of change on another.  The scales selected for the positive mood induction will equate to high 
positive affect (PA) and low PA and for the anxious mood condition, to high negative affect 
(NA) and low NA.   
As this study will be recruiting a sample of low trait anxious participants, there is a 
possibility that selecting participants based on a low trait anxiety score alone, could lead to 
the inclusion of some participants with a repressive coping style, which could have 
significant effects on the observed outcomes.  The effects of anxiety and self-reported anxiety 
in repressors, has been well-reported in the literature (e.g. Derakshan & Eysenck, 1999; 
Derakshan, Eysenck, & Myers, 2007).  Repression is a means of defense against intolerable 
anxiety, whereby the individual, unable to tolerate the anxiety, unconsciously represses the 
experience of anxiety.  This results in the individual appearing to be anxious to others, with 
all the physiological and behavioural responses, yet the individual is unaware of any 
subjective experiences of anxiety.  In procedures comparing high and low anxious 
individuals, this is important to be aware of, as repressors will self-report being low anxious 
yet behave and respond in ways akin to high anxious participants (Lambie & Baker, 2003), 
which has the potential to reduce any effects observed between the two groups.  It is therefore 
proposed that participants in this experiment are screened for and excluded if a repressive 
coping style is indicated.   
In measuring interpretation biases, it is proposed that the ambiguous scenario 
method be used.  As discussed in section 1.6.2.1, this will allow for control over the number 
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of physical and social threat items included.  This was the method employed in the 
undergraduate studies, therefore it is fair to conclude that the ambiguous scenario method 
would also be an appropriate measure in this study.   
In line with previous research into interpretation biases using the ambiguous 
scenario method as a test for biases (e.g. Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000), an interpretation 
bias would be evident from an interaction between recognition ratings of the target/foil items 
and the valence of the items (positive or negative), i.e. a negative interpretation bias would be 
evident from high recognition ratings of negative target items and low recognition ratings of 
positive target items, with no significant differences in the recognition of positive or negative 
foil items. 
1.11  Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Two separate experiments are proposed, with the first experiment comparing high 
and low trait anxious participants’ responses following an induced positive mood and the 
second experiment, comparing high and low anxious participants’ responses following an 
induced anxious mood.  In both experiments, mood will be measured at baseline (time one), 
then following the mood induction procedure (time two) and finally, after the test for 
interpretation biases (time three).  The test for interpretation biases will measure participants’ 
recognition ratings across each half of the test (first and second half of test) and in response 
to item valence (positive or negative) and both target and foil items.  The following 
hypotheses are therefore proposed in relation to the effects on mood and on interpretation 
biases: 
Experiment One – Positive Mood Induction 
1. Low Trait Anxious Participants 
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a. Participants will report a significantly more positive mood at time two, 
than at time one, and a significantly more positive mood at time three than 
time one, as evidenced by an increase on high PA items and a decrease on 
low PA items.   
b. Participants will maintain a positive interpretation bias across both halves 
of the test, as evidenced by a two way interaction between item valence 
and target/foil items, with no effect of test half.   
2. High Trait Anxious Participants 
a. Participants will report a significantly more positive mood at time two, 
than at time one, and a significantly more positive mood at time three than 
time one, as evidenced by an increase on high PA items and a decrease on 
low PA items.   
b. Participants will maintain a positive interpretation bias across both halves 
of the test, as evidenced by a two way interaction between item valence 
and target/foil items, with no effect of test half.   
Experiment Two – Anxious Mood Induction  
1. Low Trait Anxious Participants 
a. Participants will report a significantly more anxious mood at time two, 
than at both times one and three, as evidenced by an increase in high NA 
items and a decrease in low NA items.   
b. Participants will show an initially mood congruent, negative interpretation 
bias in the first half of the test and a significantly more incongruent, 
positive interpretation bias in the second half of the test, as evidenced by a 
three way interaction between test half, item valence and target/foil items. 
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2. High Trait Anxious Participants 
a. Participants will report a significantly more anxious mood at time two, 
than at time one, with mood at time three remaining significantly more 
negative than at time one, as evidenced by an increase in high NA items 
and a decrease in low NA items.  
b. Participants will show a mood congruent, negative interpretation bias at 
times one and two, with evidence only of an interaction between item 
valence and target/foil items, with no effect of test half.   
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CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT ONE 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1  Overview of Chapter 
There are eight sections within this chapter.  In section 2.1.2 an overview of the 
design is presented, followed by a description of the sample and recruitment process in 
section 2.1.3 and an outline of the inclusion and exclusion criteria.  Section 2.1.4 highlights 
the ethical considerations for this study.  Details of the measures used in the study and the 
rationale for their use is presented in section 2.1.5.  Then follows an account of the mood 
induction procedure and the justification for its use in section 2.1.6.  An overview of the 
method used to measure interpretation biases and an explanation for its use in this study is 
discussed in section 2.1.7.  Section 2.1.8 provides a comprehensive and detailed account of 
the experimental procedure. Finally, the planned analyses are described in section 2.1.9.  
Details and copies of all, except copyright materials, used in this study are provided in 
Appendices A-R and are signposted throughout this chapter.    
2.1.2  Design 
The stated hypotheses were tested using a 2 x 3 mixed-design to assess changes in 
mood over time, with mood rating as the dependent variable, anxiety (high or low) as the 
between-subjects variable and time (3) as the within-subjects variable.  In order to explore 
interpretation biases, a 2x2x2x2 mixed model design was employed, with recognition ratings 
as the dependent variable, anxiety (high or low) was the between-subjects variable and the 
within-subjects variables were item valence (positive or negative), target/foils and test half 
(first or second half).   
Participants were allocated to either the high or low trait anxious group, based on 
screening measures for anxiety.  Participants’ trait anxiety and depression scores were 
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measured initially, followed by a baseline mood assessment.  All participants were then 
exposed to a positive mood induction procedure, after which mood was again measured.  All 
participants completed the test for interpretation biases followed by a final measure of mood.  
Figure 2.1 below outlines the design of this study.   
Figure 2.1 
Flow Diagram of Study Design, Showing Temporal Sequence of Events   
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.3  Participants 
2.1.3.1  Sample Size 
There has been no previous research using this procedure with both high and low 
trait anxious participants, therefore it was not possible accurately to predict the power and 
required sample size.  Based on results from Segal et al. (2006) and Hunter et al.'s (2006) 
similar studies, it might reasonably be expected that an effect size of between 0.50 and 0.89 
for the test of interpretation biases could be achieved.  Therefore, based on the more 
conservative estimate of 0.50, a minimum of 12 participants per group would be required 
(please refer to Appendix A for power calculation). Hunter et al. (2006) using only low 
anxious participants demonstrated a significant effect with 20 participants per condition.  As 
this particular procedure has not been reported before, a more conservative sample size of 20 
per group was aimed for (total of 40 participants).   
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Six participants were also recruited to the piloting procedure in order to ensure the 
selected mood induction procedure evoked the desired mood.  These participants were not 
paid and were an opportunistic sample (i.e. friends and relatives of the researcher).   
2.1.3.2  Recruitment 
Participants were initially recruited from the student population of the University of 
East Anglia (UEA), a higher education institution based in Norwich.  UEA has a population 
of over 15,000 students including undergraduate and postgraduate students, 3,000 of whom 
are resident on campus.   
Recruitment to this study was achieved by a number of methods.  Each academic 
school at UEA was contacted via email addressed to either the Head of School, or the e-mail 
list ‘gatekeeper’ where one was known, to request permission to send an email to the students 
within that school.  Permission from 20 schools was granted and an email was sent to these 
students (Appendix B).  Participants who had signed up to a psychology research volunteer 
panel, managed by the School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice and the School of 
Social Work and Psychology, were also contacted to invite them to participate.  Posters and 
flyers were distributed around the university campus and an advertisement was placed on the 
university’s employment website.  Finally, participants who attended for the experiment were 
given flyers to pass to their friends and peers.  Due to difficulties in recruiting sufficient 
numbers of high anxious participants from the student population, recruitment was widened 
in the final month of data collection to include staff members of the university.  Permission to 
contact staff members was requested from each departmental manager, and where permission 
was granted, staff members were contacted by the most appropriate means, i.e. email for 
administrative staff or by letter for those staff without email access, such as the cleaning and 
catering staff. 
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2.1.3.3  Inclusion Criteria 
All participants were recruited from the student and staff populations at UEA.  Due 
to the nature and age certificates of the films that participants were exposed to, only 
participants over the age of 18 years were included; no upper age limit was imposed.  
Participants were required to be native English speakers or had spoken English in an English 
speaking country since the age of 10 years.  This latter criterion was imposed due to an 
observed response biases among non-native English speaking, but reportedly fluent, 
participants in a related study, (personal communication, B. Mackintosh, October 2008).  
Therefore, a more stringent inclusion criterion was imposed, to ensure that participants were 
native or as-if native, English speakers, having spoken it since childhood.  Participants were 
also included if they reported either low or high trait anxiety (defined further in section 
2.1.5.4).   
2.1.3.4  Exclusion Criteria 
Participants were excluded from the study if they were under the age of 18 years.  In 
order to rule out the confounding effects of reading ability and memory, all participants who 
reported any learning difficulties or memory impairments were excluded.  Previous research 
has also shown that individuals with a repressive coping style potentially could lead to very 
skewed results, as one might expect given the behavioural and emotional profile of 
repressors, as discussed in Chapter 1 (see also Mackintosh et al., 2006).  Therefore, 
participants identified as potentially having a repressive coping style were also excluded.   
Research within this area is frequently carried out at UEA, therefore those that had 
previously participated in research using similar methods were excluded.  Participants that 
reported experiencing any mental health difficulties either currently or within the last five 
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years, whether diagnosed or not, were excluded in order to avoid exposing them to potentially 
distressing material.  Participants were screened for trait anxiety and depression during the 
experiment and all those that were scoring in the severe range for depression and more than 3 
standard deviations above the mean on the trait anxiety scale were also excluded.   
2.1.4  Ethical Considerations 
Through the screening of participants for trait anxiety, there was a small possibility 
of the identification of clinical levels of anxiety in participants.  This was unlikely given that 
the measure of anxiety used in this study is only a measure of trait anxiety and thus measures 
the vulnerability to becoming anxious, not current distress (Creamer, Foran, & Bell, 1995).  
However, in order to reduce the possibility of clinically anxious participants being exposed to 
distressing material, participants who were identified as having scores more than three 
standard deviations above the mean for their population at the screening stage were excluded 
from the study.  Participants who were identified as scoring above this cut-off were allowed 
to continue with the experiment, although their data was excluded from the analyses.  
Similarly, in screening for depressive symptoms, participants’ whose scores were within the 
severe range were also allowed to complete the experiment, although their data was removed 
from the final analyses.  Where concerns were raised regarding responses given on the 
questionnaires, the researcher discussed these with the participant and suggested appropriate 
sources of support.   The researcher conducting this experiment is experienced in dealing 
with high levels of distress and had the requisite skills to manage such a situation.  The 
researcher was also supervised by an experienced Clinical Psychologist from whom further 
advice and supervision was available should it have been needed regarding the most 
appropriate course of action for at risk participants.   
All participants were screened for repressive coping styles and were excluded from 
the study if this was believed to be present.  It was not deemed appropriate or ethical to 
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inform participants if this was identified.  A repressive coping style is one of many different 
defence mechanisms that an individual develops to defend against intolerable anxiety 
(Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1997).  Defence mechanisms are developed in response to an 
individual’s environment and social interactions (e.g.Vaillant, 1992) and for the most part are 
adaptive for that individual.  It would therefore only be appropriate to inform and discuss 
with an individual their defence mechanisms in the process of individual therapy, where help 
for a particular problem has been sought.  To inform normal, healthy participants of a 
repressive coping style would at best be meaningless to them and at worst could lead to 
unnecessary distress.  Therefore in order to avoid creating distress in otherwise healthy 
individuals, participants were not informed of their exclusion due to a repressive coping style.   
The procedure involved a minimal amount of deception with regards the aims of the 
experiment and some details of the tasks participants were to undertake.  Participants were 
not told that there was a recognition task following the reading of the scenarios, nor were 
they informed that the aim was to investigate interpretation biases.  To inform participants of 
this would have rendered the procedure ineffective.  It was not anticipated that this deception 
would have caused any distress to the participants.  However had any participants been 
observed to be experiencing any distress, the researcher would have halted the procedure and 
debriefed participants, although this was not necessary on any occasion.  All participants 
were given full details of all other aspects of the study and asked to sign a consent form.  
They were informed of their rights to withdraw from the study at any point and were fully 
debriefed at the end of the procedure.   
Participants were assured that all the data collected was in anonymised form and 
kept completely confidential.  At the point of their returning the screening questionnaires, 
they were assigned a participant number.  A record of each participant’s name and number 
was stored by the primary researcher in a locked filing cabinet and kept separately to the data.  
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All completed questionnaires and data were only identifiable by the participant number and 
contained no identifying information.  All questionnaires and hard copies of participants’ 
responses were stored by the primary researcher in a locked cabinet for the duration of the 
study.  At the end of the research study, the original data was stored in a locked archive room 
at UEA.   
Participants were offered £5 and an information leaflet about mental health 
resources available to students in the area and on-line (Appendix C) as recompense for their 
time.  This was offered to all participants who attended for the testing session, regardless of 
whether they completed the experiment or not.  
This study received ethical approval from the University of East Anglia, Faculty of 
Health Ethics Committee on the 4th July 2008, with approved amendments made on 22nd 
October 2008 and 26th March 2009 (see Appendices D, E and F respectively).   
2.1.4.1  Information Sheet and Consent Form 
Participants were provided with a detailed information sheet at the initial screening 
stage (see Appendix G).  Participants identified as appropriate for inclusion in this study, 
were again given this information to read before signing the consent form (Appendix H) prior 
to the experimental procedure and had the opportunity to ask questions before giving their 
consent.      
2.1.5 Measures 
2.1.5.1 Demographic Variables 
Prior to inclusion in this study, participants were screened to ensure they met the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria.  In order to collect information regarding demographic 
variables, all potential participants were asked to complete a brief demographic questionnaire 
(Appendix I).   
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2.1.5.2  Brief Measure of Anxiety 
Only participants who were either high or low in trait anxiety were to be included in 
this study, therefore a very brief questionnaire that was a good predictor of trait anxiety 
scores was required.  One such measure, the Mackintosh and Mathews Anxiety Questionnaire 
(MMANX ; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2006), was devised specifically for this purpose by 
researchers in this field (see Appendix J).  In pilot studies involving 270 participants, the 
MMANX was shown to have a high correlation of .87 with the Spielberger Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983), allowing for prediction of participants’ scores on the 
STAI questionnaire with reasonable accuracy and was reported to have good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α .83).  The MMANX consists of 10 items referring to different 
emotional and physical states, for which participants were required to indicate how much 
they generally experienced each state on a Likert scale of one to five.  Only six of the items 
were target items, the remaining four were distracter items.   
The MMANX scores were converted to estimated STAI scores using a standard 
formula: (MANX x 2.3) + 8.8 = STAI (Mackintosh & Mathews, 2006).  It has been common 
practice in previous studies to categorise participants into high, low and mid-range trait 
anxiety levels using tertile splits based on all the scores for the whole sample.  However, in 
this study this was not deemed appropriate as this would have required all participant 
recruitment and screening to have taken place before the experiment was undertaken, which 
would have led to high levels of participant attrition and the increased probability that 
participants’ anxiety scores would have changed during that time.  Therefore, cut-off scores 
were obtained from a previous study that had screened a large number of undergraduate 
students using the STAI and had categorised them using tertile splits (Lambie & Baker, 
2003).  Based on their findings, for this study low trait anxiety was defined as an estimated 
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score of 38 or below on the STAI which equated to an actual score of 12 or below on the 
MMANX using the above formula.  High anxiety was defined as an estimated score of 48 or 
above on the STAI, which equated to an actual score of 17 or above on the MMANX 
2.1.5.3 Measure of Repressive Coping Style 
A short-form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960) was used as an adjunct to the MMANX to screen for repressive coping 
styles.  The operational definition of repression is a low, self-reported level of anxiety and a 
high level of defensiveness or social desirability.  Previous research has extensively relied on 
the STAI as a measure of anxiety and the MCSDS as a measure of defensiveness.  The full 
MCSDS consists of 33 items, which was considered too long for an initial screening measure.  
A short form of the MCSDS was identified from the literature, which comprised just 13 
questions.  This short form has good psychometric properties (internal validity .73) and has a 
correlation of .93 with the original scale (Reynolds, 1982; Appendix K).  Zook and Sipps 
(1985) also recommended the 13-item scale over other forms, as it was found to be as reliable 
as the original scale and has been the most extensively researched.  The score on the short-
form can be multiplied by 2.54 to provide a reasonably accurate estimation of the scores on 
the full-scale.  The short-form MCSDS consists of 13 statements which participants were 
required to indicate whether they were true or false as they applied to them personally.   
As there are no pre-determined cut-offs for repressive scores, identification of 
repressors in a sample in previous studies has been via tertile splits of the whole sample’s 
data.   In this study, the categorisation of repressors was based on the results of the Lambie 
and Baker (2003) study.  The results from this study reported that repressors were those that 
scored below 27 on the STAI and above 15 on the full MCSDS.  To apply this to our study, 
repressive copers were defined as those scoring 7 or below on the MMANX and 6 or above 
on the short-form MCSDS.   
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2.1.5.4  Measure of Trait Anxiety 
Participants’ trait anxiety levels were assessed prior to their participation in the 
experiment in order to confirm their estimated trait anxiety from the MMANX, using the 
STAI (Spielberger, 1983).  The STAI is the most commonly used measure in previous 
research allowing for more direct comparison of our results with previous findings 
(Piotrowski, 1999).  The STAI is a sensitive enough measure to allow for the detection of 
differences in levels of trait anxiety within the normal range, as opposed to other commonly 
used measures such as the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1990), which measure 
clinical levels of anxiety.  The STAI has adequate psychometric properties.  The test-retest 
reliability ranges from .73 to .86 and the internal consistency is .90.   
2.1.5.5  Measure of Depression 
Levels of depression were measured primarily to screen out participants with severe 
depression.  The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) is a widely used measure of 
depressive symptoms with excellent psychometric properties (reliability .92; Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996).  The BDI-II consists of 21-items related to symptoms of depression, which 
participants must rate on a scale of 0-3 as to how frequently they experience them.  Scores are 
categorised into ‘normal’, ‘mild’, ‘moderate’ and ‘severe’ ranges.   
2.1.5.6  Measure of Current Mood 
A brief measure of current mood was required to assess participants’ mood at three 
points in the procedure.  A Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; Appendix L) was used in this study, 
as in Hunter et al.’s (2006) study, which was based on Mayer and Gaschke’s (1988) Brief 
Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS).   The BMIS was derived from Watson and Tellegen’s 
(1985) circumplex model of affective states.  Eight scales selected were chosen to equate to 
Watson and Tellegen’s (1985) high PA (happy, carefree), low PA (sad, low) to measure 
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positive mood in experiment one and high NA (tense, worried) and low NA (calm, content) 
to measure anxious mood in experiment two.  Whilst the VAS used in Hunter et al’s study is 
not a standardised measure, it does provide an indication of high and low positive and 
negative affective states, as is required for this study.  The brevity of the measure was also 
vital, as time taken completing measures, could have seen induced moods decay or interfered 
with during that time.  Additional benefits of using the VAS included the replication of the 
measures used by Hunter et al. (2006) and Vinnicombe et al. (2006) in order to increase the 
likelihood of replicating their results with a different population.  The VASs in this study 
consisted of one practice item and eight test items.   
2.1.6  Mood Induction Procedure 
In the studies by Vinnicombe et al. (2006) and Hunter et al. (2006), positive and 
negative moods were induced by exposure to short film clips with mood congruent music 
played over the top of the films.  As discussed in Chapter 1, it was not felt that the chosen 
methods of selecting the films were sufficiently rigorous nor was there adequate evidence 
that these films reliably induced the desired mood.   
Exposing participants to film clips to induce a particular mood is a commonly used 
method in the literature and there are a number of studies that have examined the efficacy of 
particular clips at inducing mood.  Hewig et al. (2005) undertook a study using 20 film clips, 
which were shown to 38 participants without the soundtracks and measured the induction of a 
range of self-reported moods.  The authors reported that the two most effective clips for 
inducing a positive mood were clips from When Harry Met Sally (Reiner & Scheinman, 
1989) and An Officer and a Gentleman (Elfand & Hackford, 1982).  Please refer to Table 2.1 
for details of the clips and editing guidelines.  As the clips were relatively short (1-3 minutes 
long) and it was likely that there would be some individual differences in how participants 
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responded to each clip, it was decided that both clips for the positive mood would be shown 
to participants consecutively.   
Table 2.1 
 Details of the Positive Film Clips and Editing Guideline, Adapted from Hewig et al. (2005) 
Film  When Harry Met Sally 
 Editing instructions from Philippot (1993) 
Clip description Sally (Meg Ryan) is faking an orgasm at the table of a 
restaurant. 
Editing guidelines1 Start: Camera pans across restaurant to Sally and Harry sat at 
a table discussing Harry’s previous relationships. 
End: Woman at next table places her order “I’ll have what 
she’s having”.   
Clip length 2’45” 
Target emotion Amusement 
Film An Officer and a Gentleman 
 Editing instructions from Tomarken, Davidson, and Henriques 
(1990) 
Clip description Paula is working in a factory. Zack comes in, kisses her and 
carries her out of the factory 
Editing guidelines1 Start: Final scene of film set in the factory. Camera shot of 
machine and Zak (officer) is seen to appear from behind the 
machine entering the factory.  End: Zak carries Paula out of 
the factory. End before credits appear. 
Clip length: 2’08” 
Target emotion Amusement 
  
1
 A description of the scenes has been provided rather than specific times, as these were found to be inaccurate 
depending on the medium of the original film (i.e. VHS, DVD or digital download).   
 
The decision was made not to play mood congruent music over the film clips and 
instead to leave the original soundtrack on the film clips.  In a review of the literature on the 
effectiveness of music in inducing mood, there was considerable evidence that music is 
effective at inducing moods (Bruner, 1990).  However which particular piece of music for 
which mood can also be a very personal and individual phenomenon that is also current mood 
and context specific based on the individual’s own music tastes and associations with that 
piece of music (Konečni, 1982; see also Crozier, 1997).  It was not therefore thought possible  
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to select with any confidence a piece of music that would reinforce the moods induced by the 
films and was more likely to interfere with it.  
The two selected films clips with the original soundtracks were piloted on a small 
opportunistic sample of six participants to ensure that they were effective at inducing the 
desired mood.  The results of the pilot are reported in Appendix M and suggested that they 
were effective in inducing a positive mood.   
2.1.7  Measuring Interpretation Biases 
Within the literature, there are three commonly used methods to measure 
participants’ interpretation biases. An overview of each is provided in section 1.6.2.1.  Due to 
the control over numbers of items and those that pertain to social and physical threat within 
the test, the ambiguous scenario method was deemed to be the most reliable measure of 
interpretation biases, as used by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000).  To briefly recap on the 
test procedure, participants were first presented with an ambiguous scenario, with the final 
word presented as a fragment, which participants were required to complete in order to make 
sense of the scenario.  Participants were then asked to answer a comprehension question 
about the scenario in order to ensure the active encoding and processing of the scenario in 
memory.  After a number of scenarios had been presented, participants were asked to 
complete a recognition task, where they were shown four different sentences and were asked 
to rate how similar in meaning the sentences were to the original scenarios.  These four 
sentences include positively negatively valenced foil sentences that were unrelated to the 
original meaning and positively and negatively valenced target sentences that were similar to 
the original in meaning.   
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2.1.8  Procedure 
Participants contacted the researcher to express an interest in this study, and were 
then sent a brief email outlining the study (see Appendix N), the participant information sheet 
(see Appendix G), the MMANX questionnaire, the short-form MCSDS and a demographics 
questionnaire, to complete and return, to assess their eligibility.   
Participants that did not meet the criteria were emailed, thanking them for their 
interest and informing them that they were not to be invited to participate in the study.  All 
ineligible participants were however invited to join the Psychology Volunteer Panel and were 
given details of how to register (see Appendix O).   
Participants that were eligible were emailed inviting them to sign up to an online 
scheduler (see Appendix P).  The on-line scheduler allowed participants to view details of the 
experiment and available times to attend and select a suitable time-slot.  Once a participant 
had signed up, an email was automatically generated to the researcher informing them of the 
participant’s name, email address and the time they had signed up for.   
2.1.8.1  Randomisation to Experiments 
Participants who were deemed appropriate for this study were allocated to either this 
experiment (experiment 1), a subsequent experiment which ran concurrently (experiment 2) 
and a related, collaborative study, run by a fellow doctoral student at UEA (see Appendix Q 
for details of this study).  Whilst it would have been ideal to randomly allocate participants to 
each experiment, this was impracticable given that participants were tested as and when they 
signed up, rather than having an initial pool of participants to randomly allocate to 
experiments.  For these reasons, a quasi-randomised procedure for allocation to experiment 
was used.  Testing sessions were alternately designated as either experiment 1 or experiment 
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2, with the addition of the collaborative experiment in the early stages of recruitment.  
Participants then signed up to the session according to whether the time suited them, without 
the knowledge of which experiment they were allocated to and with no influence from the 
researcher.   
2.1.8.2  Testing Conditions 
All participants were tested in the same room in a teaching building on the university 
campus.  The room contained 20 computer stations around the outside walls, with privacy 
screens around each station.   
Participants were tested individually or in groups of up to five, depending on the 
attendance to each session.   
2.1.8.3  Apparatus 
Each participant was seated at an individual workstation with a desktop computer, 
which was operated by use of a keyboard and a mouse.  Participants were also given 
headphones to wear during the mood induction procedure. 
The STAI, VASs and the interpretation bias test were presented on a desktop 
computer using the computer programme E-Prime (Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 
2002), which recorded the responses.  The BDI-II was given to participants on paper.  The 
mood induction film clips had been edited using Wondershare Video Converter Suite 
(Wondershare Software Co., Ltd, 2008) and were presented on the desktop computer using 
the computer software Windows Media Player (Microsoft, 2004).   
2.1.8.4 Procedure 
Participants were seated at their workstation and were first asked to read through the 
participant information sheet and were given the opportunity to ask questions before signing 
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the consent form.  All participants then completed the STAI on E-Prime after reading the 
instructions below.   
A number of statements, which people have used to describe themselves, will be 
displayed on the screen.  
Please read each statement and then tick the appropriate box to the right of the 
statement to indicate how you GENERALLY feel.   
There are no right or wrong answers but you will be unable to go back to the 
previous question if you make a mistake. 
Do not spend too much time on any one statement, but give the answer that best 
describes how you usually feel. 
Please use the mouse to tick the boxes. Call us in when the screen says ‘thank-you’. 
Press any key to go on.   
 
Each statement on the STAI was displayed sequentially on the screen, with the 
proceeding statement appearing only after the participant had made a response.  On 
completion, their score was displayed, embedded in a random code on the screen for the 
researcher’s information.  
Participants were then asked to complete the BDI-II using paper and pen.  During 
this time the researcher compared the STAI scores against the initial MMANX scores to 
ensure participants had been correctly categorised as high or low anxious and that they were 
not above the cut-off for clinical anxiety.  The completed BDI-II was scored by hand to 
ensure participants were not in the severe range.   
62 
 
The following instructions were then presented on the computer screen before 
participants went on to complete the first series of mood VASs on E-Prime.   
In this task you are asked to indicate how you are feeling at the moment, compared 
with how you generally feel. 
Indicate your rating by clicking on the scale bar. 
A practice trial will be shown to illustrate how to do the rating. 
Each time, please read the labels on the scale very carefully before you start. 
Press any key to go on. 
   
Participants were given one practice trial on the VAS using the neutral state of 
‘tiredness’ before completing the eight test trials.  Each statement was displayed on the 
screen, one at a time, with the proceeding statement appearing on a new screen only after the 
participant had given a response.   
On completing the VASs, participants were given the following instructions before 
watching the film clips.  The instructions were presented on white A4 paper, left-aligned and 
in black, Times New Roman typeface, font size 16.  The instructions were left by the 
computer for the participant to refer back to as needed.   
We would now like you to watch two short film clips. 
Please put on the headphones provided so that you can hear the audio track. 
There are two film clips, each of which is 2-3 minutes long.  The clips are 
taken from commercially available and well-known films. 
Please watch the films closely and pay attention to what feelings the film 
evokes in you, as you will be asked about this afterwards. 
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The films may contain material that some people might find distressing. 
If at any point you decide that you don’t want to continue, you can stop the 
film at anytime by pressing the ESCAPE button in the top left hand corner of 
the keyboard, or you can ask one of the researchers to stop it for you. 
When you are ready to watch the films, using the mouse, please click on the 
play button. 
 
The second series of mood VASs were then presented before proceeding to the test 
for interpretation biases.  All materials for the interpretation bias test were adapted from 
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000).  Participants were given the following instructions on the 
computer screen before being asked to complete two practice trials, to ensure they understood 
the task.  
 
You are about to read 20 short stories, each story will be displayed line by line. 
Please press the ARROW DOWN key to start the story and to read each line. The 
last word of each story will appear in an incomplete form. 
Your task is to work out what the word is. 
AS SOON AS YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED THE WORD, PRESS THE ‘ARROW 
DOWN’ KEY. 
Then find and press the LETTER KEY corresponding to the FIRST missing letter of 
the word. 
You will then be asked a simple question about the text and given feedback about 
your response. 
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The first two stories are for practice.  
Press the ‘arrow down’ key to go on.   
 
The story was presented line by line, with participants pressing the ‘arrow down’ 
key to proceed to the next line of the story.  At the end of the story a new page appeared with 
the word fragment.  Participants were instructed to press the ‘arrow down’ key as soon as 
they knew what the word was, and then press the key corresponding to the first missing letter.  
A new page then appeared on the screen with the word fragment completed, for one second.  
A new page then appeared with the comprehension question, which required a yes or no 
response.  Participants were instructed to press the ‘left arrow’ key to answer ‘no’ and the 
‘right arrow’ key to answer ‘yes’.  After participants had given a response, feedback appeared 
in the centre of a new screen, informing them if they were ‘Correct!’ or ‘Incorrect’.  After 
two practice trials the following screen appeared before participants went on to the 20 test 
trials. 
Now you have completed the practice task. 
Please ask the experimenter if you have any questions at this point. 
If you are clear, press the ‘arrow down’ key to go on.   
 
All participants were then presented with ten social-threat scenarios and ten physical 
threat scenarios, which were displayed in random order by the programme E-Prime in the 
same format as the above practice trials.  Please refer to Appendix R for the 20 scenarios used 
in this study.  After all 20 scenarios had been read, the programme automatically proceeded 
to the test phase and participants were given the following instructions. 
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Thank you. That is the end of the first part of the task. 
Press the “arrow down” key to start the second part. 
[new page] 
Remember back to the stories you read before. 
Now you will be shown the title and a brief description as a reminder for each story 
along with 4 different endings. 
Please rate the endings in the following way: 
Press one of the number keys 1,2,3,4 to indicate how similar the ending is to how 
you remember it. 
1= very different in meaning 
2= fairly different in meaning 
3= fairly similar in meaning 
4= very similar in meaning 
Read each ending carefully. 
Respond as quickly as possible. 
You will begin with the two practice items. 
Please press the ‘arrow down’ key to start. 
 
Participants were given two practice trials to ensure they understood the instructions 
before proceeding to the test trials.  For each scenario, participants were asked to rate on a 
scale of one to four how similar in meaning four different sentences were to the original 
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meaning.  The four sentences comprised a positive target, a negative target, a positive foil and 
a negative foil.  On completion of the practice items, the four endings for the 20 target 
scenarios were presented one at a time, using a block-randomisation sequence generated by 
the E-prime programme.   
On completion of the test for interpretation biases, all participants were asked to 
complete a third series of mood VASs.  This then completed the experiment and participants 
were thanked for their time, debriefed, given the mental health information leaflet and paid 
five pounds.   
2.1.9  Planned Analysis 
The plan for analysis was to firstly explore the effect of induced mood and trait 
anxiety on ratings of high positive affect (PA) items and secondly on low PA items using 
mixed-model ANOVAs.  A separate mixed-model ANOVA was also planned to explore the 
effects on interpretation biases.  For the analyses of both high and low PA ratings, the 
dependent variable will be mood ratings, the between-subject independent variable being trait 
anxiety (high or low) and the within subjects variable being time (pre-, post-mood induction 
and post-interpretation bias test), resulting in 2x3 mixed-model analyses.  For the analysis of 
interpretation biases, the dependent variable is recognition rating, the between-subjects 
independent variable is anxiety (high or low) and the within-subjects variables will be test 
half (first and second half of the test), target/foil items and item valence (positive or 
negative), resulting in a 2x2x2x2 mixed-model analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT ONE 
3.1  Results 
3.1.1 Overview of Chapter 
A summary is provided in  3.1.2 of the demographic variables for participants 
recruited to both experiment one and two, along with reasons for exclusion from the study.  A 
rationale is also presented for modifications to the inclusion criteria.  Section 3.1.3 details the 
analysis of the data for experiment one.  In sections 3.1.3.2 to 3.1.3.4 the results of two 
mixed-model ANOVAs are presented, demonstrating the effects on high and low positive 
affect (PA).  Section 3.1.3.5 describes the analysis of the interpretation bias data, using a 
mixed-model ANOVA.  A summary of the results of experiment one is provided in section 
3.1.3.7.  
3.1.2  Overall Recruitment and Participant Demographics for Experiments One and Two 
A total of 253 participants returned the screening questionnaires.  Table 3.1 below 
summarises the demographics of the sample.  
Table 3.1 
Demographic Information from Whole Sample  
  N % Mean SD 
Gender: Male 63 24.9 - - 
 Female 184 72.7 - - 
 Not Specified 6 2.4 - - 
 
 Age - - 26.8 9.1 
 MMANX - - 14.0 3.8 
 MCSDS - - 6.8 2.8 
Key:  MCSDS – Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short Form 
 MMANX  - Mackintosh and Mathews Anxiety Scale 
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 Of the 253 screening questionnaires received, 131 met the inclusion criteria for this 
study.  Of those eligible participants, 18 participants were quasi-randomly diverted to a 
similar study, as described in the previous chapter and 35 did not attend for the experiment.  
A total of 78 participants therefore completed the experiments one and two.  There were 122 
participants who were not eligible to participate; due to mid-range anxiety scores (62.6%), 
repressive scores on the MCSDS (4.6%), non-native English speakers (19.8%), learning, 
language or memory difficulties (9.2%), recent mental health problems (9.2%), having 
participated in a similar study previously (16.8%) or other reasons such as not completing the 
demographics or mood questionnaires (4.3%).  Some participants met more than one 
exclusion criteria and these have been included in both categories.  The reasons for exclusion 
are summarised in Table 3.2 below.  
Table 3.2.  
Reasons for Exclusion from the Study 
 Total  Mid-
range 
anxiety  
Repressive 
Scores on 
MCSDS 
Non-
native 
English 
speaker 
Learning 
difficulties 
Mental 
Health 
Problems 
Participation 
in similar 
study  
Other 
N 131 82 6 26 12 12 22 7 
         
% 100 62.6 4.6 19.8 9.2 9.2 16.8 4.3 
 
A total of 78 participants were initially split into high and low trait anxious groups.  
The MMANX scores were used to predict STAI scores using the formula 
STAI=8.8+(MMANX x 2.3), (Mackintosh & Mathews, 2006).  Using the STAI cut-off scores 
from Lambie and Baker (2003), participants were allocated to the high anxious group if their 
MMANX score was 17 or above (predicted STAI score ≥48) and to the low anxious group if 
their MMANX score was 12 or below (predicted STAI score ≤38).  Participants were then 
quasi-randomly allocated to experiment one (positive mood induction) or experiment two 
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(anxious mood induction) which ran concurrently.  As described in Chapter 2, each of the 
experimental sessions were alternately allocated as experiment one or two,  participants 
selected which session they wished to attend, without prior knowledge of the pre-determined 
experiment.   
After collecting 253 screening questionnaires, it was apparent that there were 
difficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of high anxious participants, using the 
predetermined cut-offs.  Additional difficulties were experienced with the MMANX not 
serving as a suitably accurate predictor of the STAI scores, perhaps in part due to the time 
between completing each questionnaire and the change in context.  It was observed that a 
number of participants deemed high or low trait anxious at the screening stage, were scoring 
in the mid range on the STAI at the time of the experiment.  Although previous investigations 
had reported a correlation of .87 between the MMANX and the STAI, pooling data from 
experiments one and two, a correlation of .78 was observed.  Table 3.3 below summarises the 
numbers of participants per condition based on the predetermined cut-offs.   
Table 3.3  
Number of High and Low Anxious Participants per Experiment using Predetermined Actual-
STAI Cut-Off Scores 
 High Anxious  Mid-Anxious 
(excluded) 
 
Low Anxious 
Expt 1 - Positive Mood  14 8 19 
 
Expt 2 - Negative Mood 7 12 18 
 
For pragmatic reasons therefore, it was deemed most appropriate to reallocate those 
eligible participants to the high and low anxious groups based on a median split of all the 253 
received MMANX scores.  Using this new criterion, a median score of 14 on the MMANX 
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was obtained from the 253 screening questionnaires, which equates to a predicted STAI score 
of 41.  Therefore, all participants with an actual STAI score of ≤40 obtained immediately 
prior to the experiment were allocated to the low anxious group and those with STAI scores 
of ≥41 were allocated to the high anxious group.  Table 3.4 below summarises the number of 
participants according to experiment and anxiety group using this new criterion.  The data for 
five participants are not included in the table below, as they were excluded from the study for 
the following reasons.  There was a software failure for one participant and so all of their data 
were lost, two participants had BDI-II scores within the severe range and two had STAI 
scores more than 3 SDs above the mean.  All participants within the clinical ranges for the 
BDI-II and STAI were exposed to the positive mood induction and their data excluded from 
the analyses.   
Table 3.4  
Number of High and Low Trait Anxious Participants in each Experiment Using Revised 
Actual-STAI Cut-Off Scores 
 High Anxious Mid-Anxious 
(excluded) 
 
Low Anxious 
Expt 1 - Positive Mood  17 0 21 
 
Expt 2 - Anxious Mood 15 0 20 
 
3.1.3 Experiment One 
3.1.3.1  Participant Demographics 
A total of 38 participants were included in experiment one, of which 21 were 
allocated to the low trait anxious group and 17 to the high trait anxious group.  The 
descriptive statistics for participants’ demographic information and screening questionnaires 
are presented below in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5  
Demographic Information for Included Participants 
  All  Low 
Anxious 
 High 
Anxious 
  N %  N %  N % 
Total  38 100  21 55.3  17 44.7 
 
Male 
Female 
  
10 
28 
 
26.3 
73.7 
 
  
6 
15 
 
25 
71.4 
  
4 
13 
 
23.5 
76.5 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Age  23.62 5.52  23.12 4.48  24.23 6.68 
MMANX  13.45 4.22  10.38 2.09  17.24 2.86 
MCSDS  7.11 2.72  7.90 2.70  6.12 2.47 
STAI  39.47 10.60  31.33 4.36  49.53 6.43 
BDI-II  7.42 6.79  3.48 3.37  12.29 6.84 
Key:  MCSDS – Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short Form 
 MMANX  - Mackintosh and Mathews Anxiety Scale 
 BDI-II – Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition 
 STAI – Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale 
 
In order to ensure the high and low anxious groups were equivalent, a series of 
analyses was carried out.  Gender differences between the high and low anxious groups was 
examined using the Chi Square statistic and there was no significant difference found in the 
gender distribution of the two groups, χ2 (1) = .123, p=.510.  Further analyses were required 
in order to ensure the groups were equivalent on the BDI-II, MCSDS and age and were 
significantly different on measures of anxiety, using the MMANX and STAI scores.  The 
data were not normally distributed and were significantly skewed, therefore parametric tests 
were not appropriate.  The Mann-Whitney U test was used to compare high and low anxious 
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groups on these variables.  A summary of the results of this analysis is provided below in 
Table 3.6.   
Table 3.6.  
Mann-Whitney U Tests for Group Equivalence Comparing Participants in the High and Low 
Anxious Groups   
 U z-score Exact Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Age 174.0 -.13 .895 
MCSDS 102.5 -2.25 .025 
BDI-II 32.5 -4.30 .000 
MMANX 8.5 -5.04 .000 
STAI 0.0 -5.25 .000 
Key:  MCSDS – Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Short Form 
 MMANX  - Mackintosh and Mathews Anxiety Scale 
 BDI-II – Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition 
 STAI – Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale 
 
The two groups were found to be significantly different in anxiety levels, as 
measured by the MMANX and the STAI, confirming that the participants had been 
appropriately allocated to the high and low anxious groups.   Although the two groups were 
not significantly different in age, there were significant differences for MCSDS scores and 
BDI-II scores.     
Consideration was given to including the MCSDS and BDI-II scores as covariates in 
the main analyses, however this was not deemed necessary.  Theoretically, we would expect 
to see several differences between two groups which are related to anxiety levels, such as a 
general increase in negative affect with increased anxiety and decreased levels of social 
desirability.  Additionally, including these covariates would only provide information as to 
how much the BDI-II and MCSDS scores covaried with the between-subjects variable of 
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anxiety, whereas the main variables of interest are the within-subjects variables, therefore 
inclusion of the covariate would unlikely increase the power and would risk loss of degrees 
of freedom (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).    
3.1.3.2  Mood Data 
3.1.3.2.1 Selection of mood scales.  
All participants rated their mood using the eight visual analogue scales at three 
points during the procedure: prior to the mood induction; immediately following the mood 
induction and immediately following the test for interpretation biases.  Theoretically, it was 
predicted that following the positive mood induction, there would be an increase in ratings on 
high PA items (happy and carefree) and a decrease in ratings on low PA items (low and sad), 
therefore only these items were included in the analyses for experiment one.   
3.1.3.2.2 Correlations between mood scales.  
An initial inspection of the correlations between these items was carried out to 
ensure that they were correlated, as would be predicted.  The raw data was not normally 
distributed and showed significant skew and kurtsosis (see Appendix S).  A visual inspection 
of the data revealed a number of outliers, which were converted to the mean plus or minus 2 
standard deviations, as recommended by Field (2005).  Following this, although the 
normality tests were still significant, the data was shown to have no evidence of significant 
skew or kurtosis as is the more reliable method for establishing normality (Appendix S).  It 
was therefore deemed appropriate to use parametric tests to examine the correlations (i.e. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient), the results of which are shown in Table 3.7 for the four 
items at times one, two and three.   
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Table 3.7  
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for High and Low PA Items at Times One, Two and Three 
  Happy Carefree Low Sad 
Time 
One 
Happy 1 .439** -.791** -.635** 
Carefree .439** 1 -.528** -.287* 
Low -.791** -.528** 1 .609** 
Sad -.635** -.287* .609** 1 
Time 
Two 
Happy 1 .636** -.440** -.605** 
Carefree .636** 1 -.376** -.289* 
Low -.440** -.376** 1 .543** 
Sad -.605** -.289* .543** 1 
Time 
Three 
Happy 1 .280* -.499** .568** 
Carefree .280* 1 -.283* -.513** 
Low -.499** -.283* 1 .588** 
Sad -.568** -.513** .588** 1 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (one-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (one-tailed) 
 
As shown in Table 3.7, high PA items (happy and carefree) were significantly 
correlated at all three times, therefore it was appropriate to average the two items to provide a 
single measure of high PA.   The low PA items (sad and low) were also significantly 
correlated at all three times, therefore these items were also averaged, to provide a single 
measure of low PA.  Separate analyses were carried out for low and high PA scales, which 
are addressed in turn below.   
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3.1.3.3 Main Analysis of High PA Data 
3.1.3.3.1  Missing data and accuracy. 
The data were checked for accuracy of data input using methods recommended by 
Tabachnik and Fidell (2007).  There were no cases of missing data.   
The ANOVA model assumes normality of the distribution and homogeneity of 
variance, both of which are addressed in turn, below.   
3.1.3.3.2  Assumption of normality. 
The raw mood data were screened for normality using both the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests.  This analysis demonstrated that for low anxious 
participants, the data were not normally distributed at time three.  The data were also 
screened for skewness and kurtosis, which also highlighted significant skew and kurtosis for 
the low anxious group at time 3, which was defined using the Wald criterion for scores which 
were greater than twice the standard error (see Appendix T for a summary of these analyses). 
It was not possible to transform the data due to grouped data being skewed in 
different directions, as this would have biased the final analyses.  Three outliers were 
identified from the raw data and were changed to the mean score plus 2 standard deviations 
as recommended by Field (2005), as summarised in Appendix T.  Following the removal of 
three outliers, the analyses were re-run, which showed no evidence of non-normality, 
skewness or kurtosis.  
3.1.3.3.3  Assumption of homogeneity of variance. 
The data did meet the assumption for homogeneity of variance of the dependent 
variable as assessed using the Levene statistic which is summarised in Table 3.8.   
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Table 3.8 
Summary of the Results of the Levene Statistic for Homogeneity of Variance  
 Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig 
Time 1 .005 1 36 .945 
Time 2 .011 1 36 .917 
Time 3 .849 1 36 .363 
 
3.1.3.3.4  Mixed-model ANOVA for high PA data. 
In order to examine the hypotheses that both high and low anxious participants 
would show an increase in high PA from time one to time two and with high PA at time three 
remaining significantly higher than at time one,  a 2x3 mixed-model ANOVA was carried 
out.  The dependent variable was high PA score, the between-subjects variable was trait 
anxiety (high or low) and the within-subjects variable was time (three time points).   
The descriptive statistics for high PA scores across the three time points are 
presented in Table 3.9 
Table 3.9 
Descriptive Statistics for High PA Ratings in High and Low Trait Anxious Participants at 
Times One, Two and Three   
  Low Trait Anxious  High Trait Anxious 
  Mean SD N  Mean SD N 
Time 1  .53 .134 21  .48 .134 17 
Time 2  .63 .131 21  .61 .139 17 
Time 3  .49 .051 21  .46 .077 17 
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The Mauchley’s test for sphericity was not significant W(2)=.97, p=.604, therefore 
sphericity could be assumed and the results reported as such, which are summarised in Table 
3.10.   
As shown in Table 3.10, there was a main effect of time.  As predicted, there was no 
significant interaction between anxiety and time.  Figure 3.1 demonstrates the main effect of 
time on high PA ratings, which was further explored in a series of apriori planned 
comparisons.  As predicted, high PA scores were significantly higher at time two (mean .62) 
than at time one (mean .51), t(37)=5.88, p<.001.  Contrary to the hypothesis that a positive 
mood would be maintained, with high PA scores being significantly higher at time three than 
at time one, no significant differences were observed between high PA at time one (mean .51) 
and time three (mean .48), t(37)=1.29, p=.102.   
Table 3.10 
Results of Mixed-Model ANOVA (Sphericity Assumed)  
Within-Subjects Effects  
Effect Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Effect 
Size 
Time .453 1 .226 25.109 .000 .98 
Time x Anxiety .005 2 .003 .305 .738 .48 
Error (Time) .649 72 .009 - - - 
Between-Subject  Effects  
Anxiety .031 1 .031 1.394 .246 .76 
Error .798 36 .022 - - - 
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Figure 3.1 
Mean High PA Item Ratings at Time One (Pre-Mood Induction), Two (Post-Mood Induction) 
and Three (Post-Interpretation Bias Test) 
 
 
3.1.3.4  Main Analysis of Low PA Data 
3.1.3.4.1  Missing data and accuracy. 
The data were checked for accuracy of data input using methods recommended by 
Tabachnik and Fidell (2007).  There were no cases of missing data.   
The ANOVA model assumes normality of the distribution and homogeneity of 
variance, both of which are addressed in turn, below.   
3.1.3.4.2  Assumption of normality. 
The raw mood data were screened for normality using both the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests.  This analysis demonstrated that for low anxious 
participants at times one and three and high anxious participants at time three, the data were 
not normally distributed.  The data were also screened for skewness and kurtosis, which also 
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highlighted significant skew and kurtosis for these groups, which was defined using the Wald 
criterion for scores which were greater than twice the standard error (see Appendix U for a 
summary of these analyses). 
It was not possible to transform the data due to grouped data being skewed in 
different directions.  Three outliers were identified from the raw data and were changed to the 
mean score plus 2 standard deviations as recommended by Field (2005), as summarised in 
Appendix U.  Following the change to three outliers, the analyses were re-run, which showed 
no evidence of non-normality, skewness or kurtosis, as summarised in Appendix U.  
3.1.3.4.3  Assumption of homogeneity of variance. 
The data did not meet the assumption for homogeneity of variance of the dependent 
variable as assessed using the Levene statistic which is summarised below in Table 3.11.  As 
recommended by Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) the more conservative alpha level of .025 for 
significance was therefore imposed.   
Table 3.11 
Summary of the Results of the Levene Statistic for Homogeneity of Variance  
 Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig 
Time 1 2.55 1 36 .119 
Time 2 .23 1 36 .638 
Time 3 6.09 1 36 .018 
 
3.1.3.4.4  Mixed-model ANOVA for low PA data. 
In order to examine the hypotheses that both high and low anxious participants 
would show a decrease in low PA from time one to time two, with low PA at time three 
remaining significantly lower than at time one,  a 2x3 mixed-model ANOVA was carried out.  
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The dependent variable was low PA score, the between-subjects variable was anxiety (high or 
low) and the within-subjects variable was time (three time points).   
The descriptive statistics for low PA scores in high and low trait anxious 
participants, across the three time points are presented in Table 3.12.   
Table 3.12 
Descriptive Statistics for Low PA Scores in High and Low Trait Anxious Participants, at 
Times One, Two and Three 
  Low Anxious  High Anxious 
  Mean SD N  Mean SD N 
Time 1  .45 .110 21  .54 .154 17 
Time 2  .36 .124 21  .37 .118 17 
Time 3  .49 .033 21  .51 .075 17 
 
The Mauchley’s test for sphericity was not significant W(2)=.99, p=.948, therefore 
sphericity could be assumed and the results reported as such, which are summarised in Table 
3.13.   
Table 3.13 
Results of Mixed-Model ANOVA (Sphericity Assumed)  
Within-Subjects Effects  
Effect Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Effect 
Size 
Time .417 2 .209 26.320 .000 .98 
Time x Anxiety .033 2 .016 2.079 .133 .82 
Error (Time) .571 72 .008 - - - 
Between-Subject  Effects  
Anxiety .044 1 .044 2.299 .138 .83 
Error .696 36 .019 - - - 
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As shown in Table 3.13, there was a main effect of time.  As predicted, there was no 
significant interaction between anxiety and time.  Figure 3.2 below demonstrates the main 
effect of time on low PA ratings, which was further explored in a series of apriori planned 
comparisons.  As predicted, low PA scores significantly reduced from time one (mean .49) to 
time two (mean .37), t(37)=5.54, p<.001.  Contrary to the hypothesis that this reduction in 
low PA would be maintained at time three, no significant differences were observed between 
low PA at time one (mean .49) and time three (mean .50), t(37)=.615, p=.271.   
Figure 3.2 
Mean Low PA Item Ratings at Time One (Pre-Mood Induction), Two (Post-Mood Induction) 
and Three (Post-Interpretation Bias Test) 
 
3.1.3.5  Summary of Results for Mood Data 
Both high and low anxious participants showed an increase in high PA and a 
decrease in low PA, following the positive mood induction.  Both high and low PA items 
showed a tendency to return to baseline levels following the test for interpretation biases 
suggesting that a positive mood was not maintained over time.   
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3.1.3.6 Main Analyses of Interpretation Bias Test 
3.1.3.6.1  Missing data and accuracy. 
The data was checked for accuracy of data input using methods recommended by 
Tabachnik and Fidell (2007).  There were no cases of missing data.   
3.1.3.6.2  Assumption of normality. 
The raw recognition data was screened for normality using both Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests.  This analysis demonstrated that the grouped data was not 
normally distributed.  The data was also screened for skewness and kurtosis, which also 
highlighted significant skew and kurtosis, which was defined using the Wald criterion of 
scores which were greater than twice the standard error (see Appendix V for a summary of 
these analyses).    
It was not possible to transform the data due to grouped data being skewed in 
different directions.  Therefore, the raw data was screened for outliers, via visual screening of 
the raw data.   Four outliers were identified within the skewed groups and were replaced with 
the mean score plus 2 standard deviations, as recommended by Field (2005).  As this did not 
correct the non-normality, this process was repeated until the outliers no longer affected the 
normality of distributions, as recommended by Tabachnik and Fidell (2007); please refer to 
Appendix V for details of this process.   
The analysis was re-run following this process and although tests for normality still 
showed significant non-normality in the high anxious group, for positive foil items in the 
second half of the test, inspection of skewness and kurtosis, showed no evidence of 
significant skewness or kurtosis for these, or any other grouped data, therefore the 
assumption of normality was assumed to have been met (see Appendix V for a summary of 
these analyses).   
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 3.1.3.6.3 Assumption of homogeneity of variance. 
Homogeneity of variance was investigated through further analysis of the data using 
the Levene statistic.  As Table 3.14 shows, the data did meet the criterion for homogeneity of 
variance.   
Table 3.14  
Summary of Levene Statistic for Homogeneity of Variance  
Item Test Half Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig 
Positive Target 1 2.63 1 36 .114 
 2 .27 1 36 .606 
Positive Foil 1 .59 1 36 .447 
 2 2.03 1 36 .163 
Negative Target 1 .92 1 36 .344 
 2 1.86 1 36 .182 
Negative Foil 1 .03 1 36 .859 
 2 .39 1 36 .536 
 
3.1.3.6.4  Mixed-model ANOVA for interpretation bias data.  
In order to test the hypothesis that both high and low anxious participants would 
show a mood congruent interpretation bias in both the first and second half of the test, a 
2x2x2x2 mixed-model ANOVA was carried out, with recognition rating as the dependent 
variable, anxiety group as the between-subject variable (high or low) and test half (first and 
second), item valence (positive/negative) and target/foil as the within-subject variables.      
The descriptive statistics for the recognition scores of positive items at times one and 
two are shown in Table 3.15.  The data shown in Table 3.15 has not been split by target/foils, 
as the ANOVA revealed no significant interaction for target/foils, as summarised in Table 
3.16.   
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Table 3.15  
Descriptive Statistics for Recognition Scores on Interpretation Bias Test 
    Low Anxious  High Anxious 
Item Valence  Test Half  Mean SD N  Mean SD N 
Positive   1  2.61 .424 21  2.02 .337 17 
  2  2.42 .436 21  2.04 .386 17 
           
Negative  1  2.08 .394 21  2.10 .348 17 
  2  2.02 .370 21  2.12 .3733 17 
 
As shown in Table 3.16, there was a main effect for item valence, and target/foils, as 
illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 respectively.  Overall, there was a higher recognition of 
positive items than negative items (mean recognition scores of 2.22 and 2.08, respectively) 
and higher recognition of target items than foil items (mean recognitions scores of 2.66 and 
1.64, respectively).   
There was also a significant interaction between item valence and anxiety, which is 
illustrated in Figure 3.5.  This interaction was explored in a series of post-hoc t-tests, using 
the Bonferonni correction for multiple tests, requiring an alpha level of .025 for significance.  
Low anxious participants showed significantly higher recognition of positive than negative 
items, t(20)=3.3, p<.025, with mean recognition scores of 2.37 and 2.05, respectively.  High 
anxious participants, showed no significant difference in recognition of positive and negative 
items, t(16)=.42, p=.681, with mean recognition scores of 2.08 and 2.11, respectively.   
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Table 3.16  
Results of Mixed-Model ANOVA for Recognition Scores (Sphericity Assumed) 
Within-Subjects Effects       
Effect Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig.  Effect 
Size 
Valence 1.52 1 1.52 4.90 .033 .911 
Valence x Anxiety 2.31 1 2.31 7.46 .010 .94 
Error (Valence) 11.16 36 .31 - - - 
Target/Foil 79.59 1 79.59 327.51 .000 1.0 
Target/Foil x Anxiety .16 1 .16 .67 .419 .63 
Error (Target/Foil) 8.75 36 .24 - - - 
Test Half .18 1 .18 2.49 .123 .84 
Test Half x Anxiety .03 1 .03 .37 .55 .52 
Error (Test Half) 2.61 36 .07 - - - 
Valence x Target/Foil  .16 1 .16 2.58 .117 .85 
Valence x Target/Foil x Anxiety .00 1 .00 .00 .951 .00 
Error (Valence x Target/Foil) 2.24 36 .06 - - - 
Valence x Test Half .38 1 .38 5.39 .026 .92 
Valence x Test Half x Anxiety .02 1 .02 .29 .594 .47 
Error (Valence x Test Half) 2.52 36 .07 - - - 
Target/Foil x Test Half .01 1 .01 .06 .802 .24 
Target/Foil x Test Half x Anxiety .05 1 .05 .57 .456 .60 
Error (Target Foil x Test Half) 3.25 36 .09 - - - 
Valence x Target/Foil x Test Half .01 1 .01 .26 .614 .45 
Valence x Target/Foil x Test Half 
x Anxiety 
.00 1 .00 .04 .836 .20 
Error (Valence x Target/Foil x 
Test Half) 
1.92 36 .05 - - - 
 
Between Subjects Effects 
      
Anxiety .97 1 .97 1.3 .264 .75 
Error 26.95 36 .75 - -  
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Figure 3.3  
Mean Recognition Scores for Positively and Negatively Valenced Items 
 
Figure 3.4  
Mean Recognition Scores for Target and Foil Items  
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Figure 3.5 
Mean Recognition Scores for High and Low Anxious Participants on Positively and 
Negatively Valenced Items  
 
 
A significant interaction was also observed for item valence and test half, which is 
illustrated in Figure 3.6.  This interaction was also explored in a series of post-hoc t-tests, 
using the Bonferonni correction for multiple tests, requiring an alpha level of .025 for 
significance.  There was a significant increase in recognition of positive items from the first 
to the second half of the test, t(37)=2.9, p<.01, with mean recognition scores of 2.18 and 
2.30, respectively.  There was however, no difference in recognition of negative items 
between the first and second half of the test, t(37)=.57, p=.570, with mean recognitions scores 
of 2.09 and 2.06, respectively. 
The predicted two-way interaction between item valence and target/foils was not 
significant, therefore the hypothesis of a consistently positive interpretation bias, was not 
supported.  In a posthoc power calculation, achieved power was estimated to be 1.0, 
suggesting that this lack of an interaction was not due to a lack of power.   
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Figure 3.6 
Mean Recognition Scores for Positive and Negatively Valenced Items in the First and Second 
Half of the Test  
 
3.1.3.6.5  Summary of findings from analysis of interpretation bias data.  
The above analysis suggests that following an induced positive mood, participants 
do not show an interpretation bias.  Overall, all participants showed a generally congruent, 
positive, response bias, which became increasingly congruent over time.  A significant 
interaction between item valence and anxiety, demonstrated that low trait anxious participants 
displayed a higher recognition of positive than negative items, i.e. a congruent response bias, 
whereas high trait anxious participants did not.   
3.1.3.7 Summary of Experiment One 
The results of experiment one demonstrated that both high and low trait anxious 
participants reported a more positive mood following the mood induction procedure as 
measured by both high and low PA measures, and that following the test for interpretation 
biases, both high and low PA returned to baseline levels.  Given this finding, it might be 
expected that mood regulation had occurred, and would be apparent through mood 
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incongruent responses on the test for interpretation biases, however this was not the case.  
Participants overall, showed a mood congruent, positive response bias, which actually 
became increasingly positive throughout the test.  Low trait anxious participants showed a 
significantly higher recognition of positive than negative items, suggesting a mood congruent 
bias, whereas high trait anxious participants did not.  However this does not seem to have had 
any affect on subsequent mood, with a positive mood not being maintained at time three.  
There was no evidence of an interpretation bias, which might suggest that a positive mood 
only leads to a more positive response bias, but does not lead to an interpretation bias.   
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT ONE 
4.1  Discussion  
4.1.1  Overview of Chapter 
In this chapter, a brief discussion of the reported findings is presented.  A summary 
of the hypotheses to be tested is given in section 4.1.2, followed the by results found in 
relation to these in section 4.1.3.  The reported results are then discussed in relation to 
previous findings and the theoretical basis to this study in section 4.1.4, with concluding 
remarks provided in section 4.1.5.  
4.1.2  Summary of Main Hypotheses 
Based on previous findings in relation to the dual process model, it was hypothesised 
that both high and low anxious participants would show congruent changes in mood 
following a positive mood induction procedure, as evidenced by an increase in high PA and a 
decrease in low PA.  As a result of substantive processes, mood congruent (i.e. positive) 
interpretation biases were expected following the mood induction, that would not change 
between the first and second half of the test, which would have resulted in the increased high 
PA and decreased, low PA ratings being maintained at the end of the experiment.   
4.1.3  Summary of Results 
As expected, both high and low trait anxious participants showed congruent changes 
in mood following the mood induction procedure on both high and low PA scales.  However, 
the hypothesised congruent interpretation bias was not observed in the results of this 
experiment.  It was found however, that all participants showed a generally positive response 
bias, with higher recognition ratings of both positive target and foil items, which became 
increasingly positive over time.  Low trait anxious participants showed a higher recognition 
of positive than negative items, whereas the high anxious participants did not.  Despite the 
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observation of an increasingly positive response bias, which it is hypothesised would have 
maintained the positive mood, both high PA and low PA ratings returned to baseline levels 
following the interpretation bias test.   
4.1.4  Discussion of Results 
The results found here are in contrast to those reported by Hunter et al. (2006) and 
Vinnicombe et al. (2006) who found a relatively neutral response bias following a positive 
mood induction.  It is suggested that this is likely to be due to the additional comparisons in 
this study of high and low anxious participants’ results and with the variable of test half being 
included.  It was observed that the low trait anxious participants had significantly higher 
recognition of positive than negative items, which the high trait anxious did not, suggesting a 
more positive response bias in the low trait anxious participants.  For both groups of 
participants, there was an increasingly congruent, positive response bias over time.   
With observations in this experiment only of response biases following a positive 
mood, does not in itself, provide evidence for or against the dual process model of mood 
regulation, as the results could be interpreted either way.  Evidence of a mood congruent 
response bias, following a positive mood induction, could be predicted from the dual process 
model, hedonistic model or even the contextual model.   
The findings reported here are in line with network activation models of mood (e.g. 
Bower, 1981), where it is reported that mood will lead to activation of similarly valenced 
cognitions.  The results may also be considered to be in line with the hedonistic model of 
mood regulation, where there is a drive to maintain a positive mood, through positively 
valenced cognitions.  Although contrary to Larsen’s (2000) suggestion that difficulties with 
mood regulation are as a result of being unable to focus on the positive, it was shown here 
that the high trait anxious participants were as able as the low trait anxious participants to 
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demonstrate an increasingly positive response bias.  It cannot be ruled out however, as 
suggested within contextual models of mood regulation (e.g. Erber & Erber, 2000), that it 
was due to an absence of social or contextual demands, that participants made no attempt to 
regulate their mood. 
In considering why, despite increasingly positive response biases, participants’ 
mood returned to baseline levels, a number of hypotheses can be considered.  The most likely 
explanation would be that due a relatively mild positive mood being induced, there was 
simply a natural decay in mood over time.  The test for interpretation biases, took up to 30 
minutes for some participants to complete, therefore it may have been very difficult for the 
mood to be maintained over this length of time.  The test itself, being quite long and 
repetitive, may also have been rather dull and boring for the participants, which may in turn 
have also affected their mood over time.  If this was the case, then it is also possible that the 
increasingly positive response bias was an attempt to regulate a more negative mood induced 
by the test itself, with biases becoming increasingly positive in order to maintain the initially 
positive mood.   
No evidence was found of interpretation biases, either positive or negative, which 
could suggest that in a positive mood, biased interpretations are not activated.  In exploring 
whether there is a causal relationship between interpretation biases and mood, or whether 
there is an interaction, it could be suggested no evidence was observed for the latter 
hypothesis, inasmuch as positive moods were not observed to have an effect on interpretation 
biases.  However trained positive interpretation biases in previous studies, have been found to 
have congruent effects on mood (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).  This would therefore, 
strengthen the argument of Mathews and colleagues, that interpretation bias training directly 
affects interpretation biases of novel stimuli, which in turn influences mood.  Were the effects 
observed in these previous studies, due to the training directly affecting mood, which in turn 
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changed interpretation biases, then it should have been observed in this study, that this 
change in mood affected interpretation biases.  This was not the case.   
There are a number of possible explanations for the effects observed in this study, 
which could be explored further in a separate experiment, examining the effects of an anxious 
mood on interpretation biases.  As discussed, it is possible that participants in this study did 
not regulate their mood due to the contextual demands of the situation, which if the same was 
observed in the anxious mood induction, could indeed be inferred.  However, if as 
hypothesised, participants will regulate a negative mood, this would provide evidence against 
the contextual demands hypothesis.  Although no evidence was found for the effect of a 
positive mood on interpretation biases, before anything more than a tentative suggestion can 
be made as to the causal relationship between interpretation biases and mood, the effects of 
an anxious mood on interpretation biases, would need to be investigated further.   
4.1.5  Conclusions 
This experiment explored the effects of an induced positive mood on the 
interpretation biases of high and low anxious individuals, within a dual process model of 
mood regulation framework.  Evidence of an increasingly positive response bias was found, 
for which several explanations could be inferred.  In order to further explore some of these 
observations, a second experiment was conducted to investigate the effects of an anxious 
mood on interpretation biases in both high and low anxious participants.  This is reported on 
in Chapters 5 to 7.    
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CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENT TWO 
5.1  Method  
5.1.1 Overview of Chapter 
The methodology for experiment two was identical to that described in experiment 
one, except that participants were exposed to an anxious mood induction procedure, as 
opposed to a positive mood induction, details of which are discussed further below.  In 
regards to measures of mood, it was hypothesised that the anxious mood induction would 
lead to an increase in high NA and a decrease in low NA items.  The items on the mood VAS 
which correspond to these constructs were ‘tense’ and ‘worried’ for high NA and ‘calm’ and 
‘content’ for low NA (Mayer & Gashke, 1988).    
5.1.2 Participant Recruitment and Allocation to Experiment Two 
As described in section 2.1.8.1 of experiment one, participants who were invited to 
attend for the experiment, were quasi-randomly allocated to each experiment, as the two 
experiments were run concurrently.   
5.1.3 Mood Induction Procedure 
As in experiment one, mood inducing film clips were selected according to the 
reported results of Hewig et al.’s (2005) study.  This study demonstrated that the two most 
effective clips for inducing an anxious mood were those taken from Halloween (Hill & 
Carpenter, 1978) and The Silence of the Lambs (Saxon, Utt, Bozman, & Demme, 1991).  
Please refer to Table 5.1 below for details of the clips and editing guidelines.  As in 
experiment one, due to the clips being relatively short (1-3 minutes) both clips were shown to 
participants consecutively.  The clips were edited using Wondershare Video Converter Suite 
(Wondershare Software Co., Ltd, 2008) and were presented on the desktop computer using 
the computer software Windows Media Player (Microsoft, 2004).   
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Table 5.1 
Summary of Anxious Film Clips and Editing Instructions, Adapted from Hewig et al. (2005) 
Film Silence of the Lambs 
 Editing instructions from Gross and Levenson (1995) 
Clip description Clarice is on the hunt for a serial killer and goes to interview James. 
She follows him into the basement and is faced with a gruesome 
sight. 
Editing guidelines: Start: Camera shot of woodland, with a green caravan in the left of 
scene. Camera pans across to left over rail tracks to a house with 
grey car parked outside.  End: Clarice enters the basement, metal 
wire is hanging down and appears to touch her nose. Re-start: A 
hand holding a gun moves rapidly across the screen with yellow 
wallpaper in the background. End: After the gruesome sight in the 
bath, the lights go out and she gasps.   
Clip length: 2’15” 
Target emotion Fear 
  
Film Halloween 
 Editing instructions from Philippot (1993 
Clip description Laurie arrives to babysit but finds no one home. She explores the 
house and finds a corpse, whilst pursued by the killer. 
Editing guidelines: Start: Laurie is in the house in the dark where she has arrived to 
babysit but no one is home.  End: Having seen the corpse in the 
wardrobe, she moves away and the murderer raises the knife behind 
her, end just before he lowers the knife. 
Clip length: 0’58” 
Target emotion Fear 
1
 A description of the scenes has been provided rather than specific times, as these were found to be inaccurate 
depending on the medium of the original film (i.e. VHS, DVD or digital download).   
 
5.1.3.1  Piloting of Anxious Mood Inductions 
Six participants were recruited to the piloting procedure in order to ensure the 
selected films evoked the desired mood.  These participants were not paid and were an 
opportunistic sample (i.e. friends and relatives of the researcher).  The results of the pilot 
study confirmed that the film clips induced an anxious mood (see Appendix M).   
5.1.4  Ethical Considerations  
Previous research has suggested that participants were not unduly distressed by the 
anxious mood procedure (Segal, et al., 2006).  However, all participants in the anxious mood 
condition were given the opportunity to watch the positive film clips from experiment one to 
ensure their mood returned to baseline level before leaving.   
96 
 
Participants found to be scoring within the clinical range for anxiety on the STAI, 
defined as more than 3 standard deviations above the mean score for their population and the 
severe range for the BDI-II, were not shown the anxious films and were instead shown the 
positive films clips from experiment one, before continuing with the experiment.  However 
their data were excluded from the analyses.   
5.1.5  Planned Analysis 
As in experiment one, the results will be analysed using three separate ANOVAs to 
firstly explore the effects of trait anxiety and induced mood on ratings of high NA items, low 
NA items and then the effects on interpretation biases.  For the analyses of both high and low 
NA ratings, the dependent variable will be average mood ratings on the relevant scales, the 
between-subject independent variable being trait anxiety (high or low) and the within subjects 
variable being time (pre-,post-mood induction and post-interpretation bias test), resulting in a 
2x3 mixed model analysis.  For the analysis of interpretation biases, the dependent variable is 
recognition rating, the between-subjects independent variable is anxiety (high or low) and the 
within-subjects variables will be test half (first and second half of the test), target/foil items 
and item valence (positive or negative), resulting in a 2x2x2x2 mixed model analysis.   
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CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENT TWO 
6.1  Results 
6.1.1  Overview of Chapter 
Section 6.1.2 summarises the demographic variables for participants included in 
experiment two.  The results of two mixed-model ANOVAs to explore the effects on mood 
are presented in section 6.1.3.  Section 6.1.4 presents the results of a mixed-model ANOVA 
exploring the effects on interpretations biases.  A summary of the results of the chapter, are 
presented in section 6.1.5.   
6.1.2  Participant Demographics 
A total of 35 participants were included in experiment two, of which 20 were 
allocated to the low anxious group and 15 to the high anxious group.  The descriptive 
statistics for participants’ demographic information and screening questionnaires are 
presented in Table 6.1. 
Gender differences between the high and low anxious groups were examined using 
the Chi Square statistic and there was no significant difference found in the gender 
distribution of the two groups, χ2 (1) = .276, p=.721.  Further analyses were required in order 
to ensure the groups were equivalent on the variables of age, MCSDS and BDI-II scores and 
that there were significant differences between the groups in anxiety, as measured by the 
MMANX and STAI.  The data was not normally distributed and was significantly skewed, 
therefore parametric tests were not appropriate, and so a series of Mann-Whitney U tests 
were carried out.  A summary of these analyses is provided in Table 6.2.   
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Table 6.1  
Demographic Information for Included Participants 
  All  Low Anxious  High Anxious 
  N %  N %  N % 
Total  35 100  20 57.1  15 42.9 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
  
11 
24 
 
31.4 
68.4 
  
7 
13 
 
35.0 
65.0 
  
4 
11 
 
26.7 
73.3 
          
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Age  25.3 8.5  21.9 2.8  29.7 11.3 
MMANX  14.0 4.2  12.2 3.4  16.5 3.9 
MCSDS  6.0 2.7  6.2 2.4  5.6 3.2 
STAI  38.6 9.5  32.3 5.7  46.9 6.4 
BDI-II  6.2 5.4  3.7 2.7  9.7 3.2 
 
Table 6.2  
Mann-Whitney U-tests for Group Equivalence, Comparing Participants in the Positive and 
Negative Mood Induction Conditions 
 U z-score Exact Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Age 86.00 -2.13 .033 
MCSDS 124.50 -.55 .592 
BDI-II 49.5 -3.36 .000 
MMANX 29.00 -5.01 .002 
STAI .00 -5.01 .000 
 
The two groups were found to be significantly different on measures of anxiety, on 
both the MMANX and the STAI.  There was no significant difference between the two 
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groups on the MCSDS, however significant differences were observed for age and BDI-II 
scores.  As discussed in relation to experiment one, differences on a number of variables 
might be expected when the groups have been selected on the basis of difference on other 
variables.  The difference in age between the groups is likely to be as a result of the 
recruitment procedure, whereby after being unable to recruit sufficient numbers of high 
anxious students, the criterion was widened to include university staff, hence the higher age 
group in the high anxious group.  Whilst anxiety between age groups may differ, this is likely 
to be due to other variables which correlate with age, such as work and family stresses, rather 
than age being a predictor of anxiety per se. For these reasons, the variables of age and BDI-
II scores were not included in the main analyses as covariates.   
6.1.3  Selection of Mood Variables 
It was predicted that that negative affective scales on the VAS would be most 
influenced by the negative mood induction procedure, i.e. an increase in high NA and a 
decrease in low NA ratings.  The corresponding items were worried and tense for high NA 
and calm and content for low NA.   
The correlation between the four high and low NA items at times one, two and three 
were examined to ensure that these items were related as predicted.  The raw data was not 
normally distributed and showed significant skew and kurtsosis (see Appendix W).  A visual 
inspection of the data revealed a number of outliers, which were converted to the mean plus 
or minus 2 standard deviations, as recommended by Field (2005).  Following this, although 
the normality tests were still significant, the data was shown to have no evidence of 
significant skew or kurtosis as is the more reliable method for establishing normality.  It was 
therefore deemed appropriate to use parametric tests to examine the correlations (i.e. 
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Pearson’s correlation coefficient), the results of which are shown in Table 6.3 below for the 
four items at times one, two and three.   
Table 6.3 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for Low and High NA Items at Times One, Two and Three 
  Tense Worried Calm Content 
Time 
One 
Tense 1 .156 -.587** -.461** 
Worried .156 1 -.227 -.352* 
Calm -.587** -.227 1 .319* 
Content -.461** -.352* .319* 1 
Time 
Two 
Tense 1 .503** -.492** -.284* 
Worried .503** 1 -.515** -.131 
Calm -.492** -.515** 1 .421** 
Content -.284* -.131 .421** 1 
Time 
Three 
Tense 1 .584** -.757** -.595** 
Worried .584** 1 -.372* -.279 
Calm -.757** -.372* 1 .562** 
Content -.595** -.279 .562** 1 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (one-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (one tailed) 
 
As predicted the low NA items, calm and content, were significantly correlated at all 
three times, suggesting it was appropriate to use the average of these two scores to provide a 
single measure of low NA.  The high NA items, tense and worried, were significantly 
correlated at times two and three, but not at time one.  Initial exploration of the descriptive 
statistics revealed that a greater effect of the anxious mood induction was seen for the tense 
scale, as shown in Table 6.4.  Although the worried scale showed the same pattern it was to a 
much lesser extent.  In order to reduce the possibility of the reduced effect on the worried 
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scale leading to a Type II error, it was deemed most appropriate to use only the tense scale to 
measure high NA.   
Table 6.4  
Descriptive Statistics for the High NA Scale, Tense and Worried 
  Tense  Worried 
Time  1 2 3  1 2 3 
n  35 35 35  35 35 35 
Mean  .48 .64 .51  .47 .55 .49 
SD  .140 .156 .144  .167 .118 .119 
 
6.1.3.1  Main Analysis of High NA Data 
6.1.3.1.1  Missing data and accuracy. 
The data were checked for accuracy of data input using methods recommended by 
Tabachnik and Fidell (2007).  There were no missing cases identified.      
6.1.3.1.2  Assumptions of normality.  
Initial analyses of the data were carried out to ensure that the raw data were 
normally distributed and there was no significant skewness or kurtosis. Using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality, there was evidence that the data 
were not normally distributed for the low anxious group at time one.  In addition, significant 
skewness and kurtosis was also observed (Appendix X).  Due to the data being skewed in 
different directions, it was not appropriate to use transformation to correct the non-normality.  
One outlier was therefore identified and replaced with the mean score plus two standard 
deviations (Field, 2007).  As shown in Appendix X, following this process, although the 
normality tests were still significant, the data were not significantly skewed or kurtosed, as 
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evidenced by all scores being less than double the standard error scores, with this being the 
preferred method for testing normality.    
6.1.3.1.3  Assumption of homogeneity of variance. 
The data did meet the assumption for homogeneity of variance of the dependent 
variable as assessed using the Levene statistic which is summarised below in Table 6.5.   
Table 6.5 
Summary of the Results of the Levene Statistic for Homogeneity of Variance  
 Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig 
Time 1 1.005 1 33 .323 
Time 2 2.833 1 33 .102 
Time 3 1.830 1 33 .185 
 
6.1.3.1.4  Mixed-model ANOVA for high NA data. 
In order to examine the hypotheses that both high and low anxious participants 
would show an increase in high NA from time one to time two, with high anxious 
participants maintaining high NA at time three and low anxious participants showing high 
NA returning to baselines levels, a 2x3 mixed-model ANOVA was carried out.  The 
dependent variable was high NA score, the between-subjects variable was trait anxiety (high 
or low) and the within-subjects variable was time (three time points).   
The descriptive statistics for high NA scores across the three time points are 
presented in Table 6.6.   
The Mauchley’s test for sphericity was not significant W(2)=.91, p=.203, therefore 
sphericity could be assumed and the results reported as such, which are summarised in Table 
6.7.   
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Table 6.6 
Descriptive Statistics for High NA, in High and Low Trait Anxious Participants, at Times 
One, Two and Three 
  Low Anxious  High Anxious 
  Mean SD N  Mean SD N 
Time 1  .50 .128 20  .46 .157 15 
Time 2  .64 .187 20  .64 .107 15 
Time 3  .51 .121 20  .51 .157 15 
 
Table 6.7 
Results of Mixed-Model ANOVA (Sphericity Assumed)  
Within-Subjects Effects  
Effect Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Effect 
Size 
Time .519 2 .260 13.499 .000 .96 
Time x Anxiety .006 2 .003 .164 .849 .38 
Error (Time) 1.269 66 .019 - - - 
Between-Subject  Effects  
Anxiety .005 1 .005 .344 .561 .17 
Error .480 33 .015 - - - 
 
As shown in Table 6.7, there was a main effect of time.  The predicted interaction 
between time and trait anxiety was not significant.  In a posthoc power calculation, achieved 
power was estimated to be .99, suggesting that this lack of an interaction was not due to a 
lack of power.  Figure 6.1 below demonstrates the main effect of time on high NA ratings, 
which was further explored in a series of apriori planned comparisons.  As predicted, high 
NA significantly increased from time one (mean .48) to time two (mean .64), t(34)=4.99, 
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p<.001.  Levels of high NA were also shown to significantly reduce following the test for 
interpretation biases, from time two (mean .64) to time three (mean .51), t(34)=3.65, p<.01.   
Figure 6.1 
Mean High NA Item Ratings at Time One (Pre-Mood Induction), Two (Post-Mood Induction) 
and Three (Post-Interpretation Bias Test) 
 
6.1.3.2 Main Analysis of Low NA Items 
6.1.3.2.1 Missing data and accuracy.  
The data were checked for accuracy of data input using methods recommended by 
Tabachnik and Fidell (2007).  There were no missing cases identified.      
6.1.3.2.2  Assumptions of normality.  
Initial analyses of the data were carried out to ensure that the raw data were 
normally distributed and there was no significant skewness or kurtosis. Using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality, there was evidence that the data 
were not normally distributed for the low anxious group at time one and the high anxious 
group at times one and two.  Significant skewness and kurtosis was also observed (see 
Appendix Y).  Due to the data being skewed in different directions, it was not appropriate to 
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use transformation to correct the non-normality.  Three outliers were therefore identified and 
replaced with the mean score plus or minus two standard deviations (Field, 2007).  As this 
did not correct the non-normality, this process was repeated a second time (please refer to 
Appendix Y for a summary of this process).  As shown in Appendix Y, following this 
process, although the normality tests were still significant, the data were not significantly 
skewed or kurtosed, as evidenced by all scores being less than double the standard error 
scores, with this being the more reliable method for testing normality.    
6.1.3.2.3  Assumption of homogeneity of variance. 
The data did meet the assumption for homogeneity of variance of the dependent 
variable as assessed using the Levene statistic which is summarised below in Table 6.8.   
Table 6.8 
Summary of the Results of the Levene Statistic for Homogeneity of Variance  
 Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig 
Time 1 2.654 1 33 .113 
Time 2 1.362 1 33 .252 
Time 3 1.745 1 33 .196 
 
6.1.3.2.4  Mixed-model ANOVA for low NA data. 
In order to examine the hypotheses that both high and low anxious participants 
would show a decrease in low NA from time one to time two, with high anxious participants 
maintaining reduced levels of low NA at time three and low anxious participants showing 
low NA returning to baselines levels, a 2x3 mixed-model ANOVA was carried out.  The 
dependent variable was low NA score, the between-subjects variable was trait anxiety (high 
or low) and the within-subjects variable was time (three time points).   
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The descriptive statistics for low NA scores across the three time points are 
presented in Table 6.9.   
Table 6.9 
Descriptive Statistics for Low NA Scores in High and Low Anxious Participants 
  Low Anxious  High Anxious 
  Mean SD N  Mean SD N 
Time 1  .52 .084 20  .56 .137 15 
Time 2  .38 .094 20  .40 .067 15 
Time 3  .51 .082 20  .49 .117 15 
 
The Mauchley’s test for sphericity was not significant W(2)=.95, p=.439, therefore 
sphericity could be assumed and the results reported as such, which are summarised in Table 
6.10.   
Table 6.10 
Results of Mixed-Model ANOVA (Sphericity Assumed)  
Within-Subjects Effects  
Effect Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Effect 
Size 
Time .409 2 .204 27.214 .000 .98 
Time x Anxiety .011 2 .006 .764 .470 .66 
Error (Time) .496 66 .008 - - - 
Between-Subject  Effects  
Anxiety .005 1 .005 .383 .540 .53 
Error .455 33 .014 - - - 
 
As shown in Table 6.10, there was a main effect of time.  The predicted interaction 
between time and trait anxiety was not significant.  In a posthoc power calculation, achieved 
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power was estimated to be 1.0, suggesting that this lack of an interaction was not due to a 
lack of power.  Figure 6.2 below demonstrates the main effect of time on low NA ratings, 
which was further explored in a series of apriori planned comparisons.  As predicted, low NA 
significantly decreased from time one (mean .54) to time two (mean .39), t(34)=6.68, p<.001.  
Levels of low NA were also shown to significantly increase following the test for 
interpretation biases, from time two (mean .39) to time three (mean .50), t(34)=5.21, p<.001.   
Figure 6.2 
Mean Low NA Item Ratings at Time One (Pre-Mood Induction), Two (Post-Mood Induction) 
and Three (Post-Interpretation Bias Test) 
 
 
6.1.3.3 Summary of Results of Mood Data  
Both high and low trait anxious participants showed a significant reduction in low 
NA following the negative mood induction procedure.  In both high and low anxious 
participants, low NA ratings significantly increased following the test for interpretation 
biases.  The hypothesis that high trait anxious participants would maintain their mood at time 
three was not supported.   
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6.1.4 Main Analyses of Interpretation Bias Test     
6.1.4.1  Missing Data 
The data were checked for accuracy of entry using methods recommended by 
Tabachnik and Fidell (2007).  There were no cases of missing data.   
6.1.4.2  Assumptions of Normality   
The raw recognition data were screened for normality using both Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests.  This analysis demonstrated that some of the grouped data 
were non-normally distributed.  However, inspection of the skewness and kurtosis 
demonstrated no evidence of significant skewness or kurtosis, therefore it could be assumed 
that the grouped data were normally distributed.  A summary of these analyses is provided in 
Appendix Z.   
6.1.4.3 Assumption of Homogeneity of Variance   
Homogeneity of variance was investigated through further analysis of the data using 
the Levene statistic.  As Table 6.11 below shows, the data met the criterion for homogeneity 
of variance.   
6.1.4.4 Main Analyses 
In order to test the hypotheses that high anxious participants would show a mood 
congruent interpretation bias in both the first and second half of the test, and that low anxious 
participants would show a significantly more positive interpretation bias in the second half 
than the first, a 2x2x2x2 mixed model ANOVA was carried out.  The dependent variable 
measured was recognition rating, the between subjects variable was anxiety group (high or 
low) and the within subjects variables were item valence (positive/negative), target/foil item 
and test half (first and second).  The relevant descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.12 
and a summary of the results of the ANOVA are presented in Table 6.13.     
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There was a main effect for target/foil items, which as illustrated, in Figure 6.3, 
shows that there were significantly higher recognition scores for target than foil items, with 
mean recognition scores of 2.6 and 1.5, respectively. 
A main effect was also observed for anxiety group.  As illustrated in Figure 6.4 low 
anxious participants reported higher recognition scores in general than the high anxious 
participants, with mean recognition scores of 2.16 and 1.96, respectively.  
Table 6.11  
Summary of Levene Statistic for Homogeneity of Variance 
Item Test Half Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig 
Positive Target 1 .469 1 33 .498 
 2 .166 1 33 .687 
Positive Foil 1 .331 1 33 .568 
 2 .003 1 33 .956 
Negative Target 1 .127 1 33 .724 
 2 1.148 1 33 .292 
Negative Foil 1 1.119 1 33 .298 
 2 .178 1 33 .676 
 
A significant interaction was also observed for anxiety, test half and target/foil 
items, as illustrated in Figure 6.5, where there appear to be differences between the high and 
low anxious groups in recognition of target items between the first and second half of the test.  
This interaction was explored further in a series of post-hoc t-tests, with a Bonferonni 
correction for multiple tests applied, requiring an alpha level of .025.  It was observed that for 
the low anxious group, there was a significant increase in recognition of target items from the 
first to the second half of the test, t(19)=2.48, p<.025, with mean recognition scores of 2.62 
and 2.77, respectively.  However, for the high anxious group, there was no change in 
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recognition of target items between the two halves of the test, t(14)=1.31, p=.213, with mean 
recognition scores of 2.52 and 2.41, respectively.   
Table 6.12 
Descriptive Statistics for Recognition Scores on Interpretation Bias 
Item Type  Test Half  Low Anxious  High Anxious 
    Mean SD N  Mean SD N 
Positive 
Target 
 1  2.60 .201 20  2.44 .466 15 
 2  2.85 .429 20  2.56 .510 15 
 
 
 
 
        
Positive 
Foil 
 1  1.70 .320 20  1.44 .280 15 
 2  1.63 .342 20  1.53 .367 15 
 
 
 
 
        
Negative 
Target 
 1  2.65 .523 20  2.61 .443 15 
 2  2.69 .609 20  2.67 .478 15 
 
 
 
 
        
Negative  
Foil 
 1  1.54 .375 20  1.39 .308 15 
 2  1.64 .383 20  1.47 .381 15 
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Table 6.13 
Results of Mixed-Model ANOVA for Recognition Scores (Sphericity Assumed) 
Within-Subjects Effects       
Effect Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Effect 
Size 
Valence .24 1 .24 .77 .387 .66 
Valence x Anxiety .00 1 .00 .00 .966 .00 
Error (Valence) 10.44 33 .32 - - - 
Target/Foil 73.99 1 73.99 467.54 .000 1.00 
Target/Foil x Anxiety .06 1 .06 .36 .554 .51 
Error (Target/Foil) 5.22 33 .16 - - - 
Test Half .08 1 .08 .71 .405 .64 
Test Half x Anxiety .16 1 .16 1.36 .251 .76 
Error (Test Half) 3.81 33 .12 - - - 
Valence x Target/Foil  .00 1 .00 .00 .961 .00 
Valence x Target/Foil x Anxiety .00 1 .01 .06 .809 .24 
Error (Valence x Target/Foil) 2.64 33 .08 - - - 
Valence x Test Half .28 1 .28 2.59 .117 .85 
Valence x Test Half x Anxiety .20 1 .20 1.84 .184 .80 
Error (Valence x Test Half) 3.50 33 .11 - - - 
Target/Foil x Test Half .02 1 .02 .27 .604 .46 
Target/Foil x Test Half x Anxiety .45 1 .45 7.13 .012 .94 
Error (Target/Foil x Test Half) 2.01 33 .06 - - - 
Valence x Target/Foil x Test Half .73 1 .73 7.44 .010 .94 
Valence x Target/Foil x Test Half x 
Anxiety 
.01 1 .01 .08 .784 .27 
Error (Valence x Target/Foil x Test 
Half) 
3.22 33 .10 - - - 
 
Between Subjects Effects 
      
Anxiety 2.652 1 2.652 4.810 .035 .91 
Error 18.20 33 .55 - -  
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Figure 6.3  
Mean Recognition Scores for Target and Foil Items 
 
 
Figure 6.4 
Mean Recognition Scores across All Items for High and Low Anxious Participants 
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Figure 6.5 
Mean Recognition Scores for High and Low Anxious Participants, at Times One and Two, for 
Target and Foil Items   
 
A further interaction was observed for item valence, target/foils and test half, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.6.  In order to decompose this three-way interaction further, two 
separate 2x2 repeated measures ANOVAs were carried out, firstly for target items with item 
valence (positive/negative) and test half (first or second).  As summarised in Table 6.14, for 
target items there was a significant interaction between item valence and test half.  The 
interaction between item valence and test half for target items was further explored in a series 
of posthoc t-tests, using the Bonferonni correction for multiple tests, with an applied alpha 
level of .025 for significance.  A significance increase was observed for positive target items 
from the first to the second half of the test, t(34)=2.7, p<.025, with mean recognition scores 
of 2.5 and 2.7, respectively.  There was however, no significant difference in recognition of 
negative target items between the first and second half, t(34)=1.2, p=.223, with mean 
recognition scores of 2.6 and 2.5, respectively.   
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
High Anx. Low Anx. 
Target 1 Target 2 Foil 1 Foil 2
E
stim
ated M
argin
al
 M
ean
s
 
114 
 
Figure 6.6 
Mean Recognition Scores for Positively and Negatively Valenced, Target and Foil Items, 
Across Times One and Two 
 
Table 6.14 
Summary of Within-Subjects ANOVA for Target Items   
Effect Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Effect 
Size 
Valence .11 1 .11 .40 .533 .53 
Error (Valence) 9.81 34 .29 - - - 
Test Half .05 1 .05 .48 .492 .57 
Error (Test Half) 3.40 34 .10 - - - 
Valence x Test Half .86 1 .86 5.47 .025 .92 
Error (Valence x Test Half) 5.38 34 .16 - - - 
 
In the second 2x2 within subjects ANOVA for foil items, with test half (first and 
second) and item valence (positive/negative) as within-subjects variables, this interaction was 
1.45
1.65
1.85
2.05
2.25
2.45
2.65
First Half Second Half
Positive Target Negative Target Positive Foil Negative Foil 
E
stim
ated M
argin
al
 M
ean
s
 
115 
 
not significant.  No main effects for test half or item valence were observed either, as 
summarised in Table 6.15.  
Table 6.15 
Summary of Within-Subjects ANOVA for Foil Items   
Effect Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Effect 
Size 
Valence .14 1 .14 1.44 .239 .77 
Error (Valence) 3.27 34 .10 - - - 
Test Half .07 1 .07 .81 .376 .67 
Error (Test Half) 3.09 34 .09 - - - 
Valence x Test Half .07 1 .07 1.61 .213 .79 
Error (Valence x Test Half) 1.55 34 .05 - - - 
 
The predicted four-way interaction for anxiety, item valence, target/foils and test 
half, was not found to be significant.  Therefore, the hypothesis that there would be an 
increasingly positive interpretation bias for low anxious participants, and a consistently 
negative interpretation bias for the high anxious group, was not supported.  A posthoc power 
calculation revealed that the achieved power was .97, suggesting that the lack of a significant 
effect was not due to a lack of power.   
6.1.4.5 Summary of Results of Interpretation Bias Test Analysis 
The results discussed above, demonstrate that, as expected, participants showed 
significantly higher recognition ratings of target than foil items.  Recognition of target items, 
increased from the first to the second half of the test for the low anxious participants, but not 
for the high anxious participants.  A further three-way interaction was observed, between 
item valence, target/foils and test half, with the observation that recognition of positive target 
items significantly increased from the first to the second half.  This suggests that all the 
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participants showed an increasingly incongruent, positive interpretation bias from the first to 
the second half of the test.  There was no difference in the interpretation biases of high and 
low anxious participants, suggesting that both groups, in this experiment, were equally able to 
employ mood incongruent, positive interpretation biases when in an anxious mood.   
6.1.5  Summary of Results of Experiment Two 
After an induced anxious mood, all participants showed an incongruent 
interpretation bias, which became increasingly positive over time and as would be predicted, 
participants then showed an increase in low NA and a decrease in high NA, i.e. a reduction in 
anxious mood.  Contrary to the initial hypotheses, there were no interactions observed for the 
high and low anxious groups, except for the low anxious participants showing an increase in 
recognition of target items, for which there may be several explanations, which are discussed 
further in the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER 7: EXPERIMENT TWO 
7.1  Discussion 
7.1.1  Overview of Chapter 
In this chapter, a brief discussion of the reported findings is presented.  A summary 
of the hypotheses to be tested is given in section 7.1.2, followed the by results found in 
relation to these in section 7.1.3.  The reported results are then discussed in relation to 
previous findings and the theoretical basis to this study in section 7.1.4, with concluding 
remarks provided in section 7.1.5.  
7.1.2  Summary of Main Hypotheses 
Based on previous findings in relation to the dual process model, it was hypothesised 
that both high and low anxious participants would show congruent changes in mood 
following an anxious mood induction procedure.  Low trait anxious participants, as a result of 
substantive processing would show negative interpretation biases in the first half of the test, 
which through motivated processing strategies, would become increasingly positive in the 
second half.  High trait anxious participants however were expected to engage in substantive 
processing throughout, with mood congruent interpretation biases observed, which due to a 
consequential drain on cognitive resources, would have prevented them from engaging in 
motivated processing strategies at any time.  As a result of motivated, incongruent 
interpretation biases, low trait anxious participants’ mood was expected to return to baseline, 
whereas due to a failure to engage in motivated processing, high trait anxious participants 
would maintain an anxious mood at the end of the procedure.   
7.1.3  Summary of Results 
The predicted increase in high NA and reduction in low NA following the anxious 
mood induction procedure was observed for both the high and low trait anxious participants.  
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Although it was hypothesised that as a result of the mood induction there would be 
differences between the high and low anxious participants’ responses on the test for 
interpretation biases, this was not found to be the case.   It was found however, that both the 
high and low anxious participants demonstrated an increasingly positive (i.e. mood 
incongruent) interpretation bias over time.  This was evidenced by an increase in recognition 
of positive target items, and a slight but non-significant decrease in the recognition of 
negative target items.  As would be predicted therefore, high NA decreased and low NA 
increased, at the end of the procedure, for both high and low trait anxious participants.  This 
result, while in line with the idea of a causal effect for interpretation biases, did not support 
the hypothesis that high trait anxious participants would be unable to devote sufficient 
cognitive resources to engage in motivated processing.  An unexpected observation for the 
main effect of anxiety was also observed, with higher recognition ratings overall for low 
anxious participants.   
7.1.4  Discussion of Results 
The results reported from experiment two, would appear to support a dual process 
model of mood regulation, with the observation of increasingly positive responses over time 
and with a reduction in anxious mood.  This study also provided evidence for the 
hypothesised interaction between anxious mood and interpretation biases, with an induced 
anxious mood leading to more incongruent interpretation biases.  The observation that 
anxious mood ratings became less anxious at end of the procedure however should be 
interpreted with caution.  As discussed in the earlier chapter in relation to experiment one, 
this change in mood may not be as a result of mood regulation, but rather the result of natural 
mood decay, during a rather long and repetitive test.  The apparent effect of mood on 
interpretation biases therefore should also be interpreted with caution, as any changes in bias 
over time, may also be as a result of other influences on mood during the procedure.   
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Drawing on evidence from dual process models of depression, it was hypothesised 
that high anxious participants would engage in substantive processing, which would maintain 
an anxious mood, leading to depletion of cognitive resources meaning that they would be 
unable to engage in substantive, incongruent processing.  However, in this study high anxious 
participants did demonstrate incongruent processing, with no differences in the processing 
styles to the low anxious group.  A possible explanation for this finding may be that in 
completing a task placing relatively little demand on cognitive resources, high anxious 
participants have sufficient cognitive resources still available in order to engage in effortful 
regulation of a mildly anxious mood.  Further studies could explore this question, with the 
addition of a cognitive load during the interpretation bias test.  With the reduction of 
available cognitive resources, it would be expected that high anxious participants would then 
be unable to engage in such an effortful and demanding process of mood regulation, whereas 
low anxious participants should still be able to.   
In this study, it was observed that high anxious participants reported generally lower 
recall for all items, than the low anxious participants.  This main effect was not predicted, nor 
is there any theoretical basis for why this might have occurred.  However, some tentative 
suggestions might be made as to why this occurred.  As discussed above, it is hypothesised 
that the process of mood regulation is more effortful for the high anxious participants; it may 
therefore be the case that high anxious participants were generally less able to attend to the 
task due to the cognitive effects of the anxious mood.  This may give further cause for future 
research examining the effect of a cognitive load on high anxious participants’ ability to 
regulate an anxious mood.   
In terms of the theoretical implications of these findings, these are discussed further 
in Chapter 8, drawing on the findings from both experiments one and two.   
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7.1.5  Summary 
In this second experiment, high and low anxious participants were exposed to an 
anxious mood induction procedure, with congruent effects observed for high and low NA 
ratings.  Both high and low anxious participants demonstrated an increasingly positive 
interpretation bias, with an anxious mood reducing at the end of the procedure.  Further 
research is suggested to explore the effects of an increased cognitive load on high anxious 
participants’ ability to regulate mood under similar conditions.   
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CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
8.1  Overview of Chapter 
A brief overview of the stated hypotheses is provided in section 8.2, followed by a 
summary of the findings in experiments one and two in section 8.3.  The results are then 
discussed in relation to the observed differences between high and low anxious participants, 
along with the limitations, with suggestions for future research in section 8.4.  In section 8.5 
the results are discussed in relation to the dual process model of mood regulation and in 
section 8.6, how these results might be explained by hedonistic or contextual motivators.  The 
implications of these findings for the causal effects of interpretation biases on anxiety are 
discussed in section 8.7.  A summary of the validity of the measures and design is provided in 
section 8.8, followed by discussion of the clinical implication of this and future studies in 
section 8.9.  The general strengths and limitations of this study are discussed in section 8.10, 
following which an overall summary of the study and conclusions are presented in section 
8.11.   
8.2  Summary of Hypotheses 
The dual process model would predict that an induced mood would have an effect on 
subsequent cognitive processes, which would be initially congruent with mood as a result of 
substantive processing, becoming increasingly incongruent over time, with effortful, 
motivated processing.  Participants high in trait anxiety, were hypothesised to be unable to 
engage in motivated processing during an anxious mood, thereby maintaining a congruent 
bias throughout, without evidence of mood regulation.   
8.3  Summary of Findings 
In two experiments, high and low trait anxious participants were exposed to a 
positive and an anxious mood induction procedure and effects on interpretation biases were 
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measured as evidence of mood regulatory strategies.  Following a positive mood induction, 
both high and low anxious participants showed a general, positive response bias, which 
became increasingly positive over time.  However following an anxious mood induction 
procedure, both high and low anxious participants showed an increasingly positive 
interpretation bias, which may be interpreted as evidence of a change from substantive 
processing, to a more effortful style of processing in order to regulate mood, as proposed by 
the dual process model.   
8.4  Effects of Trait Anxiety on Mood Regulation  
It was not predicted that any differences would be observed between high and low 
anxious participants, when in a positive mood, as theoretically high trait anxiety should only 
affect the regulation of negative affect, not positive affect.  In this study, it was observed that 
neither high nor low anxious participants attempted to regulate a positive mood, with 
evidence only of a positive response bias.  Low anxious participants did however, report 
significantly higher recognition of positive than negative items, whereas the low anxious 
participants did not.  This suggests that there is some evidence of low anxious participants 
having a slightly more positive bias than high anxious participants.   
In an induced anxious mood, there was a significant difference in the overall 
recognition of items, with low anxious participants reporting higher recognition of items than 
the high anxious participants.  As discussed in the previous chapter, this may be due to high 
anxious participants applying more cognitive resources to the effortful process of mood 
regulation than their low anxious counterparts, therefore being less able to attend to the task 
in general and being less confident in their responses.   
To test whether the above hypothesis may be correct, it is proposed that future 
research could explore the effects of an additional cognitive load to tests of interpretation 
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biases following both a positive and anxious mood induction.  Such research would help to 
determine whether in an anxious mood, high trait anxious participants still have the cognitive 
resources available to regulate mood through incongruent interpretation biases and if this 
differs to low trait anxious participants’ responses under the same conditions.  Also, as no 
evidence of mood regulation was observed in a positive mood condition, the question of 
whether participants would be more motivated to repair a positive mood, due to the 
increasing demands on cognitive resources, and whether high and low trait anxious 
participants would be equally able to do so, could be further investigated.  Such studies may 
have more ecological validity inasmuch as in most people’s daily lives, there are constant 
demands placed on cognitive resources, which may compete with the demands of mood 
regulation.  Therefore when other demands take precedence, mood regulation may not be 
achievable, particularly for high trait anxious participants if, as is hypothesised, being so 
overwhelmed by the anxious affect, they have even less cognitive resources available.   
As discussed in Chapter 3, due to the difficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of 
high anxious participants, plans to exclude participants in the mid-range for trait anxiety had 
to be abandoned, in favour of a median split.  This is likely to have been one reason for few 
differences being observed between the high and low anxious groups.  In future studies 
wishing to explore differences in high and low anxious participants, participants should be 
allocated according to tertile or even quartile splits on trait anxiety measures to ensure that 
any true differences between the groups can be observed.  In overcoming the difficulties with 
recruitment, the population recruited from may be widened to include community samples for 
example, or a more direct approach to recruitment, by attending classes for example, rather 
than by email and posters alone.   
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8.5  Implications for a Dual Process Model of Mood Regulation 
The evidence reported here from both experiments would appear to lend support to a 
dual process model of mood regulation, although there are limitations as to what conclusions 
may be drawn.  As predicted by this model, in an anxious mood, participants demonstrated an 
increasingly incongruent positive, interpretation bias over time.  As may also be predicted 
from this model, a positive mood led to congruent positive response biases.  However, the 
effects of these cognitive biases, should lead to congruent effects on subsequent mood.  
Although there was evidence for congruent effects on mood in experiment two, incongruent 
effects were observed in experiment one.  This is likely to be due to methodological issues, 
whereby changes in mood were likely to be as a result of natural mood decay, with both 
positive and anxious moods returning to baseline levels, irrespective of observed cognitive 
biases.  In the methods used here, there are difficulties in differentiating any changes in mood 
from those due to cognitive processes and those due to mood decay.  As the moods induced 
were relatively mild, they could be expected to decay relatively quickly, which combined 
with a fairly lengthy test for interpretation biases, would see any moods dissipated by the end 
of the task.  This may also have implications for the observed effects on cognitive biases over 
time.  Although interpretation biases are said to occur at the time of encoding, rather than at 
recall (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002), induced moods may already have begun to decay during 
the initial reading and encoding of the ambiguous sentences.  This may suggest that observed 
changes in cognitive biases were actually mood congruent throughout, rather than evidence 
of a motivated mood regulating strategy.  However, the observation of an increasingly 
positive response bias in the positive mood condition, would suggest otherwise, as if 
cognitive biases were changing congruently with mood, a less positive bias would have been 
observed.   
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This may be an issue that is difficult to overcome within an experimental paradigm.  
An important flaw in the design of the study was that there was no baseline measure of how 
long mood was naturally maintained in the absence of a test for interpretation biases.  With 
this as a consideration for future studies, different mood induction procedures could also be 
piloted to examine which method induces the most persistent mood.   
In the test for interpretation biases, the biases are said to occur at the encoding stage, 
whilst reading the ambiguous scenarios, therefore by the time participants get to the sentence 
recognition stage, any mood regulation or mood maintenance has already taken place.  In the 
time taken to complete the subsequent recognition task, any effects on mood may be lost due 
to decay or indeed boredom.  It may therefore be beneficial in future studies  in trying to 
capture any relevant mood changes, to measure mood after reading the ambiguous scenarios 
but before completing the sentence recognition task.  
8.6  Hedonistic or Contextual Motivations for Mood Regulation? 
According to the contextual model of mood regulation, it would be expected that 
mood would be regulated or maintained according to the demands of the situation.  Were this 
the case in this study, then it would be hypothesised that, given that the contextual demands 
were equivalent across the two experiments, participants would have been equally motivated 
to either regulate or maintain their mood.  This was not observed in this study, therefore 
suggesting, that at least for this procedure, contextual demands were not the main motivation 
for mood regulation. 
Consistent with the hedonistic model, however, it was observed that a positive mood 
led to congruent cognitive biases, whereas as an anxious mood led to incongruent biases.  
This may suggest therefore, that in the absence of other demands, hedonistic concerns would 
drive mood regulation, in order to maintain a positive mood and reduce an anxious mood, 
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which in this study was observed for both high and low trait anxious participants.  As 
discussed in section 8.4, further research with the addition of cognitive load, could also 
determine whether hedonistic concerns are still evident when competing demands are placed 
on cognitive resources, or if contextual demands would then take precedence over the desire 
or ability to regulate mood.   
8.7  Causal Effects of Interpretation Biases on Mood  
Despite some of the limitations of this study, there are some important conclusions 
that can be drawn in regards to the direction of influence between mood and interpretation 
biases.  Previous research within the area has asserted that interpretation biases have a direct 
and causal effect on mood, with a wealth of evidence to support these claims (e.g. Mathews 
& Mackintosh, 2000; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002).  Although few conclusions can be drawn 
from this study as to the effects interpretation biases have on mood, there is however 
evidence for the effects of an induced mood on interpretation biases.  The evidence reported 
here would suggest that there is likely to be an interaction between interpretation biases and 
induced mood, as proposed by the dual process model, rather than a uni-directional causal 
relationship.  It was also shown that these interpretation biases were only activated in a 
anxious and not a positive mood, which may suggest that either interpretation biases are only 
activated in response to an anxious mood, or that they are only activated during attempts to 
regulate a mood, be it positive or anxious.  Given that in this study,  participants appeared to 
attempt to maintain a positive mood, rather than regulate it, no further conclusions regarding 
this can be drawn from this study but could be addressed in further studies where a cognitive 
load is employed, which may motivate the regulation of a positive mood, as discussed above.   
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8.8 Measures and Design 
8.8.1  Measures of Anxiety  
As discussed in Chapter 2, there were some difficulties experienced in using the 
MMANX to predict anxiety levels on the STAI.  Although previous studies had observed 
correlations of .87, only .78 was achieved in this study.  However, it is suggested that this is 
not necessarily due to the MMANX being an inappropriate measure.  It may be expected that 
a number of factors could have contributed to the discrepancies observed.  Firstly, there was 
often a delay of up to two weeks between the screening questionnaires being completed and 
attendance at the experiment, which could see anxiety levels change, particularly around 
exam time, as was reported by several participants.  Also, there was a change in context, from 
completing the MMANX anonymously to completing the STAI in the presence of the 
researcher, which could have affected how some people responded.  
However, as the MMANX is a relatively new measure of anxiety, further research 
may be required in establishing how reliable it is as a measure of trait anxiety, with scores 
being compared over time and whether it is more susceptible to changes in state anxiety than 
more conventional measures such as the STAI.    
8.8.2  Measures of Mood 
A brief, visual analogue scale to indicate mood was employed in this study, with 
particular items related to high and low NA and high and low PA, which were selected 
according to each experiment and mood induction procedure.  These items were able to 
detect significant changes in mood over time in both experiments, therefore it is thought to 
have been an appropriate measure of mood in this study.  However, if mood were to be 
measured more frequently as is suggested for future research, fewer items might be used.  
However, one of the strengths of this measure with all eight items, is that it may be less 
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susceptible to response biases, if for example only levels of anxiety or happiness were 
enquired about.  Additionally, using the same items in both experiments, eliminated this as an 
extraneous variable between experiments.   
8.8.3  Measures of Interpretation Biases 
As discussed in section 8.5, the ambiguous scenario method was effective in 
demonstrating an interpretation bias in experiment two.  One of the strengths of this measure 
is that it is able to detect true interpretation biases, as opposed to response biases.  Given the 
number of items, it was also able to show changes in interpretation biases over time and 
contained a balance of social and physical threat items, which other measures do not.   
As discussed by Salemink et al. (2007a), some participants may have been aware of 
the aims of this experiment, thus biasing their responses.   This was not explicitly measured 
in this study, although most participants were asked at the end, what they understood of the 
experiment and what they thought was being measured.  Save for a few, most participants 
were unaware of the aims of the experiment.  Some had noticed that the recognition items 
were different to the original scenarios and a few reported not being able to really remember.  
Only a few reported that they had become aware during the experiment that they had made 
either positive or negative interpretations immediately following the mood inductions and 
two reported having made a conscious effort to change from a negative bias to a positive bias, 
although mood regulation was not cited as a reason for doing so.   
Although these subjective and casual observations may not provide evidence against 
the fact that participants may have been aware of the study’s aims, it does imply that these 
results cannot be completely explained by participants being aware of their cognitive biases 
being measured and affected by mood.  However, there is certainly room for future studies to 
take more systematic measures of how aware participants are of being tested for their 
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interpretations and also that the purpose of the mood induction was to change their 
interpretations in order to estimate whether this mediated any effects observed.      
8.8.4 Threats to Social and Physical Self 
In addition to some of the difficulties in detecting changes in mood discussed in 
section 8.5, one limitation of this study was the lack of control over the type of threat 
pertained to in the mood induction and subsequently measured in the tests.  The positive 
mood induction could be said to relate to positive, social events whereas the anxious mood 
induction was related more to threats to the physical self.  As was reported by Beard and 
Amir (2009) there may be differences in the interpretation biases observed, dependent on the 
type of threat experienced in the mood induction, although this has not always been found to 
be the case (Hunter et al., 2006; Vinnocombe et al., 2006).  However, a strength of this study 
was that interpretations of both physical and social threats were measured, therefore this 
should control for any possible bias as a result.   
8.8.5  Randomisation 
There is a small possibility that some bias may have been introduced through a lack 
of randomisation of participants to each experiment.  Although completely random allocation 
was not appropriate for pragmatic reasons as discussed in Chapter 2, it could be argued that 
block randomisation could have been a viable alternative.  This may however, have reduced 
the flexibility for participants to choose from a range of session times.  It would also have 
been difficult to implement using the online scheduler system, as it is not possible to 
determine which participants can sign up to which sessions.  As this is a new system for the 
university and modifications are still being made in how it is used, this may be a 
consideration for future experiments, if such a facility could be built in.   
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8.8.6  Analyses 
It is acknowledged that to strengthen the argument for the differential effects of 
positive and anxious moods on interpretation biases, rather than conducting two separate 
experiments and analysing the data separately, ideally induced mood would have been 
included as a second between-subjects variable and incorporated into a single analysis.  
However, in this study, due to the small number of high anxious participants in particular, 
this would have reduced the power of the analysis and some important effects would have 
been lost.  It is hoped however, that given that all other variables were kept constant between 
the two experiments, such as by running the experiments alongside each other to rule out 
effects of time of year and exam times for example, this may increase the likelihood that 
differences between the two experiments were true differences due to induced mood.  
Theoretically, it is also appropriate to conduct two separate experiments, given that positive 
and anxious moods are not necessarily correlated, therefore it is important to examine the two 
theoretically different constructs separately.   
8.9 Overall Strengths and Limitations of Study 
As discussed in previous sections, there are a number of limitations of this study, in 
terms of the methodology and the recruitment and allocation of high and low anxious 
participants.  There may also be some question as to whether it is appropriate to generalise 
from experimental studies to real world phenomena. It is acknowledged that the effects 
observed in this study are unlikely to reflect how mood is actually regulated outside of the 
experimental situation.  In reality, the moods that are experienced are likely to be of greater 
intensity and personal relevance, the demands placed upon an individual may compete with 
the demands of mood regulation and individuals may employ a greater range of strategies to 
maintain or regulate a mood, such as memory recall (e.g. Josephson, Singer, & Salovey, 
1996), attentional biases (e.g. MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002) 
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and behavioural strategies (e.g. Morris & Reilly, 1987).  However, it is also argued that given 
the complexity of the mood regulatory process, controlled experimental designs such as this, 
can enable researchers and indeed clinicians, to begin to unpick and expand upon some of the 
processes involved, in order to begin to make sense of the complex regulatory system and 
begin to understand at which point these processes may break down in those individuals 
unable to adequately regulate mood.   
8.10  Clinical Implications  
It was particularly interesting to note that interpretation biases were activated in both 
high and low trait anxious participants and that both groups showed evidence of a mood 
incongruent interpretation bias when in an anxious mood.  This is in contrast to previous 
findings, where high anxious participants are generally reported to have more negative 
interpretation biases than low anxious participants.  However, due to the possibility that there 
may have been insufficient differences in trait anxiety levels between the high and low 
anxious groups, it may only be concluded that non-clinically anxious participants, show 
evidence of mood incongruent interpretation biases when in an anxious mood, which may 
serve to regulate anxious moods.  It would however be very interesting to explore this further 
with groups at the extreme ends of trait anxiety, to see whether similar effects are still 
observed.  This may have implications for the clinical application of cognitive bias 
modification (CBM) if it is demonstrated that high anxious participants are anxious due to a 
failure to employ motivated processing when under stress, rather than having just a generally 
negative cognitive bias.  For example, if high anxious participants only show negative 
interpretation biases when under stress, then training of neutral biases without stress, may 
limit the generalisability of the training, if it is not conducted within the situations that most 
require it.  Equally if the converse were found and high trait anxious participants were still 
able to show motivated processing with a cognitive load, then this might lead to further 
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research exploring at what other point during the process of mood regulation does it 
breakdown for high anxious individuals, for example if motivated strategies are simply 
ineffective at reducing anxiety for those individuals due to other variables not examined here, 
such as attentional biases.   
There are also important implications for the understanding of anxiety, through a 
novel use of the dual-process model, which until now has only been applied to ‘normal’ 
mood processes and depression.  As was seen in experiment two, untrained interpretation 
biases did change over time, as the model would predict, although only following an anxious 
mood induction.  Whilst further research is required to explore whether clinical anxiety can 
be understood as a failure to initiate motivate processing, it does highlight the importance of 
including time as a variable in future studies.  As discussed in Chapter One, without time as a 
variable (or test half in this study), important effects may be missed and indeed, potentially 
important differences between high and low anxious participants, overlooked. If, as is 
predicted by this model, both low and high anxious participants both start with strategic 
(congruent) processing and over time, only low anxious participants will change to a 
motivated strategy, then interventions could also be developed with a greater focus on 
encouraging this change, as opposed to looking to develop motivated processing from the 
outset.  It may also conversely be that the differences lie at the substantive processing stage, 
with for example, high anxious individuals being more prone to having initially more 
negative interpretations thereby having to employ greater cognitive resources by having to 
constantly try to switch to a motivated processing, meaning they are less likely to have the 
cognitive resources available when under stressful conditions.  Such research using the dual 
process model framework would serve an important function in further developing our 
understanding of the development of anxiety disorders and subsequently further refine 
clinical interventions.   
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8.11  Conclusions  
This study has attempted to explore the mood regulatory effects of interpretation 
biases on positive and anxious moods, within a dual process model framework.  Whilst there 
are some acknowledged limitations, this study does provide preliminary evidence of the 
interaction between anxiety and interpretation biases for an anxious mood which can be 
understood within a dual process model framework.  In the absence of other contextual 
demands, it was observed that hedonistic concerns motivated mood regulatory processes, 
although the subsequent effects on mood could not be established.  Further research is needed 
in order to explore how these processes may differ in a truly high anxious population and if 
increasing the demands on cognitive resources would serve to accentuate differences in high 
and low anxious participants’ ability to employ cognitive biases as a mood regulatory 
strategy.   There are suggested implications for the clinical application of cognitive bias 
modification, although further research is required to establish under what conditions anxiety 
regulation fails for high anxious individuals.   
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Appendix A 
Power Calculation 
 
 Segal et al. (2006) reported an effect size of .50, for a three-way interaction 
between item valence, mood induction and prime type, using the homograph measure 
of interpretation biases.   
 Hunter et al. (2006) did not report on the predicted three-way interaction 
(mood induction, item valence and target/foils), however an effect size of .89 was 
reported for an interaction between item valence and mood induction, using the 
ambiguous scenario measure of interpretation biases.  
 Segal et al. (2006), measuring mood at three time points, following both 
positive and negative mood inductions, reported an effect size of .98.   
 The following calculation, was entered into G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007)1, based on the most conservative reported effect size of .50.  
Level of significance (α) was set at .05. 
Power was set at .90. 
 For each experiment using two groups and three within-subjects measures, the 
sample size required was estimated to be 12 per group.   
 
 
1 Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A-G., & Buchner, A. (2007).  G*Power 3: A flexible 
statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. 
Behavior Research Methods, 39, 175-191. 
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Appendix B 
Initial Participant Recruitment Email  
 
Dear  
 
RE: Psychological study - The effects on comprehension of viewing 
emotional films 
 
I am a trainee Clinical Psychologist, undertaking my doctoral studies 
at the Faculty of Health at UEA.  I am contacting you to invite you 
to participate in the above study which will form part of my thesis. 
 
This is an exciting project looking at the effect of emotions on the 
way people think and behave.  It is hoped that the results of this 
study will help inform future treatments and interventions for people 
with emotional disorders. 
 
The study will take up to an hour of your time and will take place on 
the UEA campus.  We hope that taking part in the study will be an 
interesting experience and an opportunity for you to find out more 
about psychological research.  As compensation for your time, we 
would also like to offer a £5 payment and some information about 
where to access support for mental health problems at UEA and in the 
surrounding area. 
 
If you would like to know more about this or other studies that are 
happening at UEA, please contact me at l.teape@uea.ac.uk directly 
(please do not reply to the sender). 
 
Best wishes 
Lynda Teape 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
 
Supervised by 
Dr Bundy Mackintosh, Senior Lecturer in Abnormal Psychology Dr 
Helen Buxton, Clinical Psychologist and Senior Clinical Tutor 
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Appendix C 
Mental Health Information Leaflet 
Information for Students 
 
Being a student can be a very exciting time, but it can also bring with it a number of 
different stresses.  You may be away from home, all your friends and family for the 
first time, in a new city and trying to make new friends.  You may be experiencing 
financial difficulties or struggling with the academic pressures of the course.  Many 
people at some point in their lives have found that they would benefit from some 
support or advice to help them through a difficult period.   
 
There are a number of places that you can access support and advice at these times.  
Many of the organisations we have listed below have a range of services available, 
including on-line information, telephone help lines and face-to-face counselling.   
 
If you are concerned… 
If you are concerned about your own emotional well-being or mental health, or that of 
someone close to you, please do talk to your GP who will be able to help.     
 
Norwich Mind 
www.norwichmind.org.uk 
Norwich Mind is a highly regarded provider of mental health services in the City of 
Norwich and in the Central area of Norfolk.  The services are easy to access and 
many can be delivered to people in a place of their choosing.  
If you need assistance and you reside in Norfolk, you can contact their Advice 
Service, Mind Body & Soul, on 01603 432457 or by email at 
mbs@norwichmind.org.uk  
 
If you are caring for someone with a mental health problem you can contact their 
Carer Support Service on 01603 432457.  
  
rethink 
www.rethink.org 
rethink is an organisation that provides information and a range of services to 
individuals nationwide.  Their website provides information for people experiencing 
mental health problems, their carers and those working and volunteering in mental 
health services.  They also provide information and links to services available in your 
area.   
 
Contact details: 
Rethink general enquiries 
Telephone: 0845 456 0455 or email:info@rethink.org  
 
National advice service  
Telephone: 0207 840 3188 (open 10am to 3pm Monday, Wednesday & 
Friday; 10am to 1pm Tuesday & Thursday) or e-mail: advice@rethink.org  
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University of East Anglia Counselling Services 
http://www1.uea.ac.uk/cm/home/services/students/ucs 
The University Counselling Service is part of Student Services and their aim is 
to enable students to achieve their academic and personal goals by providing 
confidential counselling and support for any difficulties encountered while at UEA. 
In addition to providing one-to-one counselling, the Counselling Service also offers 
group work and workshops to both students and staff. They work closely with other 
support services to provide an integrated service. 
The Counselling Service website contains information, including links to online 
cognitive behavioural courses and guides to managing commonly experienced 
difficulties such as stress and perfectionism.   
 
Samaritans 
www.samaritans.org.uk 
The Samaritans provides confidential non-judgemental emotional support, 24 hours a 
day for people who are experiencing feelings of distress or despair, including those 
which could lead to suicide. 
They offer their service by telephone, email, letter and face to face in most of their 
branches. 
08457 90 90 90 
jo@samaritans.org 
19 St. Stephen's Square, Norwich, Norfolk 
NR1 3SS 
United Kingdom 
Phone: (08457) 90 90 90 
 
Mental Health Care 
www.mentalhealthcare.org.uk 
A useful web-based resource containing mental health information for friends, family 
and carers.  It contains information about mental health and mental illness, research 
findings from the Institute of Psychiatry and South London and Maudsley NHS 
Foundation Trust and personal stories written by carers.   There are also links to 
other organisations and local services in your area.   
 
Bridge 
BRIDGES is a drop-in centre for people with mental health issues. The Centre is 
open to anyone over 16 years old without referral. The Centre offers companionship 
and mutual support, a choice of activities and gives members a full say in how the 
centre operates with the opportunity to be involved in the everyday running of the 
centre. 
52 Magdalen Road 
Norwich 
NR3 4AQ 
01603 403411 
bridges@rethink.org 
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Appendix D 
Letter of Approval from UEA, Faculty of Health Ethics Committee, 4th July 2008 
 
 
Miss Lynda Teape 
Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
Room 2.01 
Elizabeth Fry Building 
UEA 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
 
4th July 2008 
 
 
Dear Lynda, 
 
The effects of induced anxiety on interpretation biases in high and low anxious 
participants – 2008030 
 
The resubmission of your above proposal has now been considered by the Chair of the 
FOH Ethics Committee. We can now confirm that your proposal has now been 
approved.  
 
Please could you ensure that any amendments to either the protocol or documents 
submitted are notified to us in advance and also that any adverse events which occur 
during your project are reported to the committee. Please could you also arrange to 
send us a report once your project is complete. 
 
The committee would like to wish you good luck with your project.  
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
Debbie Graver 
Notetaker 
Faculty of Health Ethics Committee 
Tel: 01603 591023 
Email: Deborah.Graver@uea.ac.uk 
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Appendix E 
Letter of Approval from UEA, Faculty of Health Ethics Committee for Amendments, 
22nd October 2008  
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Appendix F 
Letter of Approval from UEA, Faculty of Health Ethics Committee for Amendments, 
26th March 2009
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Appendix G 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Cognition and Emotion Research Project 
 
Title of Project: The Effects on Comprehension of Viewing Emotional Films 
 
In order to improve understanding of the way our emotions work, new research 
projects regularly take place with the eventual aim of developing improved treatments 
and services for those individuals that suffer from emotional disorders or other mental 
health problems.  I would therefore like to invite you to take part in a current research 
project.  Before you decide, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the following 
information carefully.  Talk to others about the study if you wish.  If you are 
agreeable I will go over the details when we meet to make sure you understand what 
is involved and you will be asked to sign a form to give your consent to taking part.  
Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Psychologists have realised for some time that when people experience emotions 
there are changes in the way they think and behave and these changes can perpetuate 
those emotions.  We are interested in your experience of emotions and how that 
affects the way you think and behave. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen because you are a student or member of staff at the University 
of East Anglia. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No.  It is up to you whether or not to take part.  If you do, you will be given the 
opportunity to discuss the project further when we meet when you will be asked to 
sign a consent form if you are willing to go ahead.  You will remain free to withdraw 
at any time and without giving a reason.  A decision not to take part, or to later 
withdraw, will in no way affect your studies or employment at the University and no-
one except the research team will be aware of any aspects of your participation. 
 
 
Please reply to 
Lynda Teape  
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
Elizabeth Fry Building 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich   NR4 7TJ 
04th March 2008 E-mail:     l.teape@uea.ac.uk  
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What will happen to me if I take part? 
The first thing that will happen is that you will be asked to complete a number of 
questionnaires asking you about your thoughts, feelings and behaviour.  This will help 
us decide whether this study is suitable for you and to ensure we select equivalent 
individuals for the different parts of the study.  Then some people will be asked to 
attend a session, lasting approximately an hour, when you will complete a number of 
further questionnaires, watch a short video clip, and answer some questions about 
what you saw on the video.  Not everyone who completes the questionnaires will be 
asked to attend this session.  For instance, you would not be suitable for the study if 
English is not your first language or you have not spoken English in an English-
speaking country since the age of 10 years or have any significant reading problems. 
Also, as this is a study of usual emotional responses in volunteers we will not ask 
people to participate if they have a history of depression, anxiety or other mental 
illness in the past 5 years.  Finally, people who have completed a similar psychology 
study in the past may not be suitable as this could affect the reliability of the results of 
the study, we will need to ask about any previous studies in which you have 
participated.  The study is not aimed at investigating the quality of your memory of 
the video clip; we are more interested in your perception of it. 
 
What do I have to do? 
All you will have to do is complete the initial questionnaires and come to a session at 
a time agreed between you and the researcher to complete the further questionnaires, 
watch the video clip and answer the questions about it, and complete a brief 
comprehension task.  These activities are not at all difficult. 
 
Will I be paid? 
Individuals who attend the testing session will be paid £5 and will also be given a 
booklet on how to improve mental wellbeing as a thank you for taking part. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We hope that this will be an interesting and informative experience of psychological 
research for you.  Although there are no direct benefits for participants it will help our 
understanding of emotions, which will be helpful in developing further psychological 
treatments. 
 
Are there any disadvantages of taking part? 
The video clips contain scenes taken from popular movies, some pleasant and some 
less pleasant which could invoke negative emotions and there is a possibility that 
some may find these distressing.  If this is the case you can ask the researcher to stop 
at any time and withdraw yourself from the study.  However, as the clips have all 
been taken from movies available to the public on general release, and have been used 
in previous research where they have caused no problems to other participants this is 
highly unlikely.  Most find that the negative emotions invoked dissipate after a short 
period of time.  The only other disadvantage is the possible inconvenience of coming 
to the session.  Some people have also said that the activities can seem a bit dull!  
However, others have also said they have found them quite interesting to do and find 
out about, so this might not be too much of a problem for you. 
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Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes.  All information which is collected about you during the course of the research 
will be kept strictly confidential to the research team.  You will be allocated an 
anonymous code number, which will be used to identify your personal contribution. 
The information that matches this code to your name will be held in a special 
encrypted computer file, separate from the other information about the study.  Once 
we have completed collecting information about you for the study we will ensure that 
only the anonymous code remains so that the results remain completely confidential.  
Storage and use of information in this study will be fully compliant with the Data 
Protection Act. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
We hope to publish the results in journals reporting research in psychology.  You will 
not be identified in any way in the reports of the research.  We will be happy to send 
you a summary of our findings. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
The research has been organised by Lynda Teape as part of her research on the 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology.  She is supervised by Dr Bundy 
Mackintosh, an academic research psychologist and Dr Helen Buxton, a clinical 
psychologist.  None of the research team is being paid additionally to their normal 
salaries. Please contact Lynda Teape on the email address above if you would like any 
further information.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the University of East Anglia Research Ethics 
Committee and given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct at the University. 
 
If there is a problem: 
If you have a concern about any aspect of the study you should contact Lynda Teape 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist on the contact details above, who will do her best to 
answer your concerns, or direct you to further sources of help and advice.  If you 
remain unhappy and wish to make a more formal complaint, then you should contact 
Dr Helen Buxton, Clinical Tutor for the Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
on 01603 593 310 who will help you to take the complaint forward. 
Although we are not able to make any clinical diagnoses or offer treatment, and this is 
not the aim of this study, it may become apparent that you are currently experiencing 
distress.  If this is the case, we will provide you with some information and suggest 
where to seek help. 
 
 
With many thanks for considering taking part and taking time to read this sheet. 
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Appendix H 
Participant Consent Form 
 
 
Participant identification number for this trial: ______________ 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Title of Project: Clinical Psychology Research Project 
 
 
Chief Investigator:   Lynda Teape 
 Please initial box: 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet  
dated 4th March 2008 for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my studies 
or employment at the University of East Anglia being affected. 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
_____________________________   ________________   ____________________  
Name of participant  Date  Signature 
 
 
_____________________________   ________________   ____________________  
Researcher  Date  Signature 
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Appendix I 
Demographic Questionnaire 
  
  
  
  
Candidate questionnaire Participant number (OFFICE USE ONLY) 
  
Please answer all of the 
information below. 
  
1 Name   
2 Date of birth (i.e.01/01/1980)   
3 Gender   
4 School and town of study (students) Department employed (staff)   
5 Year of study (students) Job title (staff)   
6 
Is English your first language? Or have 
you spoken English in an English 
speaking country since the age of 10 
years? 
  
7 
Are you aware that you have any learning 
or language difficulties (e.g. dyslexia, 
dysphasia, memory impairments)?   
  
8 
Do you currently have or have you 
experienced in the last 5 years, any form 
of mental illness, whether treated or 
untreated?  
  
9 Have you ever participated in a psychological study at UEA before?    
  
If you have answered YES to question 9, 
please give as much detail as you can 
including who ran the experiment, when it 
was and what the study was about? 
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Appendix J 
MMANX Brief Anxiety Questionnaire 
MMANX  
 
Instructions: 
Below are a number of words that describe different feelings or emotions. 
Please read each item and then tick the box to the right of the word which best 
indicates how you GENERALLY feel.  Please do not dwell long on each answer as 
we are interested in the first response that comes to mind.  Just give the answer that 
best describes your feelings generally.  There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
 
 
 
Almost 
never 
Occasionally Sometimes Often Almost 
always 
 
1 interested       
2 satisfied      
3 inadequate      
4 sleepy      
5 calm      
6 worried      
7 energetic      
8 useful      
9 optimistic      
10 a failure      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Copyright (2006) by B. Mackintosh.  
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Appendix K 
Short-Form Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes. Read each 
item and circle whether the statement is TRUE or FALSE as it pertains to you 
personally.   
 
 TRUE  FALSE 
1.  It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I 
am not encouraged. T F  
 
2.  I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way.  T F 
 
3.  On a few occasions, I have given up doing something 
because I thought too little of my ability. T F 
 
4.  There have been times when I felt like rebelling against 
people in authority even though I knew they were 
right. T F 
 
5.  No matter whom I’m talking to, I’m always a good 
listener. T F 
 
6.  There have been occasions when I took advantage of 
someone. T F 
 
7.  I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.  T F 
 
8.  I sometimes try to get even rather than to forgive and 
forget. T F 
 
9.  I am always courteous, even to people who are 
disagreeable. T F 
 
10.  I have never been irked when people expressed ideas 
very different from my own. T F 
 
11.  There have been times when I was quite jealous of the 
good fortune of others. T F 
 
12.  I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of  
me. T F 
 
13.  I have never deliberately said something that hurt 
someone’s feelings. T F 
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Appendix L 
Visual Analogue Scales – Mood Valence 
 
1. Practice Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how tired are you feeling right now? 
 less tired than usual               more tired than usual  
very 
much 
less 
much 
less 
less a little 
bit less 
the 
same 
a little 
bit more 
more much 
more 
very 
much 
more 
 
 
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your 
choice. 
 
 
 
-----------new page------------ 
 
 
Thank you, this was the practice example. 
 
Please press any key to go on.   
 
-----------new page------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how low/depressed are you feeling right 
now? 
very 
much 
less 
much 
less 
less a little 
bit less 
the 
same 
a little 
bit more 
more much 
more 
very 
much 
more 
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Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your 
choice. 
 
-----------new page------------ 
 
3. Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how sad are you feeling right now? 
very 
much 
less 
much 
less 
less a little 
bit less 
the 
same 
a little 
bit more 
more much 
more 
very 
much 
more 
 
 
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your 
choice. 
 
-----------new page------------ 
 
4. Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how tense are you feeling right now? 
very 
much 
less 
much 
less 
less a little 
bit less 
the 
same 
a little 
bit more 
more much 
more 
very 
much 
more 
 
 
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your 
choice. 
 
-----------new page------------ 
 
5. Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how worried are you feeling right now? 
very 
much 
less 
much 
less 
less a little 
bit less 
the 
same 
a little 
bit more 
more much 
more 
very 
much 
more 
 
 
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your 
choice. 
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-----------new page------------ 
 
6. Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how carefree are you feeling right now? 
very 
much 
less 
much 
less 
less a little 
bit less 
the 
same 
a little 
bit more 
more much 
more 
very 
much 
more 
 
 
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your 
choice. 
 
-----------new page------------ 
 
 
7. Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how content are you feeling right now? 
very 
much 
less 
much 
less 
less a little 
bit less 
the 
same 
a little 
bit more 
more much 
more 
very 
much 
more 
 
 
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your 
choice. 
 
 
-----------new page------------ 
 
 
8. Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how calm are you feeling right now? 
very 
much 
less 
much 
less 
less a little 
bit less 
the 
same 
a little 
bit more 
more much 
more 
very 
much 
more 
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Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your 
choice. 
 
 
 
-----------new page------------ 
 
 
9. Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how happy are you feeling right now? 
very 
much 
less 
much 
less 
less a little 
bit less 
the 
same 
a little 
bit more 
more much 
more 
very 
much 
more 
 
 
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your 
choice. 
 
 
-----------new page------------ 
 
 
Thank you. 
 
 
---------end of questionnaire-------- 
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Appendix M 
Results of Pilot Study for Mood Induction Procedures 
 
 An opportunistic sample of six participants were exposed to two positive and 
two negative film clips.  After each of the four films, participants were asked to 
indicate first how it had affected their mood valence from, 1 being very negative, to 9, 
being very positive and then on a questionnaire regarding discrete affective states, to 
indicate on a scale of 0-9, how much fear, disgust, happiness and pleasure the films 
had evoked.  Scores for both positive films were combined, as were scores for both 
negative films.  For the second questionnaire, items fear and disgust were then 
reversed and the mean of happiness, pleasure, fear and disgust was calculated to give 
an average affect score.  The descriptive statistics are presented in Table A.  
Table A. 
Descriptive Statistics for Induced Mood Following Positive and Negative Films.   
 Positive Films  Negative Films 
 Mean SD  Mean SD 
Mood valence 7.00 1.91  3.50 1.98 
Happiness 6.25 2.22  0.92 1.88 
Pleasure 5.67 2.64  0.83 1.80 
Fear 0.67 1.61  3.58 2.47 
Disgust 0.92 1.62  2.58 2.57 
Average affect 7.08 1.47  3.40 1.65 
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 Responses following the positive and negative films were then compared using 
both the mood valence questionnaire and average affect score from the second 
questionnaire using a Mann-Whitney U test.   
A significantly more negative mood was evoked following the negative films clips, 
than the positive films as measured by both  the mood valence questionnaire, U=16.0, 
p<.001 and the average discrete affect score U=6.0, p<.001, therefore these films were 
considered appropriate for use in inducing a positive and an anxious mood.   
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 Appendix N 
Brief Information about Study for Participants 
Dear [participant] 
 
Thank you for your interest in the above study. 
 
This is an exciting project looking at the effect of emotions on the way people think 
and behave.  It is hoped that the results of this study will help inform future 
treatments and interventions for people with emotional disorders. 
 
The study will take up to an hour of your time and will take place on the UEA 
campus.  We hope that taking part in the study will be an interesting experience and 
an opportunity for you to find out more about psychological research.  As 
compensation for your time, we would also like to offer a £5 payment and some 
information about where to access support for mental health problems at UEA and in 
the surrounding area. 
 
Please find attached a detailed information sheet about the study along with some 
screening questionnaires.  If you would like to participate after reading the 
information sheet then please open each of the questionnaires (clicking 'enable 
macros' if asked). 
 
On the file called ‘Brief Screening Questionnaire’, make sure you complete all the 
questions and then click 'Next' at the bottom of the page, this will take you onto a 
second page, which you need to complete and click 'click here to save' again. 
 
For the file called 'Candidate Questionnaire' you only need to complete the questions 
on the first page and then click 'click here to save'. 
 
Both files will automatically save with your name in the title. 
 
Make sure you save the questionnaires somewhere convenient on your computer, 
then attach the new versions of both files in an email back to me. 
 
If you are eligible to participate after completing the questionnaires I will email you 
with details about how to sign-up for the study session. 
 
Any questions, please don't hesitate to ask. 
 
Best wishes 
Lynda Teape  
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
 
Supervised by 
Dr Bundy Mackintosh, Senior Lecturer in Abnormal Psychology 
Dr Helen Buxton, Clinical Psychologist and Senior Clinical Tutor 
 
 
Att.  Participant Information Sheet 
 Demographic Questionnaire 
 Brief Screening Questionnaire 
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Appendix O 
Email to Participants Ineligible for Study 
 
Dear [participant] 
 
Thank you for your interest in the above study and for taking the time to complete the 
initial questionnaires. 
 
Unfortunately, we will not be inviting you to attend for the testing session as we now 
have enough participants for this section of the study. 
 
However, the cognition and emotion research group are running a number of studies 
at present, which you may be eligible for.  If you would be interested in participating 
in other studies then please go to www.uea.ac.uk/med-swp-research where you can 
find out more. 
 
We would like to store the information from your screening questionnaires, along with 
your contact details in order that we may invite you to participate in further studies 
being conducted by the cognition and emotion group over the next year. 
 
Please do let us know if you would prefer not to be invited for future studies. 
 
Best wishes 
 
Lynda Teape            
Trainee Clinical Psychologist     
      
Supervised by  
Dr Bundy Mackintosh, Senior Lecturer in Abnormal Psychology 
Dr Helen Buxton, Clinical Psychologist and Senior Clinical Tutor 
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Appendix P 
Email Inviting Eligible Participants to Sign Up for the Study 
 
Dear [participant], 
 
Thank you for your interest, and for completing the screening questionnaires. 
 
I'm pleased to tell you that you are eligible to participate in the study. 
 
All you need to do now is go to the following website: 
http://uea-uk.sona-systems.com/ and sign up for an account (if you don't already 
have one) by clicking the link on the left hand side of the page. 
 
When you have your login and password, login to the website and click on the tab 
that says 'studies' at the top of the page.  Click on the link that says 'timeslots 
available' for our study (look for the study title "the effects on comprehension of 
viewing emotional films").   
 
At the bottom of the page click 'view timeslots for this study'.  Choose a timeslot that 
is convenient for you.  You will need a code to be able to sign up for a time slot.   
 
Please enter the code kas4892y 
 
Then click 'sign up'.   
 
If you cannot find a suitable time or experience any difficulties with using the online 
system, then please feel free to contact me.   
 
 
 
Best wishes 
Lynda Teape 
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Appendix Q 
Notes on Collaborative Project 
 
The planning and early implementation stages of this study were conducted in 
collaboration with fellow UEA, DClinPsy student, Lorna Shelfer.  The aim was that 
our two, separate but complementary studies would run alongside each other, with 
participants drawn from the same sample and the results of both studies informing our 
own respective studies.  Due to a change in circumstance, Lorna was unable to 
continue recruiting to her own study beyond December 2008.  Therefore, it may be 
noted that a small number of participants were diverted from the recruited sample in 
this study, to the collaborative study, yet no further information has been provided.  
This will be due this study as yet being uncompleted.   
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Appendix R 
Materials for the Test of Interpretation Biases  
  Practice Item 1 
Title Walking in the Park 
Line 1 You are walking through the park early on a Sunday morning. 
Line 2 The sun is shining and as you look around you see children playing 
Line 3 on the grass.  You begin to tire, so you decide to rest for 
Line 4 a few minutes while sitting on a 
Word fragment b - n c - 
Completed word bench 
Comprehension Question Did you see children in the park? 
Negative Foil You were walking through the park when a thunderstorm started 
Negative Target You had a picnic in the park one afternoon 
Positive Foil You rode your bike through the park on your way home 
Positive Target You were walking through the park and sat down to rest 
  
 
Practice Item 2 
Title Getting off the Bus 
Line 1 You are on the bus going to work 
Line 2 when you see your stop approaching. 
Line 3 You press the bell and 
Line 4 get ready to stand up when the bus 
Word fragment s t o - s 
Completed word stops 
Comprehension Question Were you going to work on the bus? 
Negative Foil As you stand, the bus accelerates past your stop 
Negative Target As you stand, the bus screeches to a halt 
Positive Foil As you stand, the bus drives straight past your stop. 
Positive Target As you stand, the bus comes to a slow halt 
  
 
Social threat 1 
Title The local club 
Line 1 You are invited for a night out at a local club, although you don't know 
Line 2 any of the members very well. As you approach the door 
Line 3 you can hear loud music and noisy conversation, 
Line 4 but as you enter the room it is quiet for a 
Word fragment m - m - n t 
Completed word moment 
Comprehension Question Do you know most of the club members? 
Negative Foil As you enter the room someone asks you why you are there. 
Negative Target As you enter the room everyone stops and stares at you. 
Positive Foil As you enter the room someone greets you warmly. 
Positive Target As you enter the room the music stops for a moment. 
  
 
Social threat 2 
Title The first aid refresher 
Line 1 You participate on a first aid refresher course at work. 
Line 2 The instructor asks a question and no one in the group 
Line 3 volunteers an answer, so he looks directly at you. You offer a reply, 
Line 4 thinking about how your answer must be sounding to the 
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Word fragment o t h - - s 
Completed word others 
Comprehension Question Was the refresher course organized by a local charity? 
Negative Foil You answer the question, realising you are irritated by this teaching style. 
Negative Target You answer the question, thinking how ignorant you may seem. 
Positive Foil You answer the question, pleased that you have such an interesting teacher. 
Positive Target You answer the question, thinking that the others may be quite impressed. 
  
 
Social threat 3 
Title The private view 
Line 1 Your neighbour invites you to a private exhibition of his art. 
Line 2 You arrive to find many other guests whom you do not know. 
Line 3 You try talking to some of them, and can see 
Line 4 how interested they are in your 
Word fragment c - - v e r - - t i - n 
Completed word conversation 
Comprehension Question Was the private view at a relative's house? 
Negative Foil You don't know anyone there and everyone ignores you completely. 
Negative Target You talk to some guests but they think what you say is boring. 
Positive Foil You meet many guests whom you know and enjoy talking to them. 
Positive Target You talk to some guests and can tell that they find you interesting. 
  
 
Social threat 4 
Title The joke 
Line 1 You are with a group of new friends, on your way to an open air concert. 
Line 2 You decide to tell a joke you heard recently. Everyone looks at you 
Line 3 as you start telling the joke, and you see 
Line 4 their expressions change when you get to the punch 
Word fragment l - n e 
Completed word line 
Comprehension Question Did you hear the joke you told quite recently? 
Negative Foil When you start telling your joke someone interrupts you. 
Negative Target When you get to the punch line everyone looks confused. 
Positive Foil When you get to the end you receive several compliments. 
Positive Target When you get to the end you see everyone starting to laugh. 
  
 
Social threat 5 
Title The wedding reception 
Line 1 Your friend asks you to give a speech at her wedding reception. 
Line 2 You prepare some remarks and when the time comes, 
Line 3 get to your feet. As you speak, you notice 
Line 4 some people in the audience start to 
Word fragment l - - g h 
Completed word laugh 
Comprehension Question Did you stand up to speak? 
Negative Foil As you speak, some people in the audience start to yawn in boredom 
Negative Target As you speak, people in the audience find your efforts laughable 
Positive Foil As you speak, people in the audience applaud your comments 
Positive Target As you speak, people in the audience laugh appreciatively 
  
 
Social threat 6 
Title The job interview 
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Line 1 You applied for a job in a company you'd really like to work in. 
Line 2 You are invited to an interview, where you answer 
Line 3 the questions as well as you can. Reflecting later, 
Line 4 you think that the quality of your answers decided the 
Word fragment o u - c o m - 
Completed word outcome 
Comprehension Question Did you think about your answers later? 
Negative Foil You think your poor reference must have made a bad impression. 
Negative Target You think that your poor answers lost you the job. 
Positive Foil You think it was a good thing you did not take the job. 
Positive Target You think that your astute answers led to you being offered the job. 
  
 
Social threat 7 
Title The bus ride 
Line 1 You get on a bus and find an empty seat next to one 
Line 2 that has a rip in it. At the next stop several people get on 
Line 3 that you vaguely recognise, but they sit together 
Line 4 and the seat next to you remains 
Word fragment v - c a - t 
Completed word vacant 
Comprehension Question Were the people who got on strangers to you? 
Negative Foil The person in the seat next to you makes a rip in the fabric. 
Negative Target The seat next to you is empty because no one wants to sit with you. 
Positive Foil The person in the seat next to you talks to you in a friendly way. 
Positive Target The seat next to you remains empty because it looks damaged. 
  
 
Social threat 8 
Title Your birthday 
Line 1 It is your birthday and you wake up looking forward to your day. 
Line 2 You wonder how many friends will send you a birthday card. 
Line 3 However, you have to go to work as usual, 
Line 4 and by the time you leave, no cards have 
Word fragment a r r - v - d 
Completed word arrived 
Comprehension Question Did you have to go to work on your birthday? 
Negative Foil You leave for work knowing that it is going to be a stressful day. 
Negative Target You leave for work realising that no one has sent you a card. 
Positive Foil You leave for work feeling pleased with the cards you have received. 
Positive Target You have to leave for work before the postman brings your mail. 
  
 
Social threat 9 
Title Meeting a friend 
Line 1 In the street, you bump into an old friend you haven't seen for a long time. 
Line 2 She is too busy to stop, so you arrange to meet later in a bar. 
Line 3 You arrive a little late but the bar is empty 
Line 4 and a few minutes later she is still not 
Word fragment t h - - e 
Completed word  
Comprehension Question there 
Negative Foil Your friend tells you that she does not want to meet you. 
Negative Target You arrange to meet in a bar but your friend stands you up. 
Positive Foil You are busy but your friend insists on meeting you in a bar. 
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Positive Target You arrange to meet a friend in a bar but your friend is late. 
  
 
Social threat 10 
Title Your first painting 
Line 1 You've taken up painting as a hobby, and have just finished 
Line 2 your first picture. You hang it on the wall 
Line 3 when a group of friends visit. Later you overhear your friends 
Line 4 making remarks that make clear their opinion of your 
Word fragment a b - l - t y 
Completed word ability 
Comprehension Question Did you leave the painting on an easel? 
Negative Foil You overhear some friends making fun of something you just said. 
Negative Target You overhear some friends making critical remarks about your picture. 
Positive Foil You overhear some complimentary remarks about your good taste. 
Positive Target You overhear some friends saying how much they liked your painting. 
 
  Physical threat 1 
Title The car park 
Line 1 It is late at night and you are in a multi-storey car park 
Line 2 trying to find your car. You have been looking for about ten minutes 
Line 3 and still cannot find it. You hear a noise behind you 
Line 4 and see a shadow of 
Word fragment s o - e t h - - g 
Completed word something 
Comprehension Question Did you find your car right away? 
Negative Foil You see that you have forgotten your ticket and will have to pay a fine. 
Negative Target You see someone coming towards you looking threatening. 
Positive Foil You see some money on the floor and pick it up. 
Positive Target You see a security person approaching to help you. 
  
 
Physical threat 2 
Title The evening stroll 
Line 1 You are taking a stroll on a quiet street near where you live. 
Line 2 As you round the corner you see someone coming towards you 
Line 3 on the same side of the road. As you meet, he stares straight at you 
Line 4 and moves closer while raising his 
Word fragment h - - d 
Completed word hand 
Comprehension Question Was the person on the opposite side of the street? 
Negative Foil As you meet he mutters obscenities and staggers away drunkenly 
Negative Target As you meet he moves closer and raises his fist menacingly 
Positive Foil As you meet he tells you how much he and his wife love your house 
Positive Target As you meet he waves in recognition and gives you a friendly greeting 
  
 
Physical threat 3 
Title The exercise regime 
Line 1 You decide that you must start to exercise more. 
Line 2 For the next week you take a little more exercise each day. 
Line 3 After several weeks, you are running further and decide to see 
Line 4 how far you can push yourself, when you notice your breathing is 
Word fragment l a - o u r - - 
Completed word laboured 
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Comprehension Question Have you been exercising for several weeks? 
Negative Foil You push yourself so hard you strain a muscle and hurt yourself 
Negative Target Pushing yourself too hard you cannot get enough air and feel dizzy 
Positive Foil Pushing yourself more than usual you feel your running is much easier 
Positive Target Running further than usual you have to breath harder and deeper 
  
 
Physical threat 4 
Title A flight abroad 
Line 1 You are on your way on holiday abroad. You have been in the air 
Line 2 for an hour when you hear a change in the sound of the engine 
Line 3 next to you. The fasten seat-belt sign flashes, 
Line 4 and you hear the captain begin to make an 
Word fragment a n n - - n c - - e n t 
Completed word announcement 
Comprehension Question Did the engine sound different than before? 
Negative Foil The seat belt light comes on, the cabin crew say you are diverted due to fog 
Negative Target The seat belt light comes on and the captain tells you one engine is failing 
Positive Foil 
The seat belt light comes on and the cabin crew say lunch will be served 
now 
Positive Target The seat belt light comes on and the captain says there will be turbulence 
  
 
Physical threat 5 
Title At home one night 
Line 1 You are at home alone late one night. You have just 
Line 2 finished reading and turn out the light to go to sleep. 
Line 3 While lying in the dark you hear a soft rustling sound 
Line 4 coming from just outside your 
Word fragment w - - d - w 
Completed word window 
Comprehension Question Were you listening to the radio before turning out the light? 
Negative Foil Lying in bed you hear a car accident in the street outside your window 
Negative Target Lying in bed you hear the sound of someone trying to get in at your window 
Positive Foil Lying in bed you hear the sound of birds singing outside your window 
Positive Target Lying in bed you hear the sound of a small animal outside your window 
  
 
Physical threat 6 
Title Late return home 
Line 1 Your partner is working late this evening but now it is well past the time 
Line 2 you were expecting them home. You are thinking about a crash you saw on 
Line 3 the route your partner drives, when the phone rings. You pick it up and 
Line 4 find out what had 
Word fragment h a - - e n - d 
Completed word happened 
Comprehension Question Did you expect your partner to be late? 
Negative Foil The phone rings and a friend tells you about gossip being spread about you. 
Negative Target The phone rings and you are informed your partner is hurt in the accident. 
Positive Foil The phone rings and a friend invites you and your partner round for a meal. 
Positive Target The phone rings and it is your partner telling you they are nearly home. 
  
 
Physical threat 7 
Title Walking home 
Line 1 You have been visiting some friends in the centre of town, when you 
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Line 2 realise it is getting late. They offer you a lift but you set off on foot. 
Line 3 Walking through a street that you don't know at all well, you can hear 
Line 4 someone running up from 
Word fragment b e - - n d 
Completed word behind 
Comprehension Question Did your friends offer you a lift? 
Negative Foil In the unfamiliar street you think about how bored you were that evening 
Negative Target In the unfamiliar street a mugger runs up from behind and threatens you 
Positive Foil In the unfamiliar street you think about how much you enjoyed your visit 
Positive Target In the unfamiliar street your friend runs up from behind to walk with you 
  
 
Physical threat 8 
Title Visiting the doctor 
Line 1 You have been feeling dizzy occasionally, and decide to get a check-up. 
Line 2 You make an appointment right away. 
Line 3 Your doctor takes your blood pressure and listens to your chest, 
Line 4 and then tells you to relax while giving you his 
Word fragment o p - n - o n 
Completed word opinion 
Comprehension Question Did you delay before going to the doctor? 
Negative Foil The doctor tells you that you will have to pay extra on your health plan. 
Negative Target The doctor tells you he has bad news about your health. 
Positive Foil The doctor tells you that you have free dental care on your health plan. 
Positive Target The doctor tells you all is normal and you are in good health. 
  
 
Physical threat 9 
Title The screening clinic 
Line 1 You have been offered a routine cancer screening appointment 
Line 2 at your local health centre. You have an X-ray and some samples 
Line 3 are taken for tests. While waiting you see the doctor point out something 
Line 4 on the X-ray plate to the 
Word fragment n - r s e 
Completed word nurse 
Comprehension Question Were you being screened for cancer? 
Negative Foil You notice the Doctor pointing out that you are very unfit. 
Negative Target You notice the Doctor pointing out a tumour on your X-ray to the nurse. 
Positive Foil You notice the Doctor pointing out your impressive fitness score. 
Positive Target You notice the Doctor pointing out to the nurse that your X-ray is normal. 
  
 
Physical threat 10  
Title Your eye operation 
Line 1 You're finding that your sight is worse than it was and despite the risks 
Line 2 you decide to try an experimental laser surgery you've read about. 
Line 3 Afterwards as the bandages are taken off your eyes, you realise your life 
Line 4 will be affected radically by the 
Word fragment r - s u - t 
Completed word result 
Comprehension Question Did you read about the laser surgery? 
Negative Foil You realise the operation cost far more than you can afford 
Negative Target You realise that the operation has made your vision much worse 
Positive Foil You realise that you are surrounded by gifts from your friends 
Positive Target You realise that this operation has made your vision perfect 
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Appendix S 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment One, Exploring Correlations in High and Low 
PA Items 
 
Table S1 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Normality of Separate Scales for High and Low PA at 
Times One, Two and Three 
  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  Shapiro-Wilk 
Scale Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig.  
Happy 1 .165 38 .011  .954 38 .122 
2 .170 38 .007  .961 38 .203 
3 .253 38 .000  .842 38 .000 
Carefree 
 
 
1 .148 38 .034  .965 38 .268 
2 .142 38 .052  .960 38 .190 
3 .172 38 .006  .907 38 .004 
Low 1 .200 38 .001  .945 38 .060 
2 .159 38 .016  .940 38 .041 
3 .191 38 .001  .891 38 .001 
Sad 1 .193 38 .001  .931 38 .022 
2 .166 38 .009  .967 38 .327 
3 .252 38 .000  .791 38 .000 
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Table S2 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis for High and Low PA Scales at 
Times One, Two and Three 
      Skewness  Kurtosis 
Scale Time Mean SE SD  Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Happy 1 .53 .023 .144  .059 .383  .155 .750 
2 .65 .023 .141  .254 .383  .055 .750 
3 .50 .016 .098  1.157* .383  5.688* .750 
Carefree 
 
 
1 .48 .028 .172  -.463 .383  -.108 .750 
2 .59 .025 .153  .101 .383  1.047 .750 
3 .47 .020 .123  1.029* .383  1.780* .750 
Low 1 .49 .022 .137  -.236 .383  .566 .750 
2 .37 .022 .138  -.072 .383  .584 .750 
3 .50 .012 .076  -.413 .383  3.036* .750 
Sad 1 .48 .030 .187  -.453 .383  1.367* .750 
2 .37 .022 .135  -.415 .383  .344 .750 
3 .50 .011 .068  -.879* .383  4.715* .750 
*Scores more than twice the standard error indicating significant skew or kurtosis  
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Table S3 
Summary of Identified Outliers in Raw, High and Low PA Data and Process of 
Reducing Effects on Normality  
 
Scale 
 
Time 
Outlier 
– case 
no. 
Case 
score 
Mean 
score 
 
SD 
Mean 
+/-  2 
SD 
Happy 3 54 .88 .50 .098 .70 
 3 7 .25 .50 .098 .31 
 
Carefree 3 54 .88 .47 .123 .72 
 
Low 3 59 .69 .50 .076 .65 
  78 .25 .50 .076 .35 
 
Sad 1 9 .88 .48 .187 .86 
 1 26 .87 .48 .187 .86 
 1 54 .00 .48 .187 .11 
 1 35 .00 .48 .187 .11 
 3 78 .25 .50 .068 .37 
 3 73 .38 .50 .068 .37 
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Table S4 
Summary of Analyses of Normality of Separate Scales for High and Low PA at Times 
One, Two and Three following Removal of Outliers 
  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  Shapiro-Wilk 
Scale Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig.  
Happy 1 .165 38 .011  .954 38 .122 
2 .170 38 .007  .961 38 .203 
3 .185 38 .002  .932 38 .023 
Carefree 
 
 
1 .148 38 .034  .965 38 .268 
2 .142 38 .052  .960 38 .190 
3 .241 38 .000  .917 38 .008 
Low 1 .200 38 .001  .945 38 .060 
2 .159 38 .016  .940 38 .041 
3 .198 38 .001  .913 38 .006 
Sad 1 .184 38 .002  .949 38 .083 
2 .166 38 .009  .967 38 .327 
3 .274 38 .000  .827 38 .000 
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Table S5 
Summary of Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis for High and Low PA Scales at Times 
One, Two and Three Following Removal of Outliers 
      Skewness  Kurtosis 
Scale Time Mean SE SD  Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Happy 1 .53 .023 .144  .059 .383  .155 .750 
2 .65 .023 .141  .254 .383  .055 .750 
3 .50 .013 .078  .234 .383  .907 .750 
Carefree 
 
 
1 .48 .028 .172  -.463 .383  -.108 .750 
2 .59 .025 .153  .101 .383  1.047 .750 
3 .47 .018 .110 
 
.419 .383  -.597 .750 
Low 1 .49 .022 .137  -.236 .383  .566 .750 
2 .37 .022 .138  -.072 .383  .584 .750 
3 .50 .011 .065  .118 .383  .902 .750 
Sad 1 .49 .028 .171  -.069 .383  .510 750 
2 .37 .022 .135  -.415 .383  .344 .750 
3 .51 .010 .059  .321 .383  1.383 .750 
*Scores more than twice the standard error indicating significant skew or kurtosis  
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Appendix T 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment One, High PA Data 
 
Table T1 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Normality of High PA Data 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Low 
Anxious 
1 .135 21 .200  .949 21 .328 
2 .182 21 .068  .945 21 .277 
3 .203 21 .024  .761 21 .000 
         
High 
Anxious 
1 .151 17 .200  .917 17 .132 
2 .179 17 .151  .948 17 .427 
3 .201 17 .065  .920 17 .148 
 
Table T2 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis of High PA Data 
    Skewness  Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SE SD Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Low 
Anxious 
 
 
1 .53 .029 .134 .575 .501  1.391 .972 
2 .63 .029 .131 .739 .501  .143 .972 
3 .51 .022 .101 2.506* .501  8.435* .972 
High 
Anxious 
1 .48 .033 .134 -.598 .550  -.356 1.063 
2 .61 .034 .139 .010 .550  -.340 1.063 
3 .46 .019 .077 .693 .550  1.049 1.063 
          
*Scores more than twice the standard error indicating significant skew or kurtosis  
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Table T3 
 
Summary of Conversion of Outliers in High PA Data 
 
 
Group 
 
Time 
Outlier 
– case 
no. 
Case 
score 
Mean 
score 
 
SD 
Mean 
+/-  2 
SD 
Low Anxious 3 54 .88 .5126 .02215 .5569 
 3 73 .62 .5126 .02215 .5569 
 3 56 .58 .5126 .02215 .5569 
 
 
Table T4 
Summary of Analyses of Normality of High PA Data Following Conversion of 
Outliers 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Low 
Anxious 
1 .135 21 .200  .949 21 .328 
2 .182 21 .068  .945 21 .277 
3 .145 21 .200  .932 21 .148 
         
High 
Anxious 
1 .151 17 .200  .917 17 .132 
2 .179 17 .151  .948 17 .427 
3 .201 17 .065  .920 17 .148 
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Table T5 
Summary of Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis of High PA Data Following Change of 
Outliers 
    Skewness  Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SE SD Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Low 
Anxious 
 
 
1 .53 .029 .134 .575 .501  1.391 .972 
2 .63 .029 .131 .739 .501  .143 .972 
3 .49 .011 .056
1 
-.154 .501  -1.290 .972 
High 
Anxious 
1 .48 .033 .134 -.598 .550  -.356 1.063 
2 .61 .034 .139 .010 .550  -.340 1.063 
3 .46 .019 .077 .693 .550  1.049 1.063 
* Scores more than twice the SE, indicating significant skewness or kurtosis 
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Appendix U 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment One, Low PA Data 
 
Table U1 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Normality of Low PA Data 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Low 
Anxious 
1 .190 21 .047  .875 21 .012 
2 .170 21 .117  .936 21 .180 
3 .230 21 .005  .867 21 .008 
         
High 
Anxious 
1 .106 17 .200  .974 17 .888 
2 .122 17 .200  .964 17 .706 
3 .227 17 .020  .868 17 .020 
 
Table U2 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis of Low PA Data 
    Skewness  Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SE SD Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Low 
Anxious 
 
 
1 .44 .028 .127 -1.397* .501  3.134* .972 
2 .36 .027 .124 -.647 .501  .113 .972 
3 .49 .009 .039 1.342* .501  3.472* .972 
High 
Anxious 
1 .54 .037 .154 .027 .550  -.630 1.063 
2 .37 .029 .118 -.271 .550  .273 1.063 
3 .51 .022 .089 -1.363* .550  3.692* 1.063 
          
*Scores more than twice the standard error indicating significant skew or kurtosis  
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Table U3 
Summary of Conversion of Outliers in Low PA Data 
 
Table 1.  
 
Group 
 
Time 
Outlier 
– case 
no. 
Case 
score 
Mean 
score 
 
SD 
Mean 
+/-  2 
SD 
Low Anxious 1 54 .06 .44 .127 .186 
      
 
 3 59 .61 .49 .039 .568 
      
 
High Anxious 3 78 .25 .51 .089 .332 
      
 
 
 
Table U4 
Summary of Analyses of Normality of Low PA Data Following Conversion of Outliers 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Low 
Anxious 
1 .179 21 .079  .924 21 .106 
2 .170 21 .117  .936 21 .180 
3 .194 21 .039  .917 21 .077 
         
High 
Anxious 
1 .106 17 .200  .974 17 .888 
2 .122 17 .200  .964 17 .706 
3 .195 17 .087  .932 17 .237 
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Table U5 
Summary of Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis of Low PA Data Following Conversion of 
Outliers 
    Skewness  Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SE SD Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Low 
Anxious 
 
 
1 .45 .024 .110 -.721 .501  .665 .972 
2 .34 .027 .124 -.647 .501  .113 .972 
3 .49 .007 .033 .570 .501  1.048 .972 
High 
Anxious 
1 .54 .037 .154 .027 .550  -.630 1.063 
2 .37 .029 .118 -.271 .550  .273 1.063 
3 .51 .018 .075 -.525 .550  .987 1.063 
          
*Scores more than twice the standard error indicating significant skew or kurtosis  
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Appendix V 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment One, Recognition Data 
 
Table V1  
Summary of Initial Analysis of Normality of Grouped Recognition Data 
 
Group 
 
Item 
Test 
Half 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Low 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 .114 21 .200  .942 21 .233 
2 .145 21 .200  .943 21 .248 
Positive 
Foil 
1 .246 21 .002  .805 21 .001 
2 .102 21 .200  .956 21 .444 
Negative 
Target 
1 .097 21 .200  .969 21 .700 
2 .097 21 .200  .961 21 .541 
Negative 
Foil 
1 .153 21 .200  .925 21 .109 
2 
 
.121 21 .200  .960 21 .507 
High 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 .197 17 .080  .893 17 .052 
2 .202 17 .064  .903 17 .078 
Positive 
Foil 
1 .195 17 .086  .896 17 .057 
2 .225 17 .022  .829 17 .005 
Negative 
Target 
1 .106 17 .200  .974 17 .890 
2 .094 17 .200  .981 17 .966 
Negative 
Foil 
1 .175 17 .178  .944 17 .366 
2 .424 17 .009  .806 17 .002 
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Table V2  
 Summary of Initial Analysis of Skew and Kurtosis of Grouped Recognition Data 
  Test    Skewness  Kurtosis 
Group Item Half Mean SE SD Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Low 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 2.83 .118 .540 -.713 .501  .912 .972 
2 2.92 .085 .391 -.120 .501  1.293 .972 
Positive 
Foil 
1 1.82 .136 .622 2.132* .501  7.145* .972 
2 1.92 .134 .616 .709 .501  .689 .972 
Negative 
Target 
1 2.57 .113 .517 -.033 .501  -.749 .972 
2 2.47 .132 .604 -.556 .501  -.187 .972 
Negative 
Foil 
1 1.59 .089 .408 .862 .501  .747 .972 
2 
 
1.57 .064 .292 .206 .501  -1.002 .972 
High 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 2.56 .089 .368 .929 .550  1.436 1.063 
2 2.72 .099 .408 .957 .550  .394 1.063 
Positive 
Foil 
1 1.49 .101 .418 1.268* .550  1.907 1.063 
2 1.60 .123 .509 1.518* .550  1.920 1.063 
Negative 
Target 
1 2.62 .103 .425 .372 .550  .491 1.063 
2 2.63 .106 .437 -.113 .550  .141 1.063 
Negative 
Foil 
1 1.59 .098 .404 .823 .550  .414 1.063 
2 1.65 .125 .514 1.943* .550  4.694* 1.063 
*Scores more than twice the SE, indicating significant skewness or kurtosis 
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Table V3 
Summary of Initial Conversion of Outliers in Grouped Recognition Data  
 
Group 
 
Item/Test Half 
Outliers – 
case no. 
Case 
score 
Mean 
score 
 
SD 
Mean 
plus 2 
SD 
Low Anxious Positive foil 1 1 4.00 1.82 .622 3.07 
       
High Anxious Positive foil 1 
Positive foil 2 
Negative foil 2 
45 
45 
54 
2.60 
2.90 
3.20 
1.49 
1.60 
1.65 
.418 
.509 
.514 
2.32 
2.62 
2.67 
 
Table V4 
Summary of Second Conversion of Outliers in Grouped Recognition Data  
 
 
Group 
 
Item/Test Half 
Outliers – 
case no. 
Case 
score 
Mean 
score 
 
SD 
Mean 
plus 
2 SD 
High 
Anxious 
Positive foil 2 
 
Negative foil 2 
45 
54 
54 
2.62 
2.60 
2.67 
1.58 
1.58 
1.62 
.466 
.466 
.422 
2.52 
2.52 
2.46 
 
Table V5  
Summary of Third Conversion of Outliers in Grouped Recognition Data  
 
 
Group 
 
Item/Test Half 
Outliers – 
case no. 
Case 
score 
Mean 
score 
 
SD 
Mean 
plus 
2 SD 
High 
Anxious 
Positive foil 2 
 
45 
54 
2.52 
2.52 
1.57 
1.57 
.441 
.441 
2.46 
2.46 
 
Table V6  
Summary of Fourth Conversion of Outliers in Grouped Recognition Data  
 
 
Group 
 
Item/Test Half 
Outliers – 
case no. 
Case 
score 
Mean 
score 
 
SD 
Mean 
plus 
2 SD 
High 
Anxious 
Positive foil 2 
 
45 
54 
2.46 
2.46 
1.57 
1.57 
.425 
.425 
2.42 
2.42 
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Table V7 
Summary of Fifth Conversion of Outliers in Grouped Recognition Data  
 
 
 
Group 
 
Item/Test Half 
Outliers – 
case no. 
Case 
score 
Mean 
score 
 
SD 
Mean 
plus 
2 SD 
High 
Anxious 
Positive foil 2 
 
45 
54 
2.42 
2.42 
1.56 
1.56 
.415 
.415 
2.39 
2.39 
 
 
 
Following the above process the effect of the outliers was reduced and the 
distribution of the data was observed to meet the criterion for normality, as 
demonstrated in the text.   
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Table V8 
Summary of Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis of Grouped Recognition Data Following 
Conversion of Outliers 
 
 
Group 
 
Item Type 
Test 
Half 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Low 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 .114 21 .200  .942 21 .233 
2 .145 21 .200  .943 21 .248 
Positive 
Foil 
1 .178 21 .079  .942 21 .244 
2 .102 21 .200  .956 21 .444 
Negative 
Target 
1 .097 21 .200  .969 21 .700 
2 .097 21 .200  .961 21 .541 
Negative 
Foil 
1 .153 21 .200  .925 21 .109 
2 
 
.121 21 .200  .960 21 .507 
High 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 .197 17 .080  .193 17 .052 
2 .202 17 .064  .903 17 .078 
Positive 
Foil 
1 .176 17 .170  .927 17 .194 
2 .203 17 .060  .877 17 .029 
Negative 
Target 
1 .106 17 .200  .974 17 .890 
2 .094 17 .200  .981 17 .966 
Negative 
Foil 
1 .175 17 .178  .944 17 .366 
2 .210 17 .046  .895 17 .056 
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Table V9 
Summary of Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis of Grouped Recognition Data Following 
Conversion of Outliers 
  Test   Skewness  Kurtosis 
Group Item Half Mean SE SD Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Low 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 2.83 .118 .540 -.713 .501  .912 .972 
2 2.92 .085 .391 -.120 .501  1.293 .972 
Positive 
Foil 
1 1.78 .104 .475 .782 .501  1.545 .972 
2 1.92 .134 .616 .709 .501  .689 .972 
Negative 
Target 
1 2.57 .113 .517 -.033 .501  -.749 .972 
2 2.47 .132 .604 -.556 .501  -.187 .972 
Negative 
Foil 
1 1.59 .089 .408 .862 .501  .747 .972 
2 
 
1.57 .064 .292 .206 .501  -1.002 .972 
High 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 2.56 .089 .368 .929 .550  1.436 1.063 
2 2.72 .099 .408 .957 .550  .394 1.063 
Positive 
Foil 
1 1.47 .091 .375 .835 .550  .290 1.063 
2 1.56 .099 .408 .988 .550  .128 1.063 
Negative 
Target 
1 2.62 .103 .425 .372 .550  .491 1.063 
2 2.63 .106 .437 -.113 .550  .141 1.063 
Negative 
Foil 
1 1.59 .098 .404 .823 .550  .414 1.063 
2 1.60 .095 .390 .988 .550  .745 1.063 
*Scores more than twice the SE, indicating significant skewness or kurtosis 
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Appendix W 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment Two, Exploring Correlations in High and Low 
NA Items 
 
Table W1 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Normality of Separate Scales for High and Low NA at 
Times One, Two and Three 
  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  Shapiro-Wilk 
Scale Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig.  
Calm 1 .278 35 .000  .871 35 .001 
2 .214 35 .000  .915 35 .011 
3 .178 35 .007  .920 35 .014 
Content 1 .151 35 .042  .948 35 .098 
2 .203 35 .001  .832 35 .000 
3 .204 35 .001  .897 35 .003 
Tense 1 .249 35 .000  .904 35 .005 
2 .160 35 .024  .940 35 .054 
3 .172 35 .010  .916 35 .011 
Worried 1 .164 35 .018  .938 35 .049 
2 .237 35 .000  .925 35 .021 
3 .168 35 .014  .922 35 .016 
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Table W2 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis for High and Low NA Scales at 
Times One, Two and Three 
      Skewness  Kurtosis 
Scale Time Mean SE SD  Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Calm 1 .51 .022 .131 
 
.647 .398  1.287 .778 
2 .34 .019 .110  -.570 .398 
 
-.391 .778 
3 .50 .022 .129  -.071 .398 
 
2.693* .778 
Content 1 .57 .024 .140  -.221 .398  .712 .778 
2 .43 .020 .119  -.714 .398  5.504* .778 
3 .50 .020 .118 
 
.903* .398  2.571* .778 
Tense 1 .48 .026 .155  -1.000* .398  1.963* .778 
2 .64 .026 .156  -.285 .398  1.167 .778 
3 .51 .024 .144  -.489 .398  1.358 .778 
Worried 1 .47 .028 .167  .197 .398  1.109 .778 
2 .55 .020 .118  .760 .398  .410 .778 
3 .49 .020 .119  -.749 .398  1.162 .778 
*Scores more than twice the standard error indicating significant skew or kurtosis  
  
 201 
 
Table W3 
Summary of Conversion of Outliers in Raw High and Low NA Data 
 
Scale 
 
Time 
Outlier – 
case no. 
Case 
score 
Mean  
score 
 
SD 
Mean plus 
2 SD 
Calm 3 13 .87 .50 .129 .76 
 3 49 .13 .50 .129 .24 
Content 2 46 .79 .43 .119 .67 
 2 21 .01 .43 .119 .19 
 3 13 .88 .50 .118 .74 
 3 48 .75 .50 .118 .74 
Tense 1 21 .00 .48 .155 .16 
 1 23 .12 .48 .155 .16 
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Table W4 
Summary of Analyses of Normality of Separate Scales for High and Low NA at Times 
One, Two and Three Following Removal of Outliers 
  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  Shapiro-Wilk 
Scale Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig.  
Calm 1 .278 35 .000  .871 35 .001 
2 .214 35 .000  .915 35 .011 
3 177 35 .007  .942 35 .064 
Content 1 .151 35 .042  .948 35 .098 
2 .186 35 .003  .909 35 .007 
3 .202 35 .001  .925 35 .019 
Tense 1 .239 35 .000  .928 35 .025 
2 .160 35 .024  .940 35 .054 
3 .172 35 .010  .916 35 .011 
Worried 1 .164 35 .018  .938 35 .049 
2 .237 35 .000  .925 35 .021 
3 .168 35 .014  .922 35 .016 
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Table W5 
Summary of Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis for High and Low NA Scales at Times 
One, Two and Three Following Removal of Outliers 
      Skewness  Kurtosis 
Scale Time Mean SE SD  Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Calm 1 .51 .022 .131  .647 .398  1.287 .778 
2 .34 .019 .110  -.570 .398  -.391 .778 
3 .50 .019 .112  -.085 .398  .896 .778 
Content 1 .57 .024 .140  -.221 .398  .712 .778 
2 .44 .016 .093  -.430 .398  1.062 .778 
3 .50 .018 .105  .243 .398  .669 .778 
Tense 1 .48 .024 .140  -.479 .398  .441 .778 
2 .64 .026 .156  -.285 .398  1.167 .778 
3 .51 .024 .144  -.489 .398  1.358 .778 
Worried 1 .47 .028 .167  .197 .398  1.109 .778 
2 .55 .020 .118  .760 .398  .410 .778 
3 .49 .020 .119  -.749 .398  1.162 .778 
*Scores more than twice the standard error indicating significant skew or kurtosis  
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Appendix X 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment Two, High NA Data 
 
Table X1 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Normality of High NA Data 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Low 
Anxious 
1 .211 20 .020  .937 20 .214 
2 .110 20 .200  .948 20 .343 
3 .154 20 .200  .907 20 .056 
         
High 
Anxious 
1 .266 15 .005  .928 15 .257 
2 .268 15 .005  .918 15 .176 
3 .260 15 .008  .799 15 .004 
 
Table X2 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis of High NA Data  
    Skewness  Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SE SD Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Low 
Anxious 
 
 
1 .50 .029 .128 -.581 .512  1.535 .992 
2 .64 .042 .187 -.380 .512  .559 .992 
3 .51 .030 .136 .360 .512  2.473* .992 
High 
Anxious 
1 .16 .040 .157 -.311 .580  .000 1.121 
2 .64 .028 .107 .383 .580  1.001 1.121 
3 .51 .041 .157 -1.285 .580  .898 1.121 
          
*Scores more than twice the SE, indicating significant skewness or kurtosis 
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Table X3 
 
Summary of Initial Conversion of Outliers in High NA Data 
 
 
Group 
 
Time 
Outlier 
– case 
no. 
Case 
score 
Mean 
score 
 
SD 
Mean 
+/-  2 
SD 
Low Anxious 3 49 .88 .51 .136 .76 
 
 
 
Table X4 
Summary of Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis of High NA Data Following Conversion 
of Outliers  
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Low 
Anxious 
1 .211 20 .020  .937 20 .214 
2 .110 20 .200  .948 20 .343 
3 .162 20 .181  .930 20 .156 
         
High 
Anxious 
1 .266 15 .005  .928 15 .257 
2 .268 15 .005  .918 15 .176 
3 .260 15 .008  .799 15 .004 
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Table X5 
Summary of Analyses of Normality of High NA Data Following Conversion of 
Outliers  
    Skewness  Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SE SD Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Low 
Anxious 
 
 
1 .50 .029 .128 -.581 .512  1.535 .992 
2 .64 .042 .187 -.380 .512  .559 .992 
3 .51 .027 .121 -.455 .512  1.130 .992 
High 
Anxious 
1 .16 .040 .157 -.311 .580  .000 1.121 
2 .64 .028 .107 .383 .580  1.001 1.121 
3 .51 .041 .157 -1.285 .580  .898 1.121 
          
*Scores more than twice the standard error indicating significant skew or kurtosis  
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Appendix Y 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment Two, Low NA Data 
 
Table Y1 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Normality of Low NA Data 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Low 
Anxious 
1 .200 20 .035  .947 20 .327 
2 .159 20 .200  .959 20 .526 
3 .177 20 .101  .941 20 .250 
         
High 
Anxious 
1 .224 15 .042  .930 15 .273 
2 .253 15 .010  .750 15 .001 
3 .199 15 .115  .893 15 .075 
 
Table Y2 
Summary of Initial Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis of Low NA Data 
    Skewness  Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SE SD Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Low 
Anxious 
 
 
1 .52 .019 .084 .452 .512  1.434 .992 
2 .38 .021 .094 -.165 .512  -.476 .992 
3 .50 .020 .090 -.684 .512  2.239* .992 
High 
Anxious 
1 .56 .035 .137 .866 .580  .471 1.121 
2 .39 .027 .103 -2.395* .580  7.134* 1.121 
3 .50 .035 .136 1.421* .580  3.254* 1.121 
          
*Scores more than twice the standard error indicating significant skew or kurtosis  
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Table Y3 
Summary of Initial Conversion of Outliers in Low NA Data 
 
 
Group 
 
Time 
Outlier 
– case 
no. 
Case 
score 
Mean 
score 
 
SD 
Mean 
+/-  2 
SD 
Low Anxious 3 49 .26 .50 .090 .32 
      
 
High Anxious 2 21 .06 .39 .103 .18 
 3 13 .88 .50 .136 .77 
 
 
 
Table Y4 
Summary of Second Conversion of Outliers in Low NA Data 
 
 
Group 
 
Time 
Outlier 
– case 
no. 
Case 
score 
Mean 
score 
 
SD 
Mean 
+/-  2 
SD 
High Anxious 2 21 .18 .39 .078 .24 
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Table Y5  
Summary of Analyses of Normality Following Conversion of Outliers for Low NA 
Data 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Low 
Anxious 
1 .200 20 .035  .947 20 .327 
2 .159 20 .200  .959 20 .526 
3 .154 20 .200  .970 20 .745 
         
High 
Anxious 
1 .224 15 .042  .930 15 .273 
2 .172 15 .200  .927 15 .246 
3 .152 15 .200  .955 15 .600 
 
Table Y6  
Summary of Analyses of Skew and Kurtosis Following Conversion of Outliers for Low 
NA Data 
    Skewness  Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SE SD Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Low 
Anxious 
 
 
1 .52 .019 .084 .452 .512  1.434 .992 
2 .38 .021 .094 -.165 .512  -.476 .992 
3 .51 .018 .082 -.108 .512  .937 .992 
High 
Anxious 
1 .56 .035 .137 .866 .580  .471 1.121 
2 .40 .017 .067 -.949 .580  .868 1.121 
3 .49 .030 .117 .764 .580  .972 1.121 
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Appendix Z 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment Two, Recognition Data  
 
Table Z1 
Summary of Analyses of Normality of Grouped Recognition Data 
 
Group 
 
Item Type 
Test 
Half 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Low 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 .172 20 .123  .959 20 .521 
2 .118 20 .200  .986 20 .985 
Positive  
Foil 
1 .178 20 .095  .896 20 .035 
2 .135 20 .200  .974 20 .933 
Negative 
Target 
1 .116 20 .200.  .978 20 .899 
2 .185 20 072  .892 20 .029 
Negative 
Foil 
1 .146 20 .200  .948 20 .334 
2 .185 20 .073  .959 20 .530 
High 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 .151 15 .200  .953 15 .570 
2 .202 15 .101  .926 15 .241 
Positive  
Foil 
1 .158 15 .200  .946 15 .459 
2 .154 15 .200  .945 15 .447 
Negative 
Target 
1 .146 15 .200  .947 15 .479 
2 .112 15 .200  .959 15 .681 
Negative 
Foil 
1 .225 15 .040  .928 15 .251 
2 .170 15 .200  .925 15 .233 
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Table Z2 
Summary of Analysis of Skew and Kurtosis of Grouped Recognition Data 
  Test     Skewness  Kurtosis 
Group Item Half Mean SE SD Statistic SE  Statistic SE 
Low 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 2.60 .112 .201 -.034 .512  -.912 .992 
2 2.85 .096 .429 .110 .512  .310 .992 
Positive 
Foil 
1 1.70 .072 .320 .520 .512  .338 .992 
2 1.63 .076 .342 .207 .512  -.494 .992 
Negative 
Target 
1 2.65 .117 .523 -.409 .512  .586 .992 
2 2.69 .136 .609 -.684 .512  -.777 .992 
Negative 
Foil 
1 1.54 .084 .375 .645 .512  -.072 .992 
2 1.64 .086 .383 .514 .512  -.237 .992 
           
High 
Anxious 
Positive 
Target  
1 2.44 .120 .466 -.445 .580  -.402 1.121 
2 2.56 .132 .510 .276 .580  -.175 1.121 
Positive 
Foil 
1 1.44 .072 .280 .292 .580  -.825 1.121 
2 1.53 .095 .367 .822 .580  .996 1.121 
Negative 
Target 
1 2.61 .114 .443 .614 .580  -.354 1.121 
2 2.27 .123 .478 -.043 .580  -.990 1.121 
Negative 
Foil 
1 1.39 .080 .308 .782 .580  .516 1.121 
2 1.47 .098 .381 .748 .580  .368 1.121 
*Scores more than twice the SE, indicating significant skewness or kurtosis 
 
 
 
